EUROPEAN COURT

OF

HUMAN RIGHTS

 Case 47/1991/299/370 Thorgeirson against Iceland
  
SELECTED
D O C U M E N T S
 AND OBSERVATIONS
 forwarded by mr. Thorgeirson
     (in chronological order )
         leshús reykjavík 1991 ©
 
contents:
 
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manifesto 
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cv: english  
cv: français
til baka  
í æviatriði 
til baka 
í stefnuskrá 
 


Contents:
Introduction
Application
A Report to The Commission
1st convicted article
2nd convicted article
Bill of Indictment
 Criminal court defense I
 Criminal court defense II
 Criminal court Judgment
A letter to the Public Prosecutor
A letter to adv S.K.Albertsson
A request for investigation
Supreme court Judgment
Thorgeirson's speech before the Commission of Human Rights
Thorgeirson's speech before the Court of Human Rights
A memorial on the case
Claims under art. 50
Judgment of The Court of Human Rights
Conclusions
 
___________________________________________________________ 

Introduction

 
Thorgeir Thorgeirson:
in process
back
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Conclusions

 
Thorgeir Thorgeirson:
in process
back
 
 
 


Application
 
A formal application is done on a questionnaire the Commission sends to you immediately after having received your complaint. It shall be filled out and returned to the Commission within the six months deadline from the Supreme Court sentence. 

A rich accurate and systematically numbered documentation is of capital importance. 

Translations of the documents involve a considerable cost for those who do not have French or English nationalities, but you can apply for support from the Commission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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1) Name: Thorgeirson 2) First name: Thorgeir 3) Nationality: Icelandic  4) Profession: author 5) Date and place of birth:  30.04.1933 at Hafnarfjördur 6) Resident: Bókhlödustígur 6 B  -  101 Reykjavík  -  Iceland   7) Tel No:  [55]1 66 98 
8) - 12) No answers.
13) The high contracting party: Iceland 14) Statement of the facts: See enclosed: " A Short Report on Case nr. 272/1986 at the Supreme Court of Iceland: The Public prosecutor v/Thorgeir Thorgeirson" and documents in ref. to art. 6 number 1 and number 2 as well as art. 10 of Section 1. Eventually other art. 15) Statement of alleged violations of the convention and of relevant argument: See under II, 14. and enclosed documents about the violations. 16) Final decision: 20.10.1987. Judgment of the Supreme court of Iceland. 17) Other decisions: See: "A Short Report..." which is enclosed. 18) Is any other appeal or remedy available which you have not used? No. 19) Statement on the object of the application: This is the first and - I hope - the last time that I have to be in the situation of an accused person. This has been quite an experience. From the beginning of this overwhelming period I have tried to develope an objective standpoint, which at first was practically impossible, later it was easier. For some time. But the shock first came when I realized that mine was not a case of individual persecution but the com-mon experience af all those  ( ome 3000 persons a year) who happen to be summoned to meet with the people of the Criminal court of Reykjavík. The others had simply kept  silent. Many a thing to my disliking I have had to observe during the last four and a half year. What remains is a feeling of something going essentially wrong in our Judicial system. But I want to be sure and therefore I have decided to send the documentation for your objective, impartial evaluation. Your Court is widely respected and could have a very positive impact upon the situation here, which I see as a potential catastrophe if nothing will be done in the near future. Local possibilities are limited as usually in such cases. That is the reason for my application. 20) Statement concerning other international proceedings: None.
21) Enclosed documents:
a) A Short Report on the case nr. 272/1986 ( a copy)
b) My article "Let us consider now!" that started the whole case. (in Icelandic together with an English translation)
c) My article "Strike while the fly is sitting on my nose!"  (in Icelandic together with an English translation)
d) The Public Prosecutor Thordur Björnsson's letter to the Head of State Criminal Investigation Police, Hallvardur Einvardsson, dated May 21st 1984. ( Icel. copy and Engl. translation)
e) The SCIP report on their interrogation with my statements. (Icel. copy and Engl. translation )
f) The Icelandic Copyright act (art. 4) in English translation.
g) A letter of January 9th 1984 from the Minister of Justice. ( Icel. copy and Engl. translation )
h) Bill of Indictment, dated August 13th 1985.  Issued  by Public prosecutor Thordur Björnsson. (Icel. copy and Engl. transl.)
i) The Criminal Court judgment of June 16th 1986. ( Icel. copy and Engl. translation )
j) The confirmation of Sigurmar K. Albertssons appointment to advocate my appellate case, dated April 10th 1987. (Icel. copy and Engl. translation)
k) My letter of May 14th 1987 to all Supreme Court judges regarding my right according to the law on the Supreme court and according to the Convention art. 6 and art 10 of Sec. I. ( Icel. copy and Engl. translation )
l) My letter of Sept.8 to "advocate" Sigurmar K. Albertsson with my objections against his advocating the case. ( Icel. copy and Engl. translation )
m) My letter of 8/9 1987 to Public prosecutor Hallvardur Einvardsson on the same subject. (Icel. copy and Engl. trl.)
n) A transcript from the Judgment book of the Supreme court: hearing of September 22nd 1987 and  Judgment of October 20th 1987 together with Gaukur Jörundsson's dissenting opinion. (Icel. copy and Engl. translation)
o) My letter of 20/10 1987 to the Secretary of the Supreme court inquiring about documentation and facts of the appointment of the "advocate". ( icel. copy and engl. translation )
p) A letter 27/10 from the Secretary of the Supreme Court with information about the destiny of my letter to the Public prosecutor as well as the appointment of SKA. (Icl.copy & Engl.trl.) Practically each and every point mentioned in the " Short Report" is well documented ( in Icelandic). I neither had time nor means to have everything translated now. Could more documents be introduced at a later stage?
April 8th  1988
  
  
EX QUESTIONAIRE:

A  L I S T  O F  R O L E S

Because Icelandic names are difficult for persons of other nationalities I set up a list of the names and their roles in the case.
We distinguish between three different periodes of the case:
A: from December 1983 to August 1985.
B: August 1985 to August 1986.
C: the year 1987.
                                      During A                                 During B                                During C
Tórdur Björnsson:      issued the prosecution                 partly absent                                 retired
                                                                                                  partly prosecuting
Pétur Gudgeirsson:     Debuty at Public prosecut-          Prosecuting
                                            or's  Investigation                           Judge.
                                                    Office
Hallvardur Einvardsson:  Head of SCIP during                                        Public prosecutor
                                              interrogations                                                   during Supr.Court
                                                                                                                                                      procedures 
    With regards:
________________________________
Thorgeir Thorgeirson (sign) 
 
 
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Doc. a) Icel. 272/1986
A Report to The Commission of Human Rights
on The Case Nr.272/1986 at The Supreme Court of Iceland: The Public Prosecutor v/ Thorgeir Thorgeirson.
 
 
Each item of the report is supported by one or more documents (see: list of documents in application
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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1983: The 7th and the 20th of December I published two articles on police brutality in the daily Morgunbladid. 

1983: The 27th of December the solicitor of the Association of Policemen in Reykjavík asked for an Official Investigation of those texts. 

1984: The 21st of May Public Prosecutor Thordur Björnsson sent the case to The State Criminal Investigation Police for examination. The Head of SCIP at that time was Hallvardur Einvardsson who later had the role of Public Prosecutor for the same case at the Supreme Court. 

1984: The 18th of June I was interrogated at the SCIP Headquarters where I gave answers to all questions asked by two Policemen, protesting though against their methods of examination: 

    1): Isolated words and parts of sentences were being taken out of context and misinterpreted - to my disadvantage. 

    2):The interrogators were Policemen and thus not in the position to conduct an impartial examination, the subject matter being my texts on the professional errors of their companions - if not their own errors.

1985: The 13th of August: Public Prosecutor Thordur Björnsson issued a Bill of Indictment against me based on the SCIP-"examination" and referring to the Art.108 ( on Offense against State Officials ) of The General Penal Law Nr. 19/1940. I have from the very beginning considered this document a violation of Art. 4 of The Law nr. 73/1972 ( on Copyright and Protection of Authorship ). My composed texts have been altered to enable a misleading interpretation serving the aim of the Prosecutor. The correct neutral interpretation of the text obviously being crucial in a case like this. 

1985: The 17th of September Judge Pétur Gudgeirsson ( formerly employed by Public Prosecutor Thordur Björnsson where PG was working during  the period this case had  been treated by that Office ) conducted the first session of The Criminal Court Trials. The session was not recorded on tape ( although this is obligatory according to Law nr. 74/1974: on Criminal Procedure ). Nor was any of the following sessions, which all were conducted by Judge Gudgeirsson. The Public Prosecutor abstained from Court which immediately caused a lot of confusion. Judge Gudgeirsson claimed to be representing the Prosecution as well, which seems to be the practice at The Criminal Court of Reykjavík. In the situation he was unwilling to accept my note on the Prosecutor's Bill of Indictment being unlawful, thus my bearings on this matter couldn't reach the Protocol of The CC until I had published them in a letter to the Judge in a daily and formally claimed the article to be numbered among the Documents of the case. 

1985: The 24th of September my advocate, Tómas Gunnarsson, claimed the abdication and replacement of Judge Pétur Gudgeirsson on the basis that a Judge representing Prosecution in Court instantly becomes adverse to the cause of the defendant and thus involved in the case he is to judge. Adv. Gunnarsson also pointed out that our Constitution does not allow such endorsement of Prosecution. 

1985: The 25th of September CC-Judge Pétur Gudgeirsson pronounced the following Judicial Decision of his: "Defendant's Thorgeir Thorgeirsson's claim that the Judge of this case be replaced by another person is overruled". 

1985: The 25th of September advocate Gunnarsson (on my behalf) by telegram appealed Judge Gudgeirsson's Decision (of the same date) to The Supreme Court of Iceland. 

1985: The 26th of September The Public Prosecutor's obstruction (motivated by Art. 171 of the Law nr. 74/1974) of my appeal was conveyed in a letter to CC-Judge Gudgeirsson. 

1985: The 30th of September adv. Gunnarsson published an open letter to The Minister of Justice, Jón Helgason, in a daily of Reykjavík introducing to Mr. Helgason the situation of my case, objecting to many violations of good rules and prevailing Law that the Police, the Public Prosecutor and the Criminal Court had been executing. 

1985: The 9th of October Public Prosecutor Björnsson suddenly was present in Court ordering his former employee, the Honorable Judge Gudgeirsson, around. Adv. Gunnarsson made his announcement that Art. 171 of the Law nr. 74/1974, used as motivation for the Prosecutor's obstruction formerly mentioned, was contrary to Art. 1 and Art. 60 of our Consti- tution. He asked for a suspension of the Court until the Ministry had responded to his letter of sept. 30th and decided weather an appeal to the Supreme Court would be allowed. 

1985: The 18th of October The Ministry of Justice addressed a letter to adv. Gunnarsson supporting the Public Prose- cutor's obstruction of my appeal. "The Ministry has considered the matter and finds no reason to support your plea" Signed by Thorsteinn Geirsson and Thorsteinn A. Jónsson. 

1985: The 23rd of October adv. Gunnarsson published an open letter to all Members of Parliament (Alþingi) explaining the situation of my case, reminding of the Parliamentarian's duty to survey the righteous conduct of Court. 

1985: The 25th of October I published the formerly mentioned letter to the Judge in a daily of Reykjavík where I declared the Prosecutor's Bill of Indictment unlawful and put forward some 
explanations of my accused texts that CC-Judge Gudgeirsson had been unwilling to notice in Court. 

1985: The 25th of October the case was tried in presence of Public Prosecutor Björnsson who accepted that Gunnarsson's letter to the Parliamentarians and my letter to the Judge were numbered among Documents of the case. Adv. Gunnarsson once again insisted on the appeal to the SC being allowed to proceed. I was questioned about things completely irrelevant to my case and gave answers to all the questions asked. 

1985: The 11th of November adv. Gunnarsson, in a letter to CC-Judge Gudgeirsson, asked for a " copy of any conclusion of the concerned Association of Policemen of Reykjavík insisting on the official investigation of Thorgeirsons's articles ". 

1985: The 15th of November Einar Bjarnason, the Chairman of the Association of Policemen of Reykjavík testfied before the Court in presence of the Public Prosecutor that there " probably was existing some document " concerning the Association's wish to start this investigation, " at least " he could " remember the case being discussed ". 

1986: The 17th of January CC-Judge Gudgeirsson received a negative answer from the Secretary of the Association of Policemen who didn't wish to forward any such conclusion of  theirs. 

1986: The 31st of January adv. Gunnarsson in Court stressed the fact that the Association of Policemen had failed to forward any evidence of their wish to start this case which left the Court without any legal body having asked for this "  investigation ". Thus the case should be dismissed. 

1986: The 28th of April the Public Prosecutor announced in Court that he was not going to deliver any verbal or written motivations of his prosecution in the case, nor was he going to be present at my verbal vindication, which of course left the Defense in a difficult position, having no concrete argumentation to oppose. 

1986: The 16th of June CC-Judge Pétur Gudgeirsson sentenced me to 8 days of prison and payment of all costs. The strange thing about his motivation of this Sentence is that it rather sounds like a Prosecution text - which only is natural considering the fact that by abstaining from this last stage of the Trials Public Prosecutor Björnsson factually handed the power of Prosecution again to the Judge. Thus Mr. Gudgeirsson brings into the motivation of his sentence, composed of course after the delivery of my defense, numerous citations to judge made law and other "arguments" that neither had been mentioned to me nor to my advocate during the Trials. This is insufficient jurisprudence. If any. Another strange part of the CC-sentence was a very strict note my advocate, Tómas Gunnarsson, got for misconduct and offense of the Court and the Prosecutor during trials. Astonished by this highly unfair and professionally inconvenient note he contacted the Court asking for an explanation, and was then informed that his offense consisted in asking both the Judge and the Public Prose- cutor to pass a test to confirm if they really were literate. But those had been  my  words towards the end of the CC-trials as I finally got tired of the limited understanding of my texts the two Honorable Gentlemen under the circumstances could allow themselves. 

1986: The 16th of June I appealed the case to The Supreme Court of Iceland and this time the appeal was granted by Public Prosecutor Björnsson. Due to the above mentioned note adv. Gunnarsson had got, he felt obliged to defend himself in the case which made him too involved to represent my interests. In this situation I decided to take over the Defense myself ( in accordance with Art. 6, 3 c of Section I of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Co E ) as well as a similar Art. ( 49 ) in prevailing local Law on The Supreme Court of Iceland nr.75/1973 ). 

1987: The 4th of March I advertised this my decision in a letter to Magnus Thoroddsen, the President of The Supreme Court of  Iceland, referring to many a precedent of others defending their own cases at the SC. In the same letter I listed up 12 different points on violation of good rule and prevailing Law being executed by the Public Prosecutor, the Police and the CC-Judge during the "investigation", many of which I already mentioned in this report. 

1987: The 9th of March the Honorable President of the SC informed me that my wish to defend my own case had not been granted. 

1987: The 11th of March I firmly protested in a registered letters to all the members of The Supreme Court of Iceland and had my Correspondence with the SC-President officially published in a daily of Reykjavík under the title  ANALFABETISMUS REGALIS (Royal Analfabetism). 

1987: The 6th of May adv. Sigurmar K. Albertson came to my home and informed me, verbally,  that the 10th of april 1987 the President of The Supreme Court, Magnús Thoroddsen, had appointed him to defend my case at The Supreme Court. I immediately protested against this unlawful procedure and expressed my unwillingness to rely on SKA's assistance for a minute of my life. I also pointed out that SKA's conduct was more than questionable: hiding for over three weeks the fact that he secretly had taken over my interests. 

1987: The 7th of May I protested again in registered letters to all Judges of the SC referring to my constitutional rights and other legal rights already mentioned in this document. A copy was sent to the Ministry of Justice. Without result. 

1987: The 22nd of September Case 272/1986 was before the Supreme Court (see encl. documents) with Sigurmar K. Albertsson as my " advocate ". 

1987: The 22nd of September I handed over a letter to the new Public Prosecutor, Hallvardur Einvardsson (former Head of the SCIP during the period they had "examined" the same case). This letter contained my plea for an Official Investigation of the appointment of Sigurmar K. Albertsson as my " advocate " and a list of other details. A copy also was handed over to the President of the sitting SC as well as Mr. Albertsson, before the trial started (see encl. documents ). The SC-trial being held all the same I have interpreted as the Public Prosecutor's de facto rejection of my plea. 

1987: The 20th of October the SC-Judges: Gudmundur Jónsson, Gudmundur Skaftason, Arnljótur Björnsson and Magnús Þ.Torfason issued their Confirmation of the sentence of the Criminal Court. But SC-Judge Gaukur Jörundsson issued a Special Vote based on his concept of our Constitution ( see encl. documents ). Whereby all domestic remedies in the case have been exhausted. 

Conclusion: I hereby complain of the Icelandic State's violation of Art. 6, 3 c of Sec.I and Art. 10 of Sec.I of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe.  And  the violation of eventually other Art. that further consideration might add to the list. 

___________________________________ 
Thorgeir Thorgeirson ( sign ) 
 
 
 

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doc. h) Icel. 272/1986
 
BILL OF INDICTMENT
Presented at the Criminal Court of Reykjavik; 10.09.1985 
 
 
 
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR announces: 
That a case is to proceed before the criminal court of  Reykjavík against author Thorgeir Thorgeirsson, domiciled at Bókhlödustígur 6 B, Reykjavík, born 30th of april 1933 at Hafnarfjördur, for defamatory imputations against policemen in two articles published in Morgunbladid. The first article bearing the title "Let us consider now" and the subtitle " An open letter to minister of justice Jón Helgason " appeared the 7th of December 1983. The second article bearing the title "Strike while the fly is sitting on my nose..." appeared the 20th of the same month and year. 

 I. 

In the first article the following imputations are considered to be defamatory: 
 

1. In paragraph 3: " uniformed beasts "
2. In paragraph 6: " of those uniformed beasts "
3. In paragraph 6: " That boy's room-mates told me that his injuries had been caused by bouncers of a restaurant and some policemen. I refrained from believing this instantly so I inquired among the hospital staff and; Yes, right they were: there we had a victim of the Reykjavík night squad."
4. In paragraph 12: "Then I found out that most people knew various stories of persons who had had a similar or even worse experience from the uniformed beasts. Individuals had been brought back to the intellectual capacity of a new-born child as a result of choke holds that policemen and bouncers learn  and  use with brutal  spontaneity instead of handling people with prudence and care. Such stories are abundant and you can hardly treat them as simple lies any more."
5. In paragraph 13: " victims of our police brutality "
6. In paragraph 15: "allowing brutes and sadists to practice their perverted mentality..."
 II. 

In the second article the following imputations are considered to be defamatory: 

1. In paragraph 46: "Captain Bjarnason's behavior was so typical of what gradually is becoming the public opinion of our police force in defense: Bullish falsifications, illegal actions, superstition, hasted stupidity."
 III. 

The aforecited defamatory imputations that are directed against members of the Reykjavík police force without naming or assigning of individuals are considered to violate art. 108 of the general penal law nr. 19/1940.  

The claim is that the defendant be punished and sentenced to pay all costs of the case. 

The Public Prosecutor Office, Reykjavík, 
13th of August 1985. 

   (signed) Thordur Björnsson 
  (stamped) Public Prosecutor Reykjavík 

2 

The case will proceed at the criminal court of Reykjavík, helot at Borgartún 7, court room A, Tuesday the 10th of Sept- ember 1985 at 10 o'clock  and the defendant is summoned to appear in court to hear the suit, answer it and hear his sentence. 

Chamber of Criminal 
Courts, Reykjavík, 
the 9th of Sept. 1985. 

   (signed) Pétur Gudgeirsson 
 (stamped) The Criminal Court of Reykjavík 

 
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doc. I) 1991/13778/88
Defendant's Brief and Exposition of Claims in
Criminal Court Case No. 3445/1983:
The Public Prosecutor against Thorgeir Thorgeirson.
Adv. Tómas Gunnarsson:
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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I present this case on behalf of Thorgeir Thorgeirson, 
residing at Bókhlöðustígur 6B in Reykjavík, national registry number 9563-3005, and I exhibit the following: 

This Brief and Exposition of Claims. Also the defendant's exposition with attached documents, i.e. a judgment in French, pronounced in Paris in 1857 over Gustave Flaubert, with documents relating to that judgment; a photocopy from Helgarpósturinn of 17 October 1985, an article on Sigurjón Sigurðsson, director of police in Reykjaík then in office; an article by Helgi Skúli Kjartansson in Lesbók Morgunblaðsins from 9 November 1985, and an article by Álfrún Gunnlaugsdóttir and Matthías Viðar Sæmundsson in Morgunblaðið of 27 May 1986. 

The defendant requests that the case be dismissed from court or that he be acquitted of all charges, and that he be indemnified and his counsel granted lawyer's fees on account of the proceedings in the lower instance; his counsel kr. 25,000.-, and himself kr. 50,000.-. 

I reiterate the main points relating to facts of the case. The defendant has been working as an author for many years and enjoyed the recognition of public authorities, as shown i.a. by the payment of author's salaries. His work has been conducted under the protection of the final provision of Article 72 of the Constitution, which reads: "Censorship or other limitations to freedom of press may never be enacted." 
The defendant is indicted on account of individual words and sentences contained in the his two newspaper articles "Let Us Consider Now", and "Strike While the Fly Is on My Nose...", published in Morgunblaðið on 7 and 20 December 1983. 

The articles are not directed against particular public servants on account of their duties in public office. Their aim is rather to bring judicial authorities to endeavor to limit and prevent maltreatment and permanent injury inflicted on the citizens by policemen on duty. The Minister of Justice has replied to the writings of the defendant, and stated that the matter would be considered. 

Efforts to have the Reykjavík Police Association publish or exhibit its decision or resolution to lodge a complaint on account of the defendant's writings have been unsuccessful, cf. court exhibit no. XXII, and it is not certain, either, that such a resolution has been made, cf., the testimony of Einar Bjarnason, chairman of the Reykjavík Police Association, in criminal court on 15 November 1985. No individual public servant has lodged a complaint on account of the defendant's writings. 

The person to whom a reference is made in the defendant's earlier article was not Trausti Elliðason, notwithstanding the fact that the prosecution has made that assumption and exhibited evidence relating to him. As the case has progressed no confirmation of Trausti Elliðason's connections to the defendant's earlier article has been discovered. 

The Public Prosecutor has not attended to his duties relating to the conduct of this case. He has not made an appearance during all court sessions when the case has been brought up; he was not in attendance, e.g., when a videotape of a program broadcast on Television 13 December 1983 was shown. 
During the program policemen discussed the defendant's work in an unjust and illegal manner without an opportunity being offered him to answer on television; besides, allegations were made by others in the course of the program concerning the exercise of police duties, which were not less serious than those made in the defendant's writings. The Public Prosecutor has not submitted a brief in support of his claims in the indictment after the case has been treated in criminal court, and does not plan to do so in the criminal court. 

Arguments Relating to the Facts and the Law: The defendant's arguments in support of dismissal and acquittal are the following: The indictment constitutes an infringement on the part of the prosecution authority of the defendant's rights. His articles are cut down into individual sentences and words, in violation of Article 4 para. 2 of the Copyright Act, no. 73/1972, which reads: "Altering the product of a copyright holder, or publishing his product in such a manner or in such context as to prejudice his artist's honor or individuality, is prohibited." This conduct must result in dismissal of the case. 

The prosecution has waived submitting a brief in criminal court in support of the indictment. This means both that the prosecution authority has ceased prosecuting its case, and  therefore  the  case  should be terminated or acquittal granted for that reason alone. This also has the effect that preconditions for the defense counsel's work are lacking. After evidence has been collected in criminal court he lacks knowledge of the arguments the prosecution may employ when the case is submitted for adjudication. Thus the conditions as regards the substance of the arguments of the defense counsel are lacking, and he can not justly or equitably be expected to reply to arguments of which he may have very limited knowledge. The case should be dismissed from court on these grounds alone. 

As regards particular points of law relating to alleged violations of Article 108 of the General Penal Code no. 19/1940, the defendant wishes to state that it was not his intention to vituperate or insult or bring forth defamatory allegations against any particular public servant on account of the discharge of his duty; nor has any public servant lodged a complaint. 

I also call attention to the fact that the Morgunblaðið published the defendant's articles in about 40,000 copies. If anyone "brought forth" alleged insults or other expressions covered by the Article it is clearly Morgunblaðið. 

It is right and very proper to draw attention to activity which may cause physical injury, bring it to light, and request official action to prevent it. Such indications command little attention unless published in the media, and even that frequently goes unnoticed. Strong words and stylistic artifices also seem necessary to awaken people. This fact is better known by authors and various specialists than by the general public. 
Each of the last three points should by themselves suffice to bring about acquittal of the prosecution's charges. 

Disclosure can not be avoided of the fact that the defendant has doubted the technical and subjective ability of the judge of the case, and of the Public Prosecutor, to read, and requested an investigation of this and an entry into the record, which request went unheeded. For this reason and to this extent the court session of 28 April 1986 was wrongly recorded. This is a source of great concern, to say the least. 

The defendant's request was prompted by the indications of authors from various countries whom the defendant met in West Germany last winter. In their opinion the case of the defendant resembled in various ways cases from the Soviet Union, as they considered that judges and other holders of power read laws and other rules almost exclusively with the understanding desirable in the view of the authorities, not objectively. It is also well known that language used by public authorities and various experts is so different from ordinary spoken language that it is very difficult and sometimes impossible for the general public to understand the authorities. There are also examples of authorities misunderstanding other authorities. 

Reading is highly important in connection with the case of the defendant. It is most important that his articles are read in their entirety, but not as individual words or sentences. The lawyer of the Police Association, Svala Thorlacius, seems originally to have understood this, cf. her letter in court exhibit  no.  III, of  27 December 1983. Later, an indication was received from the office of the Public Prosecutor to the effect that individual words and sentences should be taken out of the articles. The Office of the Public Prosecutor also seems to consider that not all provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no.  74/ 1974, need to be taken seriously, such as the beginning of Article 20 and also a provision of the same Act stipulating that the prosecution is to safeguard what may bring about acquittal of the defendant or work in his favor. Various other conduct of the prosecution authority indicates that it does not derive the common understanding from reading laws, rather an understanding which suits financial appropriations to the Office and other condit- ions pertaining to it. 

The judge of the case, Pétur Guðgeirsson, seems to read and understand the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Copyright Act in a similar way as the prosecution authority, as evidenced by his decision of 25 September 1985 of not to withdraw. The request for the judge's withdrawal was based on his tolerating the above infringements of law with a case in progress in criminal court. 

I also call attention to the court session of 10 September 1985, where the following was recorded: 
"The judge mentions that the indictment was served the defendant at his home yesterday, summoning him to appear in court at 10 a.m. today." Attention is drawn to this as the following had been written on the indictment: "The above case will be brought up in a session of the Criminal Court of Reykjavík Tuesday 10 September 1985 at 10.00 a. m., and  the  defendant is summoned to appear in court at that time to hear the charges, conduct his defense, and receive judgment 

Reykjavík 9 September 1985. 
Bjarni Matthíasson (sign.)" 
 

In the defendant's opinion the above points are conducive to doubt as regards the judge's ability to read; however, the defendant trusts him to read French, cf. the document exhibited. 

I refer again to the requests and arguments made, and in support of them I refer to the documents exhibited, in so far as they support the defendant's claims. 
In particular I refer to the defendant's articles which have been exhibited, such as his exposition and the defense counsel's letter on court exhibit no. 12. 

I submit the case for adjudication. 

Reykjavík 3 June 1986. 

                                    Respectfully, 

<signature> Tómas Gunnarsson, Advocate
Court Exhibit  
No. XXVII: The Reykjavík Criminal Court, 3.6.1986   PG  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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CASE NO. 3445/1983
BEFORE THE REYKJAVÍK CRIMINAL COURT
Exposition on the part of the defendant,
Thorgeir Thorgeirson:
a written statement 

To the Criminal Court of Reykjavík. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

back 

INTRODUCTION 
(To the Judge) 
During the more than one and a half years I have had to stand as accused owing to the performance of my duty I have repeatedly asked that a specialist assistant judge be called to read and understand my texts, the ones that Mr. Þórður Björnsson, Public Prosecutor, has indicted me for having written. This petition of mine is not in the slightest conflict with legal custom in comparable cases, and is all the more natural since it has become more apparent with every successive court session that the driving force behind the actions of the prosecution is clearly some kind of illiteracy, concomittant with a predilection for derangement and a lack of objectivity. The petition has been turned down, as have also my frequently repeated requests that the petition at least be entered into the record. It is also a fact that few entries have been made into the record on my initiative, except if I have first written about the matter in the news-papers. All this has detracted from my faith in the legal system as a whole and in the people who have to such a large extent allowed their own personal whims to influence the development of a case which originated in a mere  request for an "investigation". I have now received an oral promise (but been refused to have it recorded, as usual), that I will be permitted to "speak" when the case is prosecuted and defended in court. At that time I thought I knew that the case would be argued orally. Since then the prosecution judicial authority has capriciously seen fit to deny oral presentation. Nevertheless I am led to believe that I shall be permitted to speak. As my trust is now at its end I feel entitled to doubt this, and I resort to delivering my exposition in written form - as it would surely be too obvious an attempt to make me ridiculous if I were to speak at an assembly where others have waived their right to speak. 
As I now decide to deliver my exposition in writing I yet again raise my petition that the judge call an assistant judge on whom all parties may agree: to read and interpret for himself the texts here at issue, their coherence and their message in its entirety. Also, to adjudge whether the treatment of my texts in the indictment conforms to the practices of civilized nations in such a situation - in other words whether the indictment does not constitute a violation of the Copyright Act and of  international agreements which our country is duty bound to observe. In this document I reserve for myself a wider freedom of  expression to the extent dictated by the necessity of explanation. 

A FEW FACTS 
I.  The Reykjavík police have repeatedly been observed in the act of taking advantage of circumstances for hurting people. Sometimes this is done inadvertently; sometimes not. The same applies to doormen at restaurants. Sometimes these two groups even cooperate among themselves. Irrefutable reports and medical inspection certificates can be made available to prove this. Even the courts have verified this. And this also fits very well with the conclusions of studies performed abroad, where humanity is, naturally, of the same species as we here, possessing similar inclinations and weaknesses. My personal stance as regards this fact is not expressed in my article "Let Us Consider Now", except in the sentence: " I have seen our policemen perform many a good deed and some of the very fine people I know are policemen. 
  We cannot do without them ". 
  The Public Prosecutor's indictment seeks to conceal this sentence. 
  But why? 

II.  It has not proved possible to bring Icelandic authorities to perform a realistic and objective study of these matters. Nor is it they who suffer battery by defective policemen and doorkeepers. Except in rare cases. And such cases may be solved by simpler methods. 

III. It is of course the general public that suffers battery by policemen and doorkeepers. Such an experience is quite memorable, and, in the normal way of things, one person tells another. In that process descriptions frequently tend to become exaggerated. As the instances increase in number a public opinion is formed, which naturally is more rough-hewn, even, than the problem itself. To a significant extent, I used this public opinion as a main feature of my article "Let Us Consider Now". Public opinion is, of course, a fact by itself, and its causes are generally of less import and more agreeable. The two must be kept separated, since for example criticism of a landscape painting can never be regarded as a condemnation of the terrain where the painter stood while he applied the colors to the canvas, can it? 

IV.  If public opinion turns sour confidence in policemen is lost, also in policemen who never have as much as hurt a fly. In the autumn of 1983 this loss of confidence had assumed proportions outright dangerous for public welfare. So, when the case of Skafti Jónsson emerged, I became aware of this danger. And my oft mentioned article published in Morgunblaðið of 7 December 1983 was my reaction to this dangerous situation. By writing the article I considered myself performing the duty of an honorable writer who studies the spirit of the nation and reports his findings without any eva ions. This is clear to any person who is willing to read the article in its entirety using the whole of his mental faculties to perceive what is written there. 

V.   The article is, of course, especially written for persons who are completely literate, even though there is no possibility of preventing persons who read badly from viewing the text in their own way. But I can naturally not assume legal responsibility for such faults on the part of my readership, unless I waive my constitutional right of freedom of expression. Unfortunately, the reactions of the Police Association and later of the Public Prosecutor have their origins in the confused manner of reading which often is due to psychiatric disturbances, mental excitation, or proclivities which I still less desire to discuss. 

THE FACTS CONNECTED 
Since public opinion was, I thought, the main danger in this case, I made it the main theme of the article "Let Us Consider Now". For the most part I disregarded Fact I, as I was aware that such assertions would be in conflict with Article 108 of the General Penal Code, which I, admittedly, regard as a silly relic of the past, but wanted to honor in full all the same. The article was intentionally written in such a way as to avoid violating the law, but at the same time to pose a question pressing enough to reach the ears of people through the background noise of the media. And there was a trap, to be sure, in borrowing the cars from Hannes Sigfússon's poetic simile of the Reykjavík night, and turning them into police vehicles (cf. court exhibit no. XVII). A trap into which the board of the Police Association stumbled directly - out of their wits, and absolutely illiterate with rage and fury. 
But the main purpose of the article, and its conclusion, was the request to the Minister to have an investigation carried out on whether public opinion is correct or incorrect. The article was intended as a lawful, urgent question. 

WHAT ARE THE ANSWERS? 
Even though my intention was to write an article completely within the limits of the law I shall not hide the fact that I also tried to phrase the text in such a way as to elicit answers from the parties concerned. The question, of course, was about the truthfulness of the menacing public opinion. If this were mere falsehood the police authorities (who alone may possess comprehensive knowledge of these matters) could be expected to react in the composed, confident and calm manner of respectable, honest souls. The board of the Police Association and the director of police would simply have recommended to the Minister that he initiate at the earliest opportunity impartial investigation of the matter asked for. Such a reaction would also have calmed the public considerably, as it would have borne witness to good faith. 
The other possibility was naturally that there might be some reality behind the rumor, in which case the reaction of the police would be different, because violence has always been characteris tic of the behavior of those who are aware of their insecurity and exposedness. 
And the reaction was worse than I possibly ever could have imagined. Alas. 
But my question has certainly received an exceedingly clear answer. It has now been under way for two and a half years, and been provided by many and powerful parties. Of that I shall not complain, as an author's mission should be asking society questions which demand its direct answers. And certainly I have been answered, by the holders of authority as well as by the public. 
I would now like to describe those answers. 

THE REACTIONS OF POLICE LEADERS 
The chairman of the Police Association, Einar Bjarnason - who seems to me a particularly truthful person as well as speaking very good Icelandic - he testified in court. A study of his testimony shows how police leaders reacted to their own understanding of my article in Morgunblaðið of 7 December 1983. 
During the following days these defenders of the law decided to occupy themselves ( outside working hours ) with breaking into the computerized files of the City Hospital to seek out a suitable person who had been at the hospital at the same time as myself. And in this way they found a lad of meager import whom they somehow persuaded to sign a highly dubious document which they themselves had composed and typed. Then they violated the Broadcasting Act in order to introduce this counterfeit product of theirs to the public. All these illegal acts were committed with the purpose of "cleansing the police" of charges of which they never were, in fact, accused directly. Much to his credit, Bjarnason has acknowledged all this, and has taken a large part of the blame on himself, even though he made the mistake of denying the existence of this notable document, as he carelessly forgot the fact that it had been preserved in the State Broadcasting Service's tape collection. And this may also have been due to his lack of memory, without ostentation. He also made it completely clear that the comrades had done these shady deeds as private individuals, not as servants of the authorities. I have called this conduct on the part of the companions "bullish falsifications, illegal actions, superstition, hashed stupidity". Of course I am aware that these words are harsh, but I shall stand firm in their defense if action by reason of them is brought against me in a civil court. And then the policemen will also have to answer for the acts which caused these words to be expressed. But I have so far failed to grasp how a prosecutor in his senses, who also has numerous times appeared sober in this criminal court, can bring himself to indict for violation of Article 108 of the General Penal Code, no. 19 of 1940, on this account. Could it be that this primitive, crude attitude, which has deprived the guardians of the law of their prudence as well as of their knowledge of reading, is either infectious or simply programmed into the system in its entirety? 

REACTIONS OF THE PUBLIC 
After my writings were published in Morgunblaðið in December 1983 it so happened that a multitude of people began to contact me. Probably in their thousands rather than hundreds. They stopped me on the street, they phoned me, and they sent me letters to describe their experiences with the police. Nobody to back the police, though. Even if I assumed that every second person was playing with my gullibility and relating fiction, the information was outright awesome. What was most disturbing about this, was, however, that whenever the police had handled a man or a woman roughly, the victim seemed to grab the phone and call me, whether by day or night. Some of this was just confounded nonsense and pure self-pity, because police must of course do their jobs, and then blandness won't always do. But in between there were examples of bad mistakes that need not have been made. I paid attention to this reaction of the public and compared it to the reaction of the system described above, because I regard myself an employee of the public, and not a servant of any authorities. All the handshakes, phone calls and letters were accompanied by endless thanks for "courage", "frankness", even "daring". People sometimes call obvious things all sorts of strange names. 
Remarkably, the victims very suddenly stopped phoning - almost as if a finger had been snapped - sometime early in 1984. The frequency of the calls was not progressively reduced, as could have been expected. Unfortunately I did not realize this until it was too late to make a note of the date. But I would like to defer discussing that point until later and in a different connection. When bringing up the question of what good may have come from my struggle. 

THE REACTIONS OF OFFICIALDOM, THE COURT, AND OF MEMBERS OF THE ALTHING 
My lawyer will, of course, conduct his fencing with the united prosecution and judicial authority about the sinister violations of law which have been committed in order to sustain this action against me. All the same I can not remain silent about my amazement at how the prosecution and the jud- iciary have joined in interpreting the entire case in the primitive, illiterate way of the police; how explicit statute provisions have been violated in the direct purpose of evading the assignment of having to read my text (two short newspaper articles) with the coherence demanded by the ethics of civilized society. And I may well add that I was not less surprised when it came to light that neither did the Ministry feel able to read the Copyright Act or other texts when required. And it was like putting the final touch on my amazement when the Althing also turned out to suffer from illiteracy of the same bizarre kind. 
On the basis of this experience I have compiled a little theory. 

ILLITERACY (ANALFABETISMUS) AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POWER 
Illiteracy was probably an effective instrument of power in the hands of the ruling classes of society ever since laws and subsequently other texts were first written down. During the middle ages and until modern times the illiteracy of the masses provided the power elite with the opportunity of interpreting (in their own favor) all laws, whether religious or secular. One might have expected this instrument to become blunt at first, and then ineffective as public literacy progressed. But traditional instruments of power are tough, as history shows, and very often they survive those radical revolutions, which actually do not kill anything except the revolutionaries themselves (to enable the old instruments of power to survive in a new form). In our present day illiteracy is still the most potent instrument of the ruling groups, but not illiteracy of the public, who now read with ease. The classes in power just become illiterate instead, with respect to anything that does not suit the interests of ruling groups and elites. This illiteracy is, evidently, of the mind, coming from within, due to psychological needs and a disturbed self-image. This illiteracy is the sister of violence. 
Whole books could be written about this - for those able to read. And maybe it will be done. 
It would be done in defence of the human being as it originally was. 
But that is probably of little concern to the criminal court. 

HAVE MY WRITINGS DONE ANY GOOD ? 
The answer to the question is: YES. 
I have discovered a law of illiteracy as an instrument of power. That's one thing. Then the police; they seem to have improved somewhat from this. I mentioned before how suddenly the phone calls of their victims stopped. 
Naturally an order from above could have been the reason. At first I was reluctant to believe it. Then I began to hear stories of tact and surprising calmness evinced by police in the most difficult situations. Of this I was informed by night owls from the nightlife jungle. Could a new policy have been instituted? I asked myself, but did not venture to answer in the affirmative until late in the autumn of 1985. At that time the newspapers published two works which somehow managed to convince me. On 7 October I read in the Helgarpósturinn a particularly convincing "close-up" of chief of police Sigurjón Sigurðsson. The article reflected well the discipline he maintained of his men. Thus, a simple command of his could readily have solved the problem here under discussion. And there are few things more probable than that a man of his intelligence was displeased the confessions of his men, made by their reactions to my writings. He may even have thought that the Public Prosecutor also went too far as the matter continued. That was an opinion frequently heard in town by then. The scale was tipped, however, by a writing published in Lesbók Morgunblaðisins on 7 November 1985, in which these matters were approached from an entirely new angle. There, a young and rising historian wrote a panegyric of the Reykjavík police force. Only a year earlier such a literary work would have been received as pure mockery. A wise man has, admittedly, called the work a dissertation for fulfilling the requirements for membership of the Oddfellows - or perhaps some other society of equal distinction, and the author a son in-law of Eimskip Ltd. But that was only said in order to please me. The writer believed that I could not stand hearing anything good about the police. In which he was mistaken. I do think it most improbable that a historian of Helgi Skúli Kjartansson's capacities would write anything at all about the police's recovery unless he knew to his certainty according to reliable sources. And felt certain, too, that such recovery was in progress. However, sycophancy goes a little too far when the police are praised for their chivalry at Austurvöllur on 30 March 1949. But it remains unaltered that the historian was aware of something that made him prophetic as he wrote. 
And may his words stand. 
From all this I draw the simple conclusion that the debate ensuing from the publication of my writings in December 1983 led to some kind of improvement of the behaviour of the police. Which is good. 
I also regard it as important to have had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the working methods of the criminal court, and being shocked by them. I gather that the court handles about 3,500 cases annually, which statistically amounts to the entire nation standing charged of crime in slightly more than 70 years. If other defendants are treated in a manner similar to myself this means plainly that the Office of the Public Prosecutor conducts relentless warfare against the nation as a whole. If similar arbitrariness and injustice are employed in other defendants' cases - and there is hardly any reason to suppose that I am an exception - then this is a problem of which an honest writer must be thoroughly aware. 
And I should be grateful. 

FINAL WORDS 
(to the Judge) 
The two writings which I have been indicted for publishing are both written for the sake of the public good, as I regard myself an employee of the public, not a slave of the authorities at all. The construction and composition of the earlier writing 
(" Let Us Consider Now ") is directly of such nature as to nowhere fall under the scope of Article 108 of the General Penal Code. That ought to be evident to any completely literate person. The later writing ("Strike While the Fly Is On My Nose") concerns activities of a more than dubious nature performed by Reykjavík law enforcement officers as private individuals outside working hours, while the sinister deeds in question, to be sure, were a reaction on their part to my writing about them in their capacities as law enforcement officers. Even if the suitability of Article 108 were recognized I fail to see that it can protect violations of law dabbled in by public servants in their spare time. That matter must pertain to the Civil Court, unless martial law is declared in Iceland on account of my writings ? 
And that is not very likely to happen. 

As I am aware that my judge is able to read French I would appreciate being allowed to attach to this document a photocopy of a 131 year old judgment in a famous case against the author Gustave Flaubert. The prosecutor's presentation of the case is also attached. That judgment has been considered by many to mark the origins of modern copyright law, i.e., exactly the ideas reflected by the international conventions on copyright which our country is obliged to obey - and those ideas are also clearly evidenced by Article 4 of the Copyright Act, no. 73/1972, to which I called the attention of the judge already when the present case was first brought up in court: that Þórður Björnsson's indictment itself violated. The judge elected to turn a blind eye to this, hopefully only due to lack of knowledge, not to willful meanness. Therefore I would like to ask him to read carefully the arguments of the French prosecutor of 131 years ago. 
His speech is a cultural jewel of which the French are very proud, as the action bears witness to all the best aspects of their cultural heritage. If not, it could never have laid the foundations of modern copyrights. It has appeared to me that your own and Björnsson's action in my case bears witness to many of the worst things which Icelandic culture has ever had to offer. That is why I take the liberty to point out to you what makes this famous speech most valuable: 
Certainly the speaker is boiling with rage, furious, and flaming with indignation. But he nevertheless takes care to describe the entire thought of Flaubert, and never dissects it at his own pleasure in order to facilitate the matter for himself. In this way he takes care to ask only for judgment of what Flaubert has written, but never requests judgment on the basis of his own opinion of the writings in question. In other words the prosecutor is able to read, and expects the same of the judges. Only there- fore did his speech become one of the brightest gems in legal philosophy, despite his personal opinion of the matter at issue. That is, he did not expect Justitia to lift her veil to look askew at the interests of those trying to silence yet another author. And his speech made the difference for European civilization. Since then, this is how Europeans are to treat authors. And so they have done, except that a few rogues like Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Salazar and others played truant from this school. Similarly those east of the iron curtain, and the Icelanders, want to manage these things their own way. But such attempts very often fail miserably, to tell the truth. They end up in disgrace. Remember the Spegill case? 
Now read these sheets carefully, Pétur, and consider whether it would not be right to grant my request to have a literate assistant judge study my texts, because it actually seems to me that subjective illiteracy is and will remain a question of employment for you - as for other judges in this country. You may well rest assured that the undersigned person will not regard himself bound to accept anything less than complete acquittal in this case with payment of full legal costs to my lawyer and full compensation to myself for being prevented from attending my job, because you should of course have stopped the proceedings forthwith when I indicated (during the first session) that the indictment was in violation of the laws applicable to my profession and a shame in the company of civilized nations. 

                            Respectfully, 
 

<signature> 
Thorgeir Thorgeirson 
                         Author 

Enclosures: 

1) LE PROCES DE MADAME BOVARY (16 sheets) 
2) The Right to Write, an article from Morgunblaðið 27 May 1986 
3) The Guardian Angels, an article from Lesbók Morgunblaðsins 7 November 1986 
4) A "Close-Up" of Sigurjón Sigurðsson, Helgarpósturinn, 17 October 1985 

Court Exhibit No. XXIX 
The Reykjavík Criminal Court, 3 June 1986 
PG 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 

 
 
 
 



 
 

 
 
 

doc. i) Icel. 272/1986
 
Judgment:
July 22nd 1986
From the Judgment book of the Criminal court
Septrmber 30th 1986
 
The defendant, Thorgeir Thorgeirsson,shall pay a fine of ikr. 10.000 or be imprisoned for 8 days should the fine not be paid within 4 weeks from the rendering of this judgment.  

The defendant shall pay all cost of the case inclusive the fee of ikr. 20.000 to his appointed advocate, Tómas Gunnarsson.  

Pétur Gudgeirsson  

This judgment is read aloud at 10:00 h. in presence of the convict and his advocate. The convict announces that he wishes to appeal the judgment to the Supreme Court of Iceland.  

Read aloud. Confirmed.  

They leave the court at 10:05 h.  
Court closed.  

Pétur Gudgeirsson  
Witnesses:  
Hjördís Thorsteinsdóttir  
Gudm. T. Gudmundsson  

Confirming this is the name of the judge and the court's seal.  
Chamber of Criminal  
Courts Reykjavík  

July 22nd, 1986  
(signed) Pétur Gudgeirsson  
(seal) The Criminal Court of Reykjavík  

The above stated judgment received by the Prosecutor's office along with a letter of last August 14th, and which the convict, Thorgeir Thorgeirson, has wished to appeal and the Prosecutor also considers essentially correct to appeal to the Supreme court for aggravation, which hereby is done and the case shall proceed as soon as possible.  

Consequently the convict, Thorgeir Thorgeirson, is summoned to be present at the Supreme court when the case will proceed there, to hear the suit, answer it and hear his sentence. No further summon is to be expected in this case.  

The Public Prosecutor Office, Reykjavík  

September 30th 1986  

(signed)  Hallvardur Einvardsson  
(stamp)  Public Prosecutor Reykjavík  

Today this summon of appeal has been rendered to me. I wish that advocate Tómas Gunnarsson be appointed for my defense.  

Reykjavík 13 - 10 - 1986  

    (signed) Thorgeir Thorgeirson  
Signed in my presence d.s.  
(signed) Bjarni Matthíasson  
policeman  

Advocate Tómas Gunnarsson is appointed to speak for the defendant at the Supreme court.  

Reykjavík, October 15th 1986.  

(signed) Magnús Th. Torfason  
(stamp) The Supreme Court of Iceland. 

back
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

doc. m) Icel. 272/1986
 
THORGEIR  
THORGEIRSON 
A letter to the Public Prosecutor
on the appointment of Sigurmar K. Albertsson to the SC case 272/1986
 
In this letter 
the defendant is insisting on his (and anyone's) right to speak for himself in court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

back 

Reykjavík Sep. 8  1987 

Hallvardur Einvardsson 
Public Prosecutor 
Hverfisgötu 6 
101 Reykjavík 

Please find enclosed the copies of two letters to my "appointed advocate" in the Supreme court case nr. 272/1986 as well as a copy of a statement, dated May 5th, which I have sent to all the Supreme court Judges by registered mail. As demonstrated in those letters I am of the opinion that my fundamental rights have been essentially violated by the Supreme court's President as he appointed this person to "advocate" my interests. In my mind this appointment is a violation of human rights, a limitation of freedom of speech and a forceful abuse against an accused person. In this connection I refer to your duties concerning accused persons as well as to the Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, and to the law on the Supreme court of Iceland. And I specially want to point out the fact that over three weeks had passed from the date of Albertsson's appointment until he had the courage to convey the situation to me. Without my knowledge he had, during this period, been in charge of my affairs, which he had been discussing with a completely alien person without my permission. 
Should all this be considered normal procedure I must assume that a general discussion about the daily routine of the concerned High Offices would perhaps be correctly timed now. And furthermore I reserve all rights to any legal action against this injustice, especially as I am convinced that the High Court as well as your own High Office, would only gain in respect and honor by securing for each and every person the fundamental rights we all are meant to enjoy from the date of our birth - judges and defendants alike. 

Finally I should like to use the opportunity to forward the wish that the obligatory tapes of the Criminal court sessions of the case be submitted in the Supreme court as documents of the case, in accordance with the law on official proceedings. 
 

Respectfully, 

( signed ) Thorgeir Thorgeirson 

 
 
 

 
 
 
 

 

doc. l) Icel. 272/1986
 
THORGEIR 
THORGEIRSON
A letter to S. K. Albertsson 
on his appointment as advocate of case No. 272/1986 
 
See also: 
A letter to the PP 
and 
A request for investigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

back 
 
 

Reykjavík Sep. 8 1987
Sigurmar K. Albertsson 
Lögfrædiskrifstofan 
Klapparstíg 27 
101 Reykjavík 

Acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 4th of this month, posted the 5th, together with a list of cases to be heard at the Supreme court where your name has been connected with mine in a manner I can by no means tolerate. 
I must use this opportunity to remind you of my registered letter to you dated May 7th of this year. From this letter you must have understood that you can by no means consider yourself as my advocate. Any confidence between you and me is thoroughly out of the question and you are, of that reason alone, completely disqualified for the defense of my case. Other reasons for your disqualifications, wherever freedom of expression is at stake, we shall discuss at a later occasion. Your appointment as my advocate is unlawful, even if it is made with the knowledge of all the Supreme court judges, which only renders each and every one of them disqualified as such, should the case proceed the 22nd of this month according to the plan you forwarded to me - and should you then be figuring in my role. There is harmony, of course, in this plan of a disqualified court having a disqualified trial with disqualified prosecutor and a disqualified pseudo advocate - all against one disqualified criminal. Especially as this case is more and more exposing the generally disqualified judicial system of our country. But in spite of all harmony of this strange case I must object to your methods and make it clear to you that I am forced to regard you as a plain employee of the state judicial system in the case and that you are in no way defending my interests. Of course it will be your own choice what errands you run for other people - likewise it has to be my own choice to whom I confide my interests. That is where your hopes of a profit ought to cease. 
In the Supreme court case nr. 272/1986 the interests of the "appointed advocate" do not go together with the interests of the defendant. A judicial system cultivating such nonsense must be a vegetation of injustice and suppression. In such a garden your interests might be blooming for a while but my interests do not grow in that kind of soil and I fear that neither is this the kind of garden where public interest ever will bloom. And that exactly is the headache. 
Therefore I am protesting once again. 

Sincerely 

(signed)Thorgeir Thorgeirson 

 

 

doc. a) Thorgeirson v. Iceland 1990
 
THORGEIR  
THORGEIRSON
A request for Investigation 
to Public Prosecutor Mr. Hallvarður Einvarðsson 
 
In this document you find all the points that the defendant felt obliged to criticize concerning the judicial system and traditional icelandic procedures at the time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

back 
 

Reykjavík 22/9 1987 
To 
The Public Prosecutor 
Mr. Hallvarður Einvarðsson 
Hverfisgata 6 
101 Reykjavík 

I am turning to you on account of a difficulty which, as seen from my point of view, can in no way be called a small one. And I am convinced that it has many aspects which concern not only myself alone. In fact one may well say that this is the difficulty of the entire judicial system. The matter relates to my security under the law, and therefore the security of others as well. 
I my opinion I have tried every conceivable approach in order to discuss the matter with the esteemed public offices concerned, but my efforts have been like shouting into the darkness of the night. 
And in my opinion this is not as it should be. My resort now is petitioning your office to have an investigation conducted of 
the measure taken by the  President of the Supreme Court to appoint Mr. Sigurmar K. Albertsson to guard the interests of the defendant in Supreme Court case no. 272/1986: THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AGAINST ÞORGEIR ÞORGEIRSON. 
As you are aware from the letters relating to this appointment of which I have already sent copies to your office, the said Mr. Albertsson was appointed my defense counsel on 10 April last without my knowledge and without any notification having been sent to me. This situation persisted for more than three weeks. On 6 May Mr. Albertsson at last notified me of this status of my personal affairs, having discussed it with an unrelated party in the meantime. 
As I understand it, this conduct is in violation of the law. I have not succeeded in obtaining any answers to my requests to the Supreme Court for obligatory information about the court sessions when this decision was made. 
I have already pointed this fact out to your office, but now I request that the matter be investigated. 
I furthermore consider necessary that a thorough investigation be conducted of how the case has emerged through the lower stages of the judicial system and through police investigations. Firstly, no request of the Police Society or its board relating to the complaint has been submitted as asked, despite the fact that the complaint is lodged in the Society's name. Secondly, the case was investigated by policemen who might well consider themselves aggrieved by the written material which gave rise to the complaint. Thirdly, the division of responsibilities between authority of prosecution and judicial authority in the Reykjavík Criminal Court was faulty. Fourthly, the Prosecutor's very indictment document constituted a violation of the Copyright Act in matters directly relating to the interpretation of the text. Fifthly, the judge passed a decision in a dispute involving himself after disagreement arose with him concerning entries into the record. Sixth and seventh, the Public Prosecutor prevented appeal of that decision despite the fact that he had become a party to the case himself, and had already made himself disqualified by violating the law in his indictment. Eighth, the legal duty of recording the criminal court proceedings by phonographic means was not observed, nor were my requests for recording my court submissions in writing heeded. Ninth, my lawyer was reprimanded for merely doing his duty as defense counsel and reiterating a request for the recording of my statements, despite having in every respect conducted himself with surprising calmness and courtesy. Thus the criminal court judge had for all these reasons and by reason of his other conduct clearly become disqualified when he rendered his judgment.Tenth, the judge made himself guilty of misrepresenting to the media the facts relating to his judgment. Eleventh, the Supreme Court has now made itself disqualified by depriving me of my fundamental rights and Twelfthly appointing for me a representative who has not even conferred with me on my defense. 
This is how the matter has come up. 
I ask for an investigation of all 12 particulars, which each by itself should in fact suffice to establish grave doubt as to whether all is in order concerning the rule of law in this country. 
But as a thirteenth question, I would like to ask you kindly to investigate whether there may be a connection between this case and another similar case where the complainant was also in hiding and the Supreme Court disqualified (by reason of the ties of the president of the court to the case, cf., section II.B in the grounds for the judgment of the Reykjavík Criminal Court) which were not invoked by the defense counsel, who lost the case, but his client nevertheless obtained a significant payment from the State Treasury following the judgment. This payment was not subject to much discussion; in a democratic state public funds are not commonly used to purchase the entire issue of a publication, even if some teasing of a public servant has been published there in an allegedly impudent manner. 
I am here referring to Supreme Court Case no. 16/ 1983, which has in common with case no. 272/1986 to have to do with freedom of expression, a matter which is, understandably, of great interest to many people, who likewise have been amazed at the judicial recklessness manifested by that judgment. 
Council for the defense in the "Spegill case" (16/1983) was Mr. Sigurmar K. Albertsson. 
I call attention to the fact that the Supreme Court of Iceland now seems intent upon having the same lawyer, Mr. Sigurmar K. Albertsson, representing the defendant in aother case where the State assails freedom of press following a questionable approach. Is there a connection? 
I am of the opinion that the major part of this nation desires to be as secure under the law as possible; I believe also that most people care especially for their legal security when there is a question of fundamental rights - such as freedom of expression is generally regarded to be. 
 I think that in both cases, the "Spegill case" and this present one, little caution has been evinced. Even though both cases have to do with vain trifles and the squeamishness of individual public servants, this class of litigation has to be regarded as concerning fundamentals. Because the rule of law is something that must be honored without exception, or else lost. 
There should be no possibility of arbitrariness whatsoever. 
As you will understand nobody would express serious doubts about his own security under the law, or that of others, merely in jest. I would appreciate if you bear that in mind, and also if you remember that this petition of mine is not least due to my fear that if nothing is done the courts might start to lose public confidence. 
And that, in fact, is the central point of my letter to you: That you have an investigation conducted of the appointment of defense counsel in the said case, and that certain related particulars be investigated with the objective that both I myself and others will in the future be able to trust better the legal system of our country. 

In respect and goodwill, 
( signature) Thorgeir Thorgeirson 

Copy to the Supreme Court 
the Minister of Justice and the media. 

 



 
 

doc. n) Icel. 272/1986
 
Judgment
October 20th 1987
A transcript from the Judgment book of the Supreme court 
 
Year 1987, Tuesday September 22nd at 09:40 h. the Supreme court Judges Gudmundur Jónsson, Gudmundur Skaftason, Magnús Th.Torfason, the appointed Supreme court Judge, Gaukur Jörundsson and Professor Arnljótur Björnsson are assembled To hear: 
case nr. 272/1986 
The Public Prosecutor 
v/ 
Thorgeir Thorgeirson 

The appealed judgment of the Reykjavík Criminal court was pronounced June 16th 1986 as follows: 
The defendant, Thorgeir Thorgeirsson, shall pay a fine of ikr. 10.000 or be imprisoned for 8 days should the fine not be paid within 4 weeks from the rendering of this judgment. 
The defendant shall pay all cost of the case inclusive the fee of ikr. 20.000 to his appointed advocate, Tómas Gunnarsson. 
Pétur Gudgeirsson 

This judgment is read aloud at 10:00 h in presence of the convict and his advocate. The convict announces that he wishes to appeal the judgment to the Supreme Court of Iceland. 
Read aloud. Confirmed. 
They leave the court at 10:05 h. 
Court closed. 
Pétur Gudgeirsson 
Witnesses: 
Hjördís Thorsteinsdóttir 
Gudm. T. Gudmundsson 
The following summon of appeal is presented: 
The above stated judgment received by the Prosecutor's office along with a letter of last August 14th, and which the convict, Thorgeir Thorgeirson, has wished to appeal and the Prosecutor also considers essentially correct to appeal to  the Supreme court for aggravation, which hereby is done and the case shall proceed as soon as possible. 
Consequently the convict, Thorgeir Thorgeirson, is summoned to be present at the Supreme court when the case will proceed there, to hear the suit, answer it and hear his sentence. No further summon is to be expected in this case. 
   The Public Prosecutor Office, 
   Reykjavík, September 30th 1986 

   Hallvardur Einvardsson ( sign ) 

The Secretary presents the documents of the case marked A-O. The case proceeded verbally. Public prosecutor Hallvardur Einvardsson represented the Prosecution forwarding the following claims on behalf of his Office: 

I. That defendant Thorgeirson be convicted in accordance with the indictment and his conviction be aggravated from what the Criminal court had decided. 
II. That defendant Thorgeirson be sentenced to pay all cost of the case, i.e. the cost of the Criminal court case plus the total cost of the appellate case inclusive a reasonable prosecutor's fee to the State. 

Appointed advocate Sigurmar K. Albertsson represented the defendant forwarding the following claims: 
I. That the appealed judgment be annulled ab initio together with the Bill of  Indictment issued 13/8 1985 and the case be remanded for a different procedure. 

II. For secondary liability: discharge. 

Furthermore he claims an advocate's fee as decided by the Supreme court. The advocate summed up the case and mentioned that he was pleading as an appointed advocate in accordance with the 3rd par. of art. 179 of the law nr. 74/1974, against the protests of the defendant, who had wished to speak for himself at the Supreme court. 

The Public prosecutor spoke again remonstrating the advocate's claims for anulment of the appealed judgment ab initio together with the Bill of Indictment. Annulment could not be motivated. The Prosecution demand a judgment on merits in this case according to the Prosecutor's former claims, which the Prosecutor reiterated and submitted the case to court. Then the Court recessed while the Judges, the Public prosecutor and the appointed advocate watched the videotaped copy of the program "Differing opinions" that had been broadcast on the State TV, December 13th 1983. The videotape was marked: Ó. The 
defendant's advocate spoke again reiterating some of his former arguments and finally reiterated his claims and submitted the case to court. The case passed for judgment. 
Court closed. 

Erla Jónsdóttir ( sign ) 
Correct trancript certified by: 
( signed )Erla Jónsdóttir 
(stamp) The Supreme Court of Iceland 
 

Year  1987, Tuesday October 20th the Supreme court of Iceland pronounced, in case nr. 272/1986 

The Public prosecutor 
v/ 
Thorgeir Thorgeirson 

the following judgment: 

This case is judged by the Supreme court Judges Gudmundur Jónsson, Gudmundur Skaftason, Magnus Th. Torfason and appointed Supreme court Judge, Gaukur Jörundsson and Professor Arnljótur Björnsson

The case was appealed to the Supreme court by a summon dated September 30th 1986 according to the wishes of the defendant and appealed for aggravation on behalf of the Prosecutor. 

The defendant's appointed advocate claims that the appealed judgment be annuled ab initio together with the Bill of Indictment and the case be remanded for a different procedure. For secondary liability he claims discharge. 

On behalf of the Prosecution the claim of annulment is remonstrated. 

Some new documents have been submitted to the Supreme court. 

In the first place the claim of annulment is based on the fact that the Criminal court Judge Pétur Gudgeirsson had been employed as deputy of the Public prosecutor, during the period this case was investigated by the Office of the public 
prosecutor thus had been disqualified conducting the case and adjudicating it. 
As no evidence has been produced as of the Criminal court judge having personally handled the case at a former stage the claim of annulment shall consequently not be considered. 
Secondly the claim of annulment is based on the same points that had been advertized to the Criminal court on September 24th 1985 and the defendant's advocate at the time had formulated in the following note: 
"The defendant's advocate refers to the fact that no representant of the Prosecution is present at the trial nor has such a person been present at any former sessions in this case. He also refers to the statement of the Judge that the defendant's indication of the Bill of indictment being a violation of art. 4 of the law on copyright nr. 73/1972, has not been introduced to the Public prosecutor. 
Referring to paragr. 1 of art. 20 of the law nr. 74/1974 and number 1 of paragr. 1 of art. 36 the defendant considers the  order of one person executing the roles of both judge and prosecutor in the same case to be unlawful. Considering the lack of initiative to modify this order the replacement of the judge of this case is required." 
The Criminal court Judge denied this request in a decree of his which the Public prosecutor did not pass for an appeal to the Supreme court, cf. number 1 of art. 171 of law nr. 74/1974. No evidence has been produced on the proceedings 
of this case, which is categorized as a legally non prosecuted case in accordance with art. 130 of the aforecited law, that can motivate a disqualification of the judge nor the annulment of the appealed judgment. 

The Criminal court's decision about the defendant's guilt and its application to penal law have to be approved of. The penalty decided by the Criminal court is to be confirmed. The Criminal court decision on cost of the case shall be 
unaltered. 

Accordingly the defendant must be sentenced to pay all cost of the appellate case inclusive a prosecutor's fee of ikr. 20.000 to the State and his Supreme court advocate's salary of ikr. 20.000. The sums are not inclusive taxes. 

Judgment: 

The appealed judgment is to remain unaltered except that the moratorium of the fine is set to 4 weeks from the rendering of this judgment. 

The defendant, Thorgeir Thorgeirson, is to pay all cost of the appellate case inclusive a prosecutor's fee of ikr. 20.000 to the State and his Supreme court advocate Sigurmar K. Albertsson's salary of ikr.20.000. 

This judgment is to be legally executed. 

A dissenting opinion 
of Gaukur Jörundsson, appointed Supreme court Judge for the case nr. 272/1986: 
The Public prosecutor 
v/ 
Thorgeir Thorgeirsson 

In cases prosecuted for punishment of defamatory imputations it has to be made unmistakably clear who is the defamed part. This is necessary for the defence of the accused and for the delicate precision of what inevitable limitations there should be imposed upon the general public debate in this respect. 

The introduction of the Bill of Indictment for this case states that the case is to proceed "for defamatory imputations against policemen", later there is stated, in part III of the indictment, that the mentioned defamatory imputations are directed against members of the Reykjavík police force without naming or assigning  of individuals."    Consequently the interpretation of the indictment is to be that the subject of the criminal act has been the Reykjavík police force in general. 

Even if the comments cited in the indictment are harsh and seem to remain unmotivated, my opinion is, considering the aforementioned formulation of the indictment, that there are no conditions to punish the defendant on grounds of art. 108 of the general penal law, which has to be interpreted with regard to the fundamental constitutional right of free expression of opinions in writing and in speech. 
Consequently I am of the opinion that the defendant be discharged of the claims of Prosecution in this case and the State shall pay all cost of the appellate case inclusive the salary of the defendant's Supreme court advocate. 

Correct transcript certified by 

( signed ) 

Fee ikr. 225,00 received: 
(stamp) The Supreme Court of Iceland 

back



 
 

Thorgeir Thorgeirson Speech at Strasbourg I 
 on Application no. 13778/1988 : Thorgeirson agains Iceland  
delivered before the Commission of Human Rights 14:03: 1990
©
leshús 
 
 
Contrary to the Supreme Court of Iceland the Commission allowed mr. Thorgeirson to speak for himself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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I. 
Introduction and claims 
My name is Thorgeir Thorgeirson. I am a freelance author, translator and journalist , born 30 April 1933; a citizen of Iceland, resident of Reykjavík, Iceland, enjoying the rights listed in the Convention for the Protection  of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which the State of Iceland ratified 3 September 1953. By a letter of 3 November 1987 I contacted the European Court of Human Rights with my complaint after having been sentenced by the Supreme Court of Iceland 20 October 1987. On 14 April 1988 the Commission received my Application and supporting material; marked: a) -  p) Icel. 272/1986, fulfilling the conditions of Art. 25 and 26 of The Convention. The bases for my application were Art.  6. 3 c and Art. 10 of Section I, with retention of rights to bring complaints under other relevant laws and conventions as might prove appropriate. Now I am exercising those rights and bringing further complaints under Art. 6, Art. 8, and Art. 10 of Section I, and retaining my right to claim just satisfaction under  Art. 50 of Section IV. Other documents which I have presented to the Secretary are my 5 COMMENTING POINTS on the observations of the Icelandic Government concerning Application no. 13778/1988 (Aug. 1989) with 6 supporting documents, numbered: Comm. points  1) to 3), and: PS doc. 1) to 3). Finally I forwarded supporting material 21 Feb. 1990, marked: doc. Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 1990; a)- e)  
  
II.
A summary
As doc. a) Icel. 272/1986 indicates, my open letter to the Minister of Justice, reproduced in doc. b) 272/1986 and another article reproduced in doc. c) 272/1986 gave rise to the criminal case against me. The history of the case is given in doc. a) 272/1986. To demonstrate that I have exhausted all local remedies provided by Icelandic law, I now present the doc. a) Thorgeirson v. Iceland 1990, A REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION, which in fact was received and rejected by the Supreme Court of Iceland, as confirmed in doc. p) Icel. 272/1986. Among the faulty elements of the proceedings against me were:  

  1.  The Reykjavík Police Society, or its board, had initiated the case without later being able to submit any document confirming this highly questionable initiation.  

  2.  The case was investigated by the State Criminal Investigation Police ( SCIP ), against my protest, as may be verified in doc. e) Icel. 272/1986. As the SCIP cannot be considered impartial or an open tribunal in the sense of Art. 6.1, this investigation was a violation of Art. 6.1 of the Convention.  

  3.  The Bill of Indictment was a violation of prevailing Icelandic law and of Art. 8 of the Convention, as will be demonstrated.  

  4.  The Public Prosecutor's office issued the Bill of Indictment on 13.08.1985. Just prior to that time, Mr. Pétur Guðgeirsson was a staff member of the Public Prosecutor's office and very likely became acquainted with the case there. Guðgeirsson left the Public Prosecutor's office in July 1985 and became the Criminal Court  
Judge who presided over this case.  

  5.   Judge Guðgeirsson himself conducted the Criminal Court investigation, acting as a representative of the Public Prosecutor's office. He thus could not have acted with impartiality as prescribed by Art. 6 of the Con- vention.  

  6.   When Judge Guðgeirsson ruled against my motion that he remove himself from the case for lack of impartiality, the ruling was appealed, but the Public Prosecutor's office denied the appeal with reference to Art. 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no. 74/1974.  

  7.   The legal duty of recording the Criminal Court proceedings by phonographic means never was observed, and most claims for records were simply overruled by Judge Guðgeirsson. ( Art. 6 )  

  8.   My lawyer was reprimanded by Judge Guðgeirsson, without cause, and thus excluded from any further defense of my case. This provided the President of the Supreme Court, Magnús Thoroddsen, with the  opportunity to force a new defense counsel upon me completely against my  will, thus violating Art. 6.3 c  of the Convent- ion and the laws governing the Supreme Court of Iceland as well as the Icelandic Code of Civil Procedure.  

  9.  All this resulted in damage to my professional standing and to my personal life. Clearly all the facts of the case violate both Art. 8 and Art. 10 of the Convention. Having suffered considerable professional and personal damages I reserve all rights to claim just satisfaction under Art. 50 of the Convention.  

  10.  In addition to this, I shall demonstrate that the laws under which the Bill of Indictment was brought ( Art. 108 of the General Penal Code  of Iceland ) clearly are a violation of various articles of the Icelandic Constitution as well as of both Art. 6 and Art. 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-  
mental Freedoms.  
   

III.
Principles 
  1.  The idea of free expression or the liberty "to print and publish the truth, from good motives and for justifiable ends" ( Black's Law Dictionary on liberty of the press ) is both an individual right to be respected, and a contribution to the rights of the public to receive information and ideas. Observing the masses of Eastern Europe rising to secure this major premise of democratic society, recently we have had an opportunity to realize that free access to opinions and knowledge - especially offending opinions and hidden knowledge, as they are more likely to open new horizons - is a necessary condition for our democracy as well. I, naturally, have not been able to find a satisfactory general definition of this liberty. Armies of scholars seem to have been occupied for ages formulating all kinds of limitations to freedom of expression, without ever defining what they are limiting. Liberty has, to date, mainly been defined by negations. Such definitions pose a great danger, since each of them inevitably is a reduction of liberty. If freedom of expression is to prevail, we shall have to construe its conventions and declarations broadly and employ definitions sparingly.   

  2. Concerning my newspaper article: "Let us consider now!" contained in doc. b) Icel. 272/1986, I wish to reiterate my former declaration, that writing this open letter to the Minister of Justice was the professional duty of a journalist who personally had experienced unmotivated police brutality, and who, after studying a number of similar cases, had found that this rapidly increasing problem was due to a minority of primitive persons employed by the Reykjavík police force. I also had discussed the matter with several attorneys, all of whom advised against suing individual policemen because, as they said, our judicial system would offer no probability of winning a case against a police officer.  

  3. My right to do this duty is a matter of interpretation of Art. 72 of the Constitution of Iceland as well as of Art. 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  

  4. The strong tone of my article is both justified and necessitated by its content. Any milder tone would have been an extenuation of my conviction. The article reported on a small group of "brutes" within the Reykjavík police force. No individual was singled out nor was the force in general defamed. On the contrary, my experiences of the kind and helpful nature of the average policeman in Reykjavík are clearly expressed. The police force in general did not suffer in the public opinion as a result of my article. But their own initiation of the case against me damaged them severely, because the public immediately concluded that this was a manifestation of the powerful influence of the above mentioned minority of "brutes" within the board of the Reyjavík Police Society. The Supreme Court judgment in my case, based on a general condemnation of the police force, which my article never expressed, since this would have been contrary to my opinion, resulted in a serious blow to the reputation of the Reykjavík police force. This was a lamentable accident, of course.  

  5. But accidents are apt to happen in a system where freedom of expression is  not  considered " applicable to ideas that offend, shock or disturb " ( ref: point 41 of the Court's Judgment of the Lingens Case, 1986 ) as well as to more favorable opinions.  
  I should like the Commission to view my case as an illustration that the respect for freedom of expression is a fundamental condition of democratic society, whereas the lack of this respect easily can have very undesirable effects. Ambitious judges may be encouraged to exaggerate the effect of a completely justified newspaper article beyond the limits of all "justifiable ends", simply to be able to break its author and teach him to obey.  This feedback of distorted truth from the judicial system seems to be inherent in all authoritarian states. And the problem we are dealing with here and now, indeed, is the monarchistic heritage within the judicial system of the republic of Iceland, a phenomenon not uncommon in former colonies. Iceland became a sovereign state only in 1918.  

  6. The content of the second newspaper article, contained in doc. c) Icel. 272/1986 is, of course, not prosecutable under Art. 108 of the Icelandic Criminal Code since Mr. Bjarnason and Mr. Elíasson had not been acting as public servants during the TV-program in question. And my article did not refer to them as such.  

  

IV.
The process 
  1. On 15 November 1985 Einar Bjarnason, the Chairman of the Reykjavík Police Society, testified at the Criminal Court of Reykjavík on his and Mr. Elíasson's appearance in the above mentioned TV-program. He stated that they had been acting as private individuals, not as policemen. At first he could not remember any document that they had read aloud during the program.  (See: doc. c) Icel. 272/1986 ). After being shown the videotape of the incident, however, he admitted having read the document aloud. He also confessed that the document had been typed at the Reykjavík police station and that police officer Jóhannes Jónasson had visited the signatory (Trausti Elliðason) and "made him sign the document" that would be lost. He could not explain how the police had found out about the dates of my hospitalization ( See doc. c) Icel.272/1986 ). My own inquiries showed that I had been isolated at Intensive Care until the very day the signatory of the above document had left the hospital - and I could not possibly have seen him. Thus, he not only was not, but could not have been, the person referred to in my article "Let us consider now!". After this evidence was presented to the court, Elliðason's "testimony" against me was dropped without comment and Judge Guðgeirsson overruled all requests by the defense for a further investigation into this matter. He also refused to investigate how the police force gathered computer information about my personal life. ( Art. 8). This is mentioned to illustrate the methods that have been used against me in a case the Ministry of Justice seems to classify as a "demanding" or "extensive" one ( p. 15 of the Governmental observations of 26 June 1989 ). And I have presented a document: Thorgeirson v. Iceland 1990 e), containing threats by a high ranking officer within the Reykjavík police force, to demonstrate the aims and ambitions of the initiators of the case.  

  2. Since 27 December 1983 most publishers in Iceland have been reluctant to deal with me, some mentioning the risk of publishing texts by someone who has the whole system of power against him.  
This should be considered in connection with my claims under Art. 50 of the Convention.  
   
 

V. 
The context 
  1. Having considered the vulnerable situation of freedom of expression in general and the vindictive initiation of this particular case, I cannot escape the conclusion that the good principle of "Justice must not only be done; it must also be seen to be done!" has in this case practically been subverted to: "Injustice must be visible enough to inhibit other writers from telling the truth !".  An author who believed himself to be doing his professional duty "from good motives and for justifiable ends" was in this case found guilty of expressing an opinion he never had and never, in fact, professed.  

  2. As the judgment in this case could not be the result of an impartial and independent tribunal, and a combination of many deplorable things was involved, the context of the case becomes especially important. I thus shall give a more detailed picture of three elements: The police investigation, the Bill of Indictment, and  Art. 108 of the General Penal Code of Iceland that was applied in the  case. Finally I shall give a brief impression of what it was like to face Prosecution, Inquisition and Judgment in one person.  
   
 

VI.
The SCIP investigation
  1. The State Criminal Investigation Police were disqualified in the case because: a) their daily procedures violated ( and, indeed, still violate ) fundamental rights of accused persons, and b) the newspaper articles involved in this investigation specially treated the negative aspects of the SCIP-procedures, as was declared by my attorney answering question no. 2 on  doc. e) Icel. 272/1986. Answering question no. 3 of the same document, I clearly reiterated this and demanded a further investigation into their methods. My theory, supported by information from within the Reykjavík police, was that police captain Gudmundur Hermannsson, together with his son, SCIP-captain Arnar Guðmundsson, while acting in a private, not official, capacity had conducted a prepara- tory "investigation" through questionable access to the hospital computer. There they found the name of a pers- on, Trausti Elliðason, whom they "made sign" the above "testimony" that later failed to do its job after I had proved that I could never have seen the signatory.  

  2. Important as this dubious "testimony" at first seemed to the investigators ( the  SCIP-men as well as Criminal Court judge Guðgeirsson ), it suddenly lost its importance as soon as its forged nature became obvious. Judge Guðgeirsson's emphasis on this "testimony" against me at first and his total disregard of it as soon as it turned in my favor, are among the many indications of his unmistakable hostility towards me during the case. This personal attitude of his may have various explanations. Some of it may have stemmed from his sympathy towards the police in general, some from prejudice towards writers in general or towards my activity in the press in particular. How should I know? One thing is certain, though: His ideas about freedom of expression proved to be as archaic as his principles of the judiciary. Other indications can be seen in the text of his judgment and in the "Observations to the Minister of Justice" he signed 15 October 1987, contained in  doc. 1) with my 5 COMMENTING POINTS last August.  
   
 

VII.
The Bill of Indictment
From the beginning, I have protested against the Bill as being a misstatement of the convictions expressed in my articles. Since the Bill of Indictment is an official assertion that my work was criminal, and since it presents words and phrases in my articles completely out of context, I have felt that my work has, indeed, been "altered and made available to the public in a context that is prejudicial to the author's individuality", and thus a violation of Art. 4 of the Copyright Act ( See: doc. f) Icel.272/1986) as well as Art. 8 of the Convention. When I voiced this complaint at a Criminal Court hearing of the case on 17 September 1985, the investigator-prosecutor Judge Guðgeirsson refused to record the complaint on the grounds that " he was in charge of this investigation  
". On the other hand, at the hearing of 24 September 1985 he recorded: "the defendant's indication that the Bill of Indictment contained a violation of Art. 4 of the Copyright Act has not come to the knowledge of the Prosecution". In spite of my insistence I never could get this indication of mine through, nor were my demands that a literary assessor be nominated to the case, ever recorded. Thus the judgments of the case have been based on a wilful misinterpretation of my newspaper articles. I already have stated why part II of the Bill is defective: The  
content of the second newspaper article never was prosecutable under Art. 108 of the Criminal Code. Another defect is part III's application of Art. 108 for the protection of a whole class of people. Art. 108 says: "Whoever vituperates or otherwise insults a public servant ...etc."  And finally, Art. 108  of the General Penal Code of Iceland is highly questionable a legislation per se, as I shall demonstrate.  
 

 VIII.
Art. 108 of the GPC
As in the Lingens case my sentence is " likely to deter journalists from contributing to public discussion  -  liable to hamper the press in performing its task ". I have presented three new documents: b), c) and d) Thorgeirson v. Iceland 1990 to demonstrate the concern of our journalists and authors  vis-à-vis Art. 108 of the General Penal Code. In practice, Art. 108 is repeatedly being used to terrorize authors and journalists and inhibit them from telling uncomfortable truths about public servants.  
  You may have noticed the absence of the EXCEPTIO VERITATIS rule in Art. 108 of the Icelandic Penal Code, which makes my case so fundamentally different from both the cases of Lingens and Barfod, since both Art. 77 of the Greenland Penal Code and Art. 111 of the Austrian Penal Code clearly demonstrate the rule of EXCEPTIO VERITATIS.  
  The late  dr. Gunnar Thoroddsen, in his fundamental work on libel and defamation before Icelandic courts, reasons that the rule of exceptio veritatis is valid as a general rule in the Icelandic judiciary in spite of the fact that this rule is not to be found in any article of Icelandic law. This he very correctly deduces from the clear exclusion of the rule in Art. 108 ( "An allegation, even if proven, brings fines, etc."). The article would, of course, not exclude a rule if it were not generally valid.  
  This raises some questions:  
  Why do civil servants enjoy this privilege? Is this perhaps in conflict with  Art. 78  of the Icelandic Constitution?    ( See: doc. Comm. points 2) ) Does not the exclusion of the exceptio veritatis rule negate the presumption of innocence and violate Art. 6.2 of the Convention, the guilt being a simple matter of taste " on which disagreement or argument is futile " ( Judge Woolsey in his judgment lifting the US ban on Joyce's Ulysses ) and without the defendant's possibility of proving his innocence? Can a democratic state have such a discretionary clause concerning the freedom of expression prevailing in law without risking violations of Art. 10 of the Convention?  
  All those questions are worth consideration.   
 
IX.
The absence of the public Prosecutor
As must be clear from the observations of 5 Criminal Court judges I cited in point 03 on pages 6 to 8 of " 5 COMMENTING POINTS ", the absence of the Public Prosecutor from The Criminal Court added the duties of prosecution to an already overloaded inquisitorial judge. Representing Prosecution means asserting the guilt of the defendant, and who can remain impartial towards his own claims? That alone completely destroys the appearance of impartiality. This, of course, also colors the questions of the Inquisitor who is the most prominent of the three gentlemen in one a defendant is confronted with when  summoned before the Criminal Court of Reykjavík. If the defendant is a person who learned in school that our security under the law was guaranteed, the confrontation with this judiciary Trinity can be compared to the shock of experiencing an earthquake of the highest degree. All of a sudden, there is no legal or moral ground beneath your feet.  
  The fear you experience is a very solitary one. Much later you might be capable of sharing such an experience with another person. Not immediately. You feel the impossibility of just treatment in the form of hostile questions from someone who will also interpret your answers and judge them, and you feel his "synchronization" with the police very strongly. The immediate result is a justifiable fit of paranoia. The very private quality of this experience shows the profound nature of what has been taken from you: You no longer enjoy as fundamental a human right as security under the law.  
  This, perhaps, is what makes my case different from the cases of Piersack and De Cubber. In my case, the violations hardly can be traced to single human errors within a comparatively secure judicial system since they are due to archaic rules of the "age-old inquisitorial procedure" ( See: 5 COMM. POINTS , page 6 ) which are still in effect at the Criminal Court of Reykjavík.  
   
 
X.
Conclusion 
Reiterating my complaints under Art. 6, Art. 8 and Art. 10 of Sec. I, and retaining the right to claim just satisfaction under Art. 50 of Sec. IV of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, I would like the honored members of this Commission to consider the questions I have raised and admit the Application 13778/ 1988.  

Thank you. 

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Thorgeir Thorgeirson:
A memorial on the case 47/1991/299/370: Thorgeirson against Iceland 
filed: September 5th  1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

* 
See also:  
Supreme Court doc:  
A request for investigation   
item thirteen 
 
 
 
 

** 
Judge Vilhjálmsson later withdrew "at his own wish" from the court.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

I am filing this memorial, together with the documents numbered I-VIII) 1991/ 13778/88, according to the Court's invitation in a letter of 06.06.1991. 

  The content of the memorial: 
  1) A note on Judge Vilhjálmsson's nomination to the Court. 
  2) Notes on the documents I-IX) 1991/13778/88. 
  3) Claims under Art. 50 of the Convention. 
  4) On DOCUMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS in chronological order. 

1) A note on Judge Vilhjálmsson's nomination to the Court. 

However important it may seem to have a judge of one's own nationality on the Court I have to express my fears that the nomination of Mr. Vilhjálmsson might bring discredit to the impartiality of the Court. Personally, I have nothing against Judge Vilhjálmsson but I wish to point out that:  

a) he was among the recipients of a registered letter ( given in doc. k) Icel. 272/1986 ) I sent to all Supreme Court Judges in Iceland, and that he then did take a stand in the case by his silence regarding one of the points I later complained of in my Application to the Commission. Thus his qualification to deal with the case could be questioned.   

b) He was connected with the case of magazine "Spegillinn" (16/1983), mentioned in my request to the Public Prosecutor for official investigation of the Supreme Court ( doc. a) Thorgeirson v. Iceland 1990 ). My request for a special investigation regarding the connection of my case ( 272/1986) to case 16/1983 never was carried out to clear the question, which leaves me with a justified suspicion. 

c) After my case had been referred to the Commission, Judge Vilhjálmsson did approach me trying to advise the withdrawal of my Application, pronouncing his firm conviction that my Application was "nonsensical". However friendly he has been pronouncing his consultations, this prejudice of his is somewhat disturbing.  

Considering the importance of the Court's impartiality I feel obliged to mention these facts, as each of them might point to a possible conflict of Judge Vilhjálmson's interests while adjudicating. ** 

 
 
 
 
2)  Notes on the documents I-IX) 1991/13778/88. 

The Report of the Commission states: "The factual elements upon which the applicant based his strong criticism of the prevailing situation may in some respects be uncorroborated ..." ( p. 24, para 81 ). This statement prompted me to introduce doc. I) 1991/13778/88 containing the full and unabridged defense of the case in the Reykjavik Criminal Court for your reconsideration as well as doc. IV) 1991/ 13778/88 presenting Mr. Valgeirsson's request for an official investigation to clear his own professional reputation, a request of exactly the same nature as the Police Association's request that started my case in December 1983. I should like to draw your kind attention to the prosecutor's answer in Valgeirsson's case, especially the sentence: "A complaint, or at least a reasonable suspicion of such conduct, is a prerequisite for initiating such investigation." As the Public Prosecutor, in my case ( Dec. 1983), undeniably initiated such investigation, without any complaint having been forwarded, he must, at the time, have had as reasonable a suspspicion about police brutality as any other citizen of Iceland. And I see the suspicion of such an authority as a firm corroboration of my credibility. Therefore, I am introducing this exchange of letters into the case. But, of course the main corroboration of my strong criticism lies in the doc.  V) 1991/13778/88 consisting of some fragments from Judge Ingibjörg Benediktdóttir's sentence in a case of police brutality, strikingly similar to what I had been describing in my article "Let us consider now!" in December 1983. I saw no reason for having repeated descriptions of half a dozen witnesses on the same incident translated. Therefore, I am introducing only fragments of this remark-able judgment. If required I can have the whole judgment of 50 pages translated. The choke holds I mention in my article of 7 Dec. 1983 also were subject to investigation in connection with case 232/1991, and I have included translations of testimonies given by different policemen before the court to demonstrate the delicacy of this topic. Their testimonies also support my opinion, already expressed in Dec. 1983, that the majority of policemen are honest but fearful people. Reading this document on the conduct of a policeman in uniform mishandling an innocent citizen he was meant to defend, certainly calls for strong reactions: Words like beastly, savage, brutal, bullish, pervert or sadistic inevitably enter your mind. A harsh action calls for harsh words. 
  Another conclusion of this remarkable judgment might be that Mr. Claessen's statement before the Commission 14.03.1990, on police brutality being extremely uncommon in Iceland, remained uncorroborated. What is true is that Icelandic policemen have seldom suffered sentences for brutality. This was obvious from the react- ions of the Chairman of the Reykjavík Police Association who, when int-erviewed by TV-2 on that occasion, said: "The Court has betrayed us!" But the "traitor" Judge Benediktsdóttir deserves full respect for having conduct- ed a  remarkably objective investigation on police brutality and for pronouncing the consequent judgment. This, of course, she did in the spirit of the revised Code of Criminal Procedure passed at the Althing last April and taking effect in July 1992. 
  The doc. VI) and VII) 1991/13778/88 give an impression of the new spirit the revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure is introducing. Allow me to point out the Ministerial Committee's comment on the old system, expressed in the text cited in doc. VI) 1991/13778/88: " This arrangement, bearing all principal characteristics of inquisitorial procedure, was long since obsolete, and inconsistent with legal procedure among civilized nations." This, and the rest of the texts, I must consider as a confession, pronounced by an official committee of worthy specialists, that my complaints under Art. 6 of the Convention were fully justified. And this leads us to the following very correct statement of the Commission's Report ( pag. 24, para 81 ): "In his article, the applicant not only drew the public's attention to a problem of general interest but also pointed out that the present system of investigation regarding alleged police brutality was ineffective and should be replaced by a more effective system." 
  A step in that direction seems to have been made by the revision of the Criminal Code of Iceland passed at the Althing last April. 
  In doc. VII) 1991/13778/88 I have gathered some articles of the revised Code of Criminal Procedure passed in April 1991 to be enacted in July 1992. All the innovations contained in those articles may be observed in connection  with my case, but I should like to stress that Art. 123: "If the prosecutor does not appear in court the case can not be brought to a conclusion "..  and Art. 155: "... the President of the Supreme Court shall appoint the defense counsel unless the defendant requires to conduct his own defense ... " are now prevailing law in Iceland stating, I hope, the point of view that doing otherwise is wrong. Thus the Court of Human Rights would indeed not be "reviewing the relevant domestic law and practice in abstracto" ( Comm. Rep. page 24, para 56 ) by deciding on breach of Art. 6 of the Convention in my case, as this would be in no conflict with the revised Code of Criminal Procedure now prevailing. 
  Doc. II) & III) 1991/13778/88 are forwarded in order to describe the slow pace of the old procedural system. A request for official investigation was decided upon years later allowing injustice to operate in the meantime. Under such a system a person would have to live at least 300 ears to win recognition of fundamental individual rights. If ever. 

3)  Claims under Art. 50 of the Convention. 

In doc. IX) 1991/13778/88 I have outlined my claims under Art. 50 of the Convention. The claims under I. cover a considerable part of the direct cost of the case. The claims under II. are based on the fact that for 7 years I have occupied the situation of a dissident person. Different state organs as Police force, Courts, State radio, State television and others have more or less been organized against me in a way that never was completely fair. As mentioned in the document my claims are absolutely minimal. In fact they could be seen as just symbolical figures to fulfill the moral duty of claiming some reparation from a state that demonstratively has been practicing persecution of an individual on account of his opinions. 
  Some of the sales figures of my books are still in round numbers, but the exact figures will be ready and confirmed by January 1992. On request, a further documentation on the claims as well as the background of my articles will be forwarded. 

4)  On DOCUMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS in chronological order. 

Realizing the mess I have made of the numbering system of the forwarded documents and observations of the case, I had a special booklet with all my material in chronological order produced. This I did to facilitate the study of the case and, especially, to make references during the hearings more convenient. Under separate cover I am sending 15 copies for the Commission and the Judges of the Court. Should more copies be needed I can have them made at a short notice. 

Respectfully, 

_____________________ 
Thorgeir Thorgeirson 

To 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
STRASBOURG 

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European Court of Human Rights; Case 47/1991/299/370
 Thorgeirson against Iceland
 
Thorgeir Thorgeirson 
Speech at Strasbourg  II 
 delivered before the Court of Human Rights 
Oral hearings: 22.01.1992.
 
Unlike  the  Supreeme  Court of Iceland the Courrt of Human Rights  permitted mr. Thorgeirson to speak for himself in court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Mr. President, Members of the Court! 

I thank you for having invited me to speak for myself and, eventually, answer your questions at the hearings. As introduction of myself and this case I refer to page 130 of the booklet DOCUMENTS & OBSERVATIONS where my speech before The Commission on March 14 1990 is printed.   As a sequel to that speech, I shall give an account of the background to my article: "Let us consider now!", which, strangely enough, has been under consideration at many a tribunal for almost a decade. 

When I, during the first week of December 1983, sat down to write this article I did not do so on the spur of the moment. The problem had "for several years been bothering - if not obsessing - my mind" as may be read on page 18 of  DOCUMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS. A whole decade earlier, in 1973, I had witnessed, in Reykjavík, an incident of completely unmotivated police brutality. I offered to testify on behalf of the victim who had registered a complaint, which he later withdrew, following his attorney's advice that there was nothing to gain and he probably would lose his reputation for life by confronting the Police Force in public. 
  This experience gave me a strong feeling for the vulnerability of the individual in our mini society of 260.000 inhabitants, where anonymity is unthinkable. But from that moment, my attention was on police brutality, and during the years to come I interviewed several dozen victims and relatives of people who had suffered battery by policemen or door-keepers in Reykjavík. In two cases I tried, in vain, to have interviews published in daily papers. I tried to take the same two cases to several attorneys, who all advised against suing members of the Police Force, as the procedure would be according to the Code of Criminal Law, and such cases were sent directly to another police institution, i.e. The State Criminal Investigation Police, for examination. 
  Which seemed to be a blind alley. 

Your Honors! I have been classified as a socially engaged writer with a realistic approach to life. I am old enough to know human nature, and police brutality alone never could have worried me all that much. But the difficulty of having police brutality openly discussed, and moreover the impossibility of having cases examined impartially, bothered me so much that I had tried to contact high ranking persons and make them conscious of this state of affairs ( see my open letter to the Minister of Justice, Mr. Helgason, on page 21 of DOC & OBS ). I quote: "Two of your predecessors in office have received letters from me regarding these problems. Neither of them had the courtesy to answer." 
  Such was the background of my article: "Let us consider now!". My interviews with a number of victims had convinced me that police brutality was a growing problem in Reykjavík. My futile attempts to have these interviews printed in daily newspapers told me that the press had a strong tendency for self censorship on the topic, as they had to depend on Police Headquarters for information on crime, which is "hot selling stuff" on the mark- et. Most attorneys seemed to agree that the judicial system offered no possibilities of an independent, impartial examination of police brutality. And finally: The State obviously had an interest in suppressing discussion on the topic, as the State Treasury was responsible for any damage or injuries demonstratively caused by their Police Forces. The whole situation obviously was a growing threat to public security. 
  My personal contacts within the Reykjavík Police Force were extremely worried about the secret choke holds being taught at the State Police Training College without any concrete rules on their use in daily routine, and with no Committee on Ethics within the Police Force to control cases of abuse. I therefore decided to expose all of this publicly in a signed article, in the widely read newspaper Morgunbladid, since this form of article could not be affected by the paper's unspoken policy on self censorship. And so I did, using the opportunity when Jóns- son's case "all of a sudden came into the spotlight of the press" as may be read on page 18 of DOC & OBS.  The article: "Let us consider now!" was thus the expression of a conviction I had been building up for years by professional journalistic methods, and the printing of it certainly was "from good motives and for justifiable ends." The main purpose of the article is, of course, to urge the Minister of Justice to establish "a committee of trustworthy people to investigate the rumors, gradually becoming public opinion, that brutality is growing within the Reykjavík Police Force and < is > being unfairly protected", as may be read on page 22 of DOC & OBS. I also indicated to the Minister of Justice "that comparatively few individuals are responsible for this negative public opinion", which I had concluded from the fact that, in the aforementioned interviews with victims of the Reykjavík Police Force, the same names of policemen kept coming up in connection with unmotivated brutality. 
  My contacts within the Reykjavík Police Force had worried about their own good reputation being spoiled by the brutal minority, but these very fine people told me that they could do little about things as this brutal minority of policemen was strongly represented on the board of their Association. 
  This vulnerability of even honest policemen was another regrettable fact, difficult to understand and impossible to mention openly without endangering them by uncovering their names, as any other policeman would be able to find out which of his colleagues I knew. This is yet another feature of the mini society we Icelanders live in. To understand this, let us study the description of policeman Steinn Jakob Ólason's behavior given in the Transcript of the Judgment Record of the Reykjavík Criminal Court, printed on page 177 of DOC & OBS. By a neck lock he caused the unconsciousness of a young man, dragged him while unconscious back to the police van  "whereupon he suddenly released his hold with the result that Kaldal's ( the victim's ) face hit the street forcefully. "The victim's face had fallen without any resistance straight down against the street", all according to Alfreð  Alfreðsson's testimony. The young man landed on his face with an impact that could be heard behind a closed window on the other side of the street. Two other policemen then turned away in horror, but the victim "lies motionless in this condition for a considerable period of time with the policemen standing idly by him; then some of them had pushed against him with their feet, as if to check whether he was conscious". 
  Alfeðsson's reliability is, in my mind, exceptional, considering the fact that he is the son of Alfreð Eyjólfsson, a former policeman and one of the teachers at the State Police Training College. This adds an extra weight to his words. Having been sober when he observed the incident he is describing he is a key witness in Judge Benediktsdóttir's investigation, which I have already described as, perhaps, the first objective investigation of police brutality in the history of the Reykjavík Criminal Court (page 192 of DOC & OBS). Alfreðson's description of the incident completely coincides with my analysis of the problem. Reading his testimony I visualize all the factors. The free play of the brute in uniform, allowing the animal within himself to operate, the sad reaction of two honest policemen turning away in resignation, and, finally, the nonchalant attitude of other policemen, pushing against the victim with their feet, as if to verify the result. No active reaction against the savage deed is recorded. I am sorry to say that my conviction about the dangerous threat of police brutality, already existing in 1983 and still in action seven years later, could not have been staged more accurately than reality itself has done "during the night preceding December 27, 1990" as may be read in the Transcript of the Judgment Record on page 177 of the DOC & OBS. 

Your Honors! Allow me to quote the Russian poet Alexander Blok. In a famous poem called: To a young lady, he writes: 
   "Excuse me ... I am a poet, a person who calls everything by its proper name." 
  The poet Alexander Blok is, strangely enough, trying to avoid the tender love of a 15 year old girl by his somewhat harsh poem. In the same right I claim the permission to "call everything by its proper name" in my somewhat harsh article "Let us consider now!", where I am, naturally enough, trying to stop the officially  protected brutal behavior of some members of the Reykjavík Police Force towards the citizens who dare to amuse themselves during the working hours of the Police Force. 
  All the harsh words in my article, which, during various legal proceedings have been singled out and misinterpreted to make them appear dubious and turn them against my reputation, all those words are more than justified if only considered in the context in which they were expressed, i. e. to describe the very concrete threat I had perceived through years of journalistic investigation. Any weaker words would have diluted the reality of what I was exclaiming. Because, even if my article was a desperate cry of warning about police brutality, the fundamental component and the main aim of my article, being an open letter to the Minister of Justice, was my urging him to stop the unfair protection of a public danger. And so he promised in a letter to me, dated January 9 1984, reproduced on page 36 of the DOC & OBS. I quote: "we should like to inform that such problems are now being studied on different levels and the Parliament has the matter on its program in a near future". 
  On January 24, 1984, the Minister spoke in Parliament expressing his personal worries about police brutality but, quoting the report of the Committee on Legal Procedure, had no proposals for an alternative solution. The result was a status quo regarding investigation of cases of police abuse. But the minister reacted anyway, which indicates that he believed in the existence of the problem and its grave nature. And the Public Prosecutor seems to have believed my words, according to the statement in his letter to Mr. Valgeirsson on page 166 in DOC & OBS. I quote: " ... at least a reasonable suspicion of such a conduct, is a prerequisite for initiating such investigation"  And, finally, the Supreme Court confirmed the accuracy of my words, since I was convicted to a minimal fine according to the last sentence of art. 108, indicating "An allegation, even if proven, brings fines if brought forth in an impudent manner." It was their duty, had they believed my words to be untrue, to declare so and sentence me to prison for up to 3 years, according to law. 
  Thus all four official documents: The Supreme Court Judgment in my case, the Judgment Record of The Reykjavík Criminal Court, the letter of the Public Prosecutor, and the letter from the Minister of Justice, seem to  indicate that officials in those institutions were fully conscious of the serious problem of police brutality in Reykjavík. 

Your Honors! As you will have noticed I have sought to corroborate the factual background of my article: "Let us consider now!" with documents issued by state institutions, which from the very beginning have supported the truth of my words, but at the same time they have shown a merciless determination to convict me for telling the truth. I should like to give those institutions credit for their corroboration of truth. However I must disagree with them on the other point and accuse them of violating art. 10 of the Convention, making the obvious truth punishable by methods incompatible with art. 6 and art. 8 of the Convention as well. Allow me to quote the important dissenting opinion of appointed Supreme Court Judge Gaukur Jörundsson ( page 99 of DOC & OBS ) that "there are no conditions to punish the defendant on grounds of art. 108 of the general penal law, which has to be interpreted with regard to the fundamental constitutional right of free expression of opinions in writing and in speech." 

Your Honors! The question might well be put: Why did I not collaborate and forward my often mentioned interviews during the processes to back up my opinions? The answer is simple. I had read police captain Sigurðsson's threat ( reproduced on page 34 of DOC & OBS ) and later realized that members of the Police Force would go as far as to break into computerized files of the City Hospital to seek out someone, who in reality, never had seen me, and make him sign a fraudulent document against my reputation which was later read on television; having realized that the State television had no intention to publish a correction in my favor; and finally; having realized the nature of the judicial system handling the case, I made up my mind to reserve my internationally recognized right to protect my sources. 
  My experiences during the legal proceedings, and up to this date, have convinced me that by refusing to disclose my sources I have saved them from difficult experiences some of which would have caused inseparable personal damages. 
  During the period from December 1983 on, I have experienced the archaic, predemocratic mentality  of  the Icelandic judicial system, and I have also richly experienced the vulnerability of the individual in our mini society. 
  Therefore vulnerability of the individual has been the refrain of this speech of mine. 
  But I do not regret a moment of this hard time.   The nature of individual rights is such that only an individual can fight for them. As described in my documents: Delineation of claims, on pages 198-205 of DOC & OBS, my finances were ruined by the general persecution, organized against me by different state institutions. But only the finances. My social and moral integrity has richly gained by standing up for the fundamental rights of free expression in my country, as I daily feel by reserved, hesitant friendships shown to me by individuals and groups, any time they would not publicly risk too much by their support. Last November the Association of Icelandic Film Makers even elected me as an Honorary Member, in spite of the fact that I have not touched a movie camera for more than a quarter of a century. 
  I make a mention of this only to specify what keeps me going all the time, along with my conviction 
that the future destiny of free expression in my country might depend on my endurance in this very case. 

Your Honors! Reiterating my former claims, with reference to all the material forwarded in my booklet DOCUMENTS & OBSERVATIONS, as well as later filed material, I thank you for your kind attention and submit to your judgment the immediate fate of my right to free expression of opinion in speech and in writing. 
  And, of course, I am ready to answer any further questions. 
 

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                                                                       doc. VIII) 1991/13778/88
Claims under Art. 50 of the Convention 
Case 47/1991/299/ 370 Thorgeirson against Iceland 
 
I. 
Reimbursement for costs and 
spare time spent on the case: isk.:  1.551.275, - 
II. 
Reduced earnings: 
isk.  24.050,- pr. month 
during the years 1984 - 1991: isk.: 2.020.200, - 
                                                    ____________ 
                              I. + II.          isk: 3.571.475, - 
  

___________________________________ 
Thorgeir Thorgeirson 

 
 

 
The judgment of The European Court of Human Rights 25 June 1992
in Case 47/1991/299/370: Thorgeirson v. Iceland 
 
        the final opinion of the Court 
 
 

          ARTICLES: 6-1 ; 10 ; 50

 

 

          The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant provisions of  Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed of the following judges: Mr R. Ryssdal, President, Mr L.-E. Pettiti,  R. Macdonald, Mr A. Spielmann, Mr S.K. Martens, Mrs E. Palm, Mr R. Pekkanen, Mr A.N. Loizou, Mr Gardar Gíslason, ad hoc judge, and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr H. Petzold, Deputy Registrar,
        [...] Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on [28 may 1992]:

 PROCEDURE
        1. The case was referred to the Court on 8 March 1991 by the European Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission"), within the three-month period laid down in Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 of the Convention. It originated in an application (no. 13778/88) against the Republic of Iceland lodged with the Commission under Article 25 by Mr Thorgeir Thorgeirson, an Icelandic citizen, on 19 November 1987.
          [...] The object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether or not the facts of the case disclosed breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Articles 6 para. 1 and 10 of the Convention.
        2.- 6. [paragraphs 2 - 6 describe the proceedings before the Court, and in particular the exchange of memorials and other submissions between the parties, the composition of the Chamber of the Court and the names of the persons representing the parties].

AS TO THE FACTS
        I. Particular circumstances of the case

        A. Background

     7. Mr. Thorgeir Thorgeirson is an Icelandic citizen. He is a writer and resides in Reykjavik, Iceland.
       8. From 1979 to 1983 a number of incidents occurred in Iceland involving allegations of police brutality, about ten of which were reported to the police. The last such complaint was made in the autumn of 1983 by a journalist, Mr Skafti Jonsson, and it led to the prosecution of three members of the Reykjavik police, of whom two acquitted and one convicted. His case received extensive coverage by the press and gave rise to considerable discussion on the relations between the public and the police. This caused the applicant to publish two articles on police brutality in the daily newspaper Morgunbladid on 7 and 20 December 1983 respectively.
        9. The first article read as follows (translation):
see pag. ?-?
        10. Extracts from the second article read as follows:
see pag.?-?
         11. In response to these articles, the Ministry of Justice sent the applicant a letter dated 9 January 1984. It informed him that the problems raised in the articles were being reviewed at various levels and that the matter on the agenda of the Parliament (Althing) so that the Minister of Justice could report to it in the near future on studies and proposals which had been made in this field.

         B. Investigation and defamation proceedings
    12. By letter of 27 December 1983, the Reykjavik Police Association had asked the public prosecutor investigate the aforementioned allegations. Accordingly, he sent the case to the State Criminal Investigation Police ("SCIP") on 21 May 1984 to examine whether the publications constituted defamation within the meaning of Article 108 of the General Penal Code of 1940 (Law no. 19/1940 - "the Penal Code"). On 18 June the interrogated the applicant, who was assisted by his lawyer.
        13. As a result, on 13 August 1985 the public prosecutor issued a bill of indictment charging the applicant defamation of unspecified members of the Reykjavik police, contrary to Article 108 of the Penal Code.
        14. The following passages of the first article were considered to be defamatory:
 "beasts in uniform" (paragraph 9(3) above);
 "of those wild beasts in uniform" (paragraph 9(6) above);
 "The young man's room-mates told me that his injuries had been inflicted by bouncers of a   restaurant and policemen. At first I could not believe this, so I inquired among the hospital   staff and - Yes, they were right; had there a victim of the Reykjavik night-squad" (paragraph   9(9) above);
 "I then found out that most people had various stories of persons who had had a similar or   even worse with the beasts in uniform. Individuals reduced to a mental age of a new-born   child as a result of that policemen and bouncers learn and use with brutal spontaneity    instead of handling people with prudence care. There are so many such stories, identical in   substance, that you can hardly dismiss them merely as lies any more" (paragraph 9(10)    above);
 "victims of the police brutes" (paragraph 9(11) above);
 "allowing brutes and sadists to act out their perversions" (paragraph 9(13) above).
        15. The second article was also considered to contain a defamatory statement:
 "Their behavior was so typical of what is gradually becoming the public image of our police  force defending itself: bullying, forgery, unlawful actions, superstitions, rashness and    ineptitude" (paragraph 10(15) above).
       16. On 9 September 1985 the indictment was served on the applicant; it summoned him to appear at a sitting on the following day of a chamber of the Reykjavik Criminal Court, of which Judge Petur Gudgeirsson was the only member. At the applicant's request, the arraignment was adjourned until 17 September. On that day the court a sitting at which he appeared, accompanied by Mr Tomas Gunnarsson, a Supreme Court lawyer; the prosecutor was not present. The sitting proceeded as follows:
        (a) As required by the second paragraph of Article 77 of the 1974 Code of Criminal Procedure   (Law no. 74/1974), the judge informed the defendant that he was being questioned as he was  suspected of committed an offense.
        (b) Mr. Tomas Gunnarsson was appointed as the applicant's defense counsel. All the case    documents handed to them.
        (c) The applicant was asked by the judge whether he had written the two newspaper articles. He  replied that he had, but pointed out that the passages quoted in the indictment, while correct,  had been removed from  context.
        (d) The judge confronted the applicant with a record of his statement to the SCIP on 18 June 1984  and with his letter to them of 19 June. The applicant confirmed the accuracy of the record   and that he had written the letter.
        (e) When asked by the judge whether he could substantiate the relevant passages in his articles,   the applicant maintained that, in their context in the indictment - on which he had already   commented -, he was neither able obliged to do so; this was not his literary product, but the   product of the accuser.
        (f) The applicant asked to be given time in which to acquaint himself with the case documents   and to prepare his comments. Another sitting was scheduled for 24 September 1985.
        17. On that date the applicant and his counsel appeared before the court, again in the absence of the prosecution. Counsel submitted a motion that Judge Petur Gudgeirsson should withdraw, on the ground that, in addition to acting as judge, he had represented the prosecution because of its absence at this and the previous sittings.
        18. On 25 September 1985 the judge decided as follows:
"This case does not warrant (an adversarial procedure) according to Article 130 of the Code of Procedure .... (The applicant's) motion that the judge yield his seat is unsupported by any valid arguments and totally unfounded. The judge is neither obliged nor allowed to yield his seat."
        19. On 26 September 1985 the prosecution, pursuant to Article 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, refused the applicant's request for leave to file an appeal by way of a summary procedure against that decision with Supreme Court. He subsequently asked the Ministry of Justice to appoint an ad hoc prosecutor to  whether leave should be granted, but this request was refused on 18 October.
        20. During the period from 9 October 1985 until 28 April 1986, the Criminal Court held six more sittings at which the applicant and his counsel were present. Documents were submitted, oral statements made and heard. The public prosecutor appeared at each of these sittings, except that on 17 February 1986, when videotaped television program was shown to the court.
    21. At a sitting held on 25 October 1985, Judge Petur Gudgeirsson showed the applicant photographs of a and asked him whether this was the young man at the local hospital, described in the first article (see  9(8) above). The applicant replied as follows:  "... it is astounding for an experienced adult to hear another experienced adult ask a question like that. I see study between one and two hundred persons daily. This would correspond to the entire population of Iceland about 7 years. Therefore an individual whom I see less than 50 times does not stick in my mind unless there are some special reasons to the contrary. Therefore it is outright absurd and against the nature of the human mind,  ask a person whether he recognizes an individual whom he might conceivably have seen seven years ago. I can, however, answer that this is not the young man I had in mind when I wrote the article 'Let Us Consider Now!' ..."
      22. During a sitting held on 28 April 1986 the parties agreed that further investigation by the court was not required. Accordingly, counsel was given until 3 June 1986 to submit the applicant's written defense;  prosecutor declared that he would make no further observations.
    23. In his defense, which was filed on 3 June 1986, the applicant resuscitated the claim (see paragraphs above) that the case should be dismissed or the defendant acquitted on account of the prosecutor's absence at certain sittings of the trial. With regard to the merits of the case, he claimed, inter alia, the following: "It is of course the general public that is assaulted by policemen ... . Such an experience is quite memorable and, in the normal course of things, one person tells another. In the process descriptions frequently become exaggerated. As the instances increase in number a public opinion is formed, which naturally is even rougher at the edges the problem itself. To a significant extent, I used this public opinion as a main feature of my article 'Let Us Consider Now!'. Public opinion is, of course, in itself a fact and its origins are generally less important and less open to dispute ...
        If public opinion turns sour, confidence in policemen is lost, also in policemen who have never as much as hurt a fly. In the autumn of 1983 this loss of confidence had assumed proportions outright dangerous to public welfare. So, when the case of Skafti Jonsson emerged, I became aware of this danger. And my ... article published in Morgunbladid on 7 December 1983 was my reaction to this dangerous situation. By writing the article I consider that I was performing the duty of an honorable writer who studies the spirit of the nation and reports his findings without hiding the truth. This is clear to any person who is willing to read the article in its entirety and puts his mind to really understanding what is written there. ... But the main purpose of the article, and its conclusion, was to request the Minister to have an investigation carried out as to whether public opinion was correct or incorrect. The  article was intended to raise a lawful, urgent question.
        Even though my intention was to write an article completely within the limits of the law, I shall not hide the fact I also tried to phrase the text in such a way as to elicit answers from the parties concerned. The question, of course, was about the truthfulness of the menacing public opinion. If this was incorrect, the police authorities (which alone may possess comprehensive knowledge of these matters) could be expected to react in the composed, confident and calm manner of respectable, honest souls. The Board of the Police Association and the Chief of Police would simply have recommended to the Minister that he initiate at the earliest opportunity an impartial investigation of the matter asked for. Such a reaction would also have calmed the public considerably, as it would have borne witness to good faith."
        24. On 16 June 1986, at a sitting attended by the applicant, judgment was delivered by Judge Petur Gudgeirsson who rejected the claim based on the prosecutor's absence at certain sittings. As to the merits he stated inter alia: "According to the evidence submitted, the defendant underwent treatment at the Reykjavik City Hospital from 19 June to 11 July 1978. At the same time a patient named Trausti Ellidason ... was staying there, (completely) paralysed following a physical assault by an acquaintance of his ... . The defendant has been shown photographs of Trausti Ellidason taken at the City Hospital the day after the assault. The defendant has stated that Trausti Ellidason is not the man he describes in his ... article in the Morgunbladid; ...

 

          A video-tape recording of the television programme 'Varied Opinions', broadcast on 13 December 1983, has been submitted in evidence. ... Matters relating to law enforcement, the relations between the public and the police, as well as the 'Skafti case' ... were discussed. At the end of the programme Mr. Einar Bjarnason, Police Sergeant and Chairman of the Reykjavik Police Association, pointed out that ... the defendant's article could be shown to be unfounded, as he had ... a statement from the young man of whom the defendant had written in the Morgunbladid. The sergeant read out (the statement). (It) reads, inter alia 'What Thorgeir Thorgeirson says about my case in his article is wrong from beginning to end.' Having investigated the matter, (Mr. Bjarnason) and Constable Bjarki Eliasson considered that the statement had been made by the person about whom the defendant had written.
        As requested by the defendant's counsel ..., (Mr) Einar Bjarnason was called to testify. He said that the statement had been made by a young disabled man, called Trausti Ellidason, ... that he had obtained information as to the time when the defendant and Trausti Ellidason were in hospital, and that it had been assumed that the defendant had been referring to Trausti Ellidason in his article. That was how they had obtained his statement. Furthermore, the witness stated that, to his knowledge, no Reykjavik policeman had ever caused anyone injuries while on duty such as those described by the defendant in his article of 7 December 1983. ... The defence ... submitted that in writing the two articles the defendant was performing a writer's duty to society by drawing attention to people's physical injuries that have been caused by the police, bringing such matters to light and requesting official action to prevent this. [...] His work fell within the scope of protection offered by Article 72 of the Constitution, which forbids censorship and other limitations on the freedom of the press.
        However the said constitutional rule goes on to provide that a person may be held responsible for printed statements, a principle which has never been disputed in Icelandic law. There are various statutory provisions making it a punishable offence to express certain thoughts or statements in public, such as in print. [...] The defendant cannot be deemed to enjoy any privileges or greater freedom of expression than others owing to the fact that he is a writer.
        The defendant's newspaper articles were published in his name, and he has acknowledged having been their author. The defendant was resident in Iceland when the articles were published in the Morgunbladid. Pursuant to Article 15 of the Right of Publications Act 1956 ... he thus incurs both criminal liability and liability for damages on account of the contents ... thereof.
        The statements founding the charges in the indictment were said to be directed against unspecified members of the Reykjavik police force.
        Notwithstanding that the wording of Article 108 of the ... Penal Code covers offences against specific ... civil servants, (this provision) also covers offences against a defined group of civil servants [...].
        The words 'beasts in uniform' and 'of those wild beasts in uniform' are, in the context in which they were published,held to amount to vituperation against and insults to unspecified members of the Reykjavik police force. These statements are punishable according to Article 108 of the ... Penal Code.
        In the indictment these statements are considered to be defamatory allegations. Having regard to the third paragraph of Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ..., the defendant can nevertheless be held responsible for their publication; his actions have been correctly reported and he cannot be held to have been prejudiced in the preparation of his defence case.
        [the statments founding the charges in the indictment are then analysed by the judge who concludes that they constitute insults and vituperation against unspecified members of the Reykjavik police]. By making these statements the defendant has become liable to punishment according to Article 108 ... .
        [...]
        25. The applicant was sentenced to pay a fine of 10,000 Icelandic crowns to the State Treasury or, in default of payment within four weeks from service of the judgment, to eight days' imprisonment. He was also ordered to pay all the costs of the case, including his counsel's fees.
        26. Both the applicant and the prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court of Iceland, which heard the case on 22 September 1987. Counsel for the applicant requested that not only the Criminal Court's judgment but also the entire proceedings, starting with the issue of the indictment, be annulled and that the case be referred back to the Criminal Court for adjudication. In the alternative, he sought his client's acquittal on all charges. The prosecutor asked for aggravation of the penalty.
        27. In its judgment of 20 October 1987, the Supreme Court held inter alia:
        "... the request to annul the proceedings is based on the same arguments as those presented to the Criminal Court on 24 September 1985, when the defendant's lawyer made the following statement:
        '... no representative of the prosecution was present at ... any former sittings in this case ... In view of Articles 20(1) and 36(1)(1) (of the Code of Criminal Procedure), the defendant considers the fact that one person performed both the role of judge and prosecutor in the same case to be unlawful. Having regard to the judge's lack of initiative in rectifying this state of affairs, (his) replacement ... is required.'
        The Criminal Court judge dismissed this request and the public prosecutor refused to authorise an appeal therefrom by way of a summary procedure to the Supreme Court ... . No evidence has been produced during the proceedings in this non- prosecuted case, so classified in accordance with Article 130 of the aforementioned code,to justify a disqualification of the judge or quashing the (conviction) ... .
        The Criminal Court's finding of the defendant's guilt and its application of the penal law ... are upheld as well as the punishment imposed ... . The Criminal Court's decision on the costs of the case shall remain unaltered."
        28. In a dissenting opinion one member of the Court held as follows:
        "In a criminal action in respect of defamator statements it is necessary to clearly define those to whom the statements are considered damaging. This is required both for the defence case and in order to resolve the difficult question of necessary limitations on discussion of matters of public concern.
        The indictment states ... that the action is brought 'on account of defamatory allegations against policemen' and ... that the allegations in question are directed 'against unspecified members of the Reykjavik police force'. The indictment must thus be understood as relating to an offence directed against policemen in Reykjavik generally. While agreeing that the statements quoted in the indictment are harsh and have, as such, not been justified, I consider, by reference to the above-mentioned way in which the case has been set out in the indictment, that the conditions for punishment by reason of a violation of Article 108 ..., which is to be construed in the light of the fundamental principle of Icelandic constitutional law relating to freedom of expression in speech and writing, have not been fulfilled.
        In view of the above I consider that the defendant should be acquitted and that all costs of the proceedings in the [Criminal] Court as well as in the Supreme Court should be paid by the State Treasury; these are to include the fees of the defendant's appointed counsel before the Supreme Court."
        II. The relevant domestic law
        A. Freedom of expression and defamation of civil servants
      29. Article 72 of the Constitution of 17 June 1944 of the Republic of Iceland reads:"Every person has the right to express his thoughts in print. However, he may be held responsible for them in court. Censorship or other limitations on the freedom of the press may never be imposed."
        The responsibility referred to in this provision is further defined by statute.
      30. An author may, according to Article 15 of the Right of Publication Act 1956 (Law no. 57/1956), be held both criminally and civilly liable for publications made in his own name, if he is domiciled in Iceland at the time of publication or if he is within the jurisdiction of the Icelandic courts when an action is brought against him. If the publication is not made in his name, it is the publisher, editor, seller, distributor or printer who may incur such liability.
     31. A defamatory publication constitutes a criminal offence under the Penal Code. Article 108 deals specifically with the defamation of civil servants, in the following terms: "Whoever vituperates or otherwise insults a civil servant in words or actions or makes defamatory allegations against or about him when he is discharging his duty, or on account of the discharge of his duty, shall be fined, detained or imprisoned for up to three years. An allegation, even if proven, may warrant a fine if made in an impudent manner."
     32. In the applicant's case both the Criminal Court and a majority of the Supreme Court interpreted Article 108 as including defamatory statements directed not only against specific civil servants, but also against a limited group of unspecified civil servants. Precedents to support this interpretation may be found in two Supreme Court judgments:
          ... .
      B. Criminal procedure
   33. Article 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vests authority to prosecute in the Public Prosecutor, who is assisted by the Assistant Public Prosecutor as well as several prosecutors and deputies. He decides how the investigation in criminal cases is to be conducted and supervises it (Article 21).
    34. Under Article 115, the Public Prosecutor may initiate criminal proceedings by issuing an indictment against the accused. This must clearly specify, inter alia, the court in which the case is to be filed, the name of the defendant, the alleged offence and the potential penalty. The indictment is then transmitted, together with the case-file, to the appropriate court. The judge to whom the case is assigned notes on the indictment, which is subsequently served on the defendant, the time when the case will be formally opened.
    35. The case is, according to Article 121, formally opened at a court sitting during which the Criminal Court makes the indictment and other documents available to the defendant. If the defendant makes a clear confession at this stage, the case will be adjudicated there and then. Otherwise, he must be given the opportunity to adduce evidence and present a defence, in writing or orally, with the assistance of counsel if appointed.
     36. It is for the Public Prosecutor to determine whether the case warrants an adversarial procedure as set out in Articles 131 to 136. If so, the prosecution will appear before the Criminal Court judge. ... .
      If the adversarial procedure is not followed, the conduct of the case is governed by Articles 123 to 129. The defendant presents his case before the judge in the absence of the prosecution, unless the Public Prosecutor decides otherwise.
     37. When the prosecution does not appear the judge must, in accordance with the general rule contained in Article 75, investigate ex officio and independently, all the facts of and issues in the case, even if the prosecution has already investigated them and prepared reports thereon. The judge must also consider all factors relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused and all mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Once the investigation is completed and the defendant, or his counsel, has submitted his evidence and written observations, the judge determines the case on the basis of all the evidence.
     38. An appeal against a conviction by the Criminal Court lies to the Supreme Court. The Public Prosecutor must appear on an appeal, even if he did not do so before the Criminal Court.
     39. The Supreme Court is empowered to review questions of both fact and law. According to Article 185, it may  annul the entire proceedings or, alternatively, the judgment of the Criminal Court if it finds that serious errors occurred in the conduct of the case at first instance. In that event, the case may be referred back, in whole or in part, to the lower court for fresh proceedings.
     40. Under Article 171, a defendant may, with leave of the Public Prosecutor, file a summary appeal with the Supreme Court against a refusal by a Criminal Court judge to withdraw. In the absence of such leave, it is possible for the defendant, in an ordinary appeal to the Supreme Court, to ask for the Criminal Court proceedings to be annulled on the ground that the judge should have withdrawn.
      41. Article 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law no. 85/1936) which, according to Article 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, applies also to criminal cases, provides that a judge shall withdraw in the following circumstances:
        (a) if he is a party or representative of or related to a party to the litigation;
      (b) if he has testified to the facts of the case or served as a surveyor or appraiser in connection with the case;
        (c) if he has argued the case or given advice to a party;
        (d) if he is hostile to a party;
        (e) if the case is of financial or moral concern to himself or his relatives;
        (f) if there is otherwise a risk that he will not be able to consider the case impartially.
      If a judge is disqualified for any of the above-mentioned reasons, the Minister of Justice must appoint another judge to hear the case.
 
 

        C. Revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure
      42. A revised Code of Criminal Procedure is expected to enter into force on 1 July 1992. Article 123 of the Bill provides that if the prosecutor does not appear at a court sitting, the case must be adjourned.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
     43. In his application (no. 13778/88) lodged with the Commission on 19 November 1987, Mr. Thorgeir Thorgeirson alleged violations of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3(c) (right to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal and right to defend oneself) and Article 10 (right to freedom of expression) of the Convention as a result of the proceedings instituted against him and his subsequent conviction.
        44. On 14 March 1990 the Commission declared admissible the complaints concerning:
       (a) the absence of the Public Prosecutor at certain court sittings during the applicant's trial and its effect on the impartiality of the Reykjavik Criminal Court; and
        (b) the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression.
        The remainder of the complaints were declared inadmissible.
       In its report adopted on 11 December 1990 (Article 31), the Commission expressed the opinion that there had been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 (unanimously) and that there had been a violation of Article 10 (thirteen to one).

 FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT
       45. At the hearing on 22 January 1992, the Government invited the Court to hold that, as submitted in their memorial of 16 September 1991, there had been no violation of the Convention in the present case.

AS TO THE LAW

 I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 PARA. 1
       46. Mr. Thorgeir Thorgeirson alleged that he had not received a hearing by an "impartial tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides:
        [text of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention] The applicant complained that, under the current Icelandic legislation (see paragraph 36 above), less serious cases, which did not warrant an adversarial procedure, could be examined in the absence of the Public Prosecutor. This meant, according to the applicant, that district court judges were empowered in such cases to take over the prosecutor's functions. This situation had been criticised by a number of district court judges and was, moreover, about to be changed: pursuant to Article 123 of the Bill revising the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was expected to enter into force on 1 July 1992, the case would have to be adjourned if the prosecutor did not appear.
       The applicant contended that in his own case, in which the Public Prosecutor had been absent from a number of sittings of the Reykjavik Criminal Court, the result of this legislation had been that Judge Pctur Gudgeirsson - single member of that court - had not only conducted the court investigation but had also taken on a role as a representative of the prosecution. Consequently, the Criminal Court did not satisfy the requirement of impartiality in Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
           47. This claim was contested by the Government and was not accepted by the Commission.
         48. It should be recalled that the Court's task is not to review the relevant law and practice in abstracto, but to determine whether the manner in which they were applied to or affected the applicant gave rise to a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (see, amongst other authorities, the Hauschildt v. Denmark judgment ...).
        49. The existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 must be determined according to a subjective test, that is on the basis of the personal conviction of a particular judge in a given case, and also according to an objective test, that is ascertaining whether the judge offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect (ibid., ...).
            50. As to the subjective test, the personal impartiality of a judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary (ibid., ...); the applicant has adduced no evidence to suggest that the judge in question was personally biased.
        51. Under the objective test, it must be determined whether, quite apart from the judge's personal conduct, there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to his impartiality. In this respect even appearances may be of a certain importance. What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the public and above all, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, in the accused. Accordingly, any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality must withdraw.
        This implies that in deciding whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular judge impartiality, the standpoint of the accused is important but not decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear can be held to be objectively justified (ibid., ...).
        52. The Court notes that in the present case the Reykjavik Criminal Court held twelve sittings between 10 September 1985 and 16 June 1986. The Public Prosecutor was absent from the following six sittings which were devoted to the matters indicated:
        (a) 10 September 1985: at the request of the applicant (who was also absent), the Court decided to adjourn the case (see paragraph 16 above);
         (b) 17 September 1985: this sitting was of a preparatory character (see paragraph 16 above);
        (c) and (d) 24 and 25 September 1985: the court dealt only with procedural matters, unrelated to the merits of the case (see paragraphs 17-18 above);
        (e) 3 June 1986: the applicant filed his written defence (see paragraph 23 above);
        (f) 16 June 1986: the court delivered judgment (see paragraph 24 above).
      On the other hand, the Public Prosecutor was, with one exception, present at all the sittings at which evidence was submitted and witnesses were heard (9 and 25 October 1985, 15 November 1985, 31 January 1986 and 17 February 1986; see paragraphs 20-21 above). The exception was the sitting of 17 February 1986, which was essentially devoted to the showing of a video-taped television programme. Both the applicant and the prosecutor appeared at a further sitting held on 28 April 1986, when they agreed that no further investigation was necessary (see paragraph 22 above).
      53. It can be seen from the foregoing that, at those sittings at which the Public Prosecutor was absent, the Reykjavik Criminal Court was not called upon to conduct any investigation into the merits of the case, let alone to assume any functions which might have been fulfilled by the prosecutor had he been present. In these circumstances, the Court does not consider that such fears as the applicant may have had, on account of the prosecutor's absence, as regards the Reykjavik Court's lack of impartiality can be held to be justified.
        54. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 6 para. 1.

 II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10
        55. Mr. Thorgeir Thorgeirson claimed that he had been a victim of a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, which is worded as follows:
        [text of Article 10 of the Convention]
        This allegation was accepted by the Commission but contested by the Government.
        56. The Court considers - and this was not disputed - that the applicant's conviction and sentence for defamation by the Reykjavik Criminal Court on 16 June 1986, as upheld by the Supreme Court on 20 October 1987 (see paragraphs 24-25 and 27 above), constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression. Such an interference entails a violation of Article 10 unless it was "prescribed by law", had an aim or aims that is or are legitimate under Article 10 para. 2 and was "necessary in a democratic society" for the aforesaid aim or aims.

            A. Was the interference "prescribed by law"?
           57. The applicant, referring to the dissenting opinion of a member of the Supreme Court in his case (see 28 above), submitted that Article 108 of the Penal Code, as interpreted in the light of the constitutional right to freedom of expression, could not provide a proper basis for his conviction.
        58. However, the Court notes that the manner in which the Reykjavik Criminal Court and, subsequently, the majority of the Supreme Court (see paragraphs 24 and 27 above) interpreted and applied that Article in the present case was not excluded by its wording (see paragraph 31 above) and was, moreover, supported by precedent (see paragraph 32 above). Above all, it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (see, amongst many other authorities, the Kruslin v. France judgment ...).
          Consequently, the Court agrees with the Government and the Commission that the interference was "prescribed by law".
 

          B. Did the interference have a legitimate aim or aims?
         59. It was not disputed that the applicant's conviction and sentence were aimed at protecting the "reputation ... of others" and thus had an aim that is legitimate under this provision.

         C. Was the interference "necessary in a democratic society"?
         60. In contesting the view of the applicant and the Commission that the interference complained of was not "necessary in a democratic society", the Government made submissions that fall into two groups, one relating to questions of general principle and the other relating to the specific circumstances of the case.
        61. The submissions in the first group may be summarised as follows.
       (a) The Court's Lingens v. Austria..., Barfod v. Denmark... and Oberschlick v. Austria... showed that the wide limits of acceptable criticism in political discussion did not apply to the same extent in the discussion of other matters of public interest. The issues of public interest raised by the applicant's articles could not be included in the category of political discussion, which denoted direct or indirect participation by citizens in the decision-making process in a democratic society.
        (b) The actions of civil servants should continually be subject to scrutiny and debate and be open to criticism.
          However, since they had no means of replying, it was not permissible to accuse them, without legitimate cause, of criminal conduct.
        (c) Apart from the differences referred to under (a), it followed clearly from the three judgments cited that a person who claimed that his freedom of expression had been unnecessarily restricted must himself have exercised it in a manner consistent with democratic principles: he must have been in good faith as to the legitimacy of his statements and have voiced them in a way that was compatible with democratic aims; in addition, the statements must have effectively promoted those aims and been supported by facts.
       62. With regard to the specific circumstances of the case, the Government made the following submissions.
        (a) The statements in the applicant's articles lacked an objective and factual basis. Police brutality was very uncommon in Iceland; during the past fifteen years, there had been only two instances of policemen being convicted of physical assault. The story of the young man at the local hospital mentioned in the first article (see paragraph 9(8)-(9) above) was completely untrue and had merely been invented to provide arguments for a campaign against the police. The applicant had refused to co-operate in clarifying this matter and had adduced no proof to support his contention. In this connection, the Government referred to a declaration by a certain Mr. Trausti Ellidason, who had been at the hospital at the relevant time, and to the proceedings before the Reykjavik Criminal Court (see paragraphs 21 and 24 above). Although it was the Skafti Jonsson case (see paragraph 8 above) that had prompted the applicant to act, his first article had not relied on that case, which it described as "of little importance". It dealt instead with police brutality that would never be brought to the public's knowledge and stated that "the real problem" was "in fact bigger and much more horrifying" (see paragraph 9(4) above). In the second article, the applicant had not discussed individual cases, but a situation which he said comprised at least several hundred cases (see paragraph 10(8) above).
        (b) The applicant's articles had not been confined to a criticism of the manner in which the police performed their duties. The author's principal aim had not been to advocate new methods of investigating complaints against the police, but to damage the reputation of the Reykjavik police as a whole, by making specific allegations of misconduct, including serious crime.
        (c) Even if it were accepted that there was a factual basis for the applicant's statements, he had clearly overstepped all reasonable limits by using malicious, insulting and vituperative language and by condemning the police on a slender foundation.
    (d) The sanctions imposed, which did not include confiscation of the articles, had been insignificant and were not likely to discourage open discussion of matters of public concern.
        63. The Court recalls that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society; subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.
          Freedom of expression, as enshrined in Article 10, is subject to a number of exceptions which, however, must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established (see the Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom ...).
        In the present case, the applicant expressed his views by having them published in a newspaper. Regard must therefore be had to the pre-eminent role of the press in a State governed by the rule of law (see the Castells v. Spain ...). Whilst the press must not overstep the bounds set, inter alia, for "the protection of the reputation of ... others", it is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest. Not only does it have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of "public watchdog" (see the Observer and Guardian judgment, ...).
        64. On the questions of general principle raised by the Government, the Court observes that there is no warrant in its case-law for distinguishing, in the manner suggested by the Government, between political discussion and discussion of other matters of public concern. Their submission which seeks to restrict the right to freedom of expression on the basis of the recognition in Article 10 that the exercise thereof "carries with it duties and responsibilities" fails to appreciate that such exercise can be restricted only on the conditions provided for in second paragraph of that Article.
     65. As regards the specific circumstances of the case, the Court is unable to accept the Government's argument that the statements in the applicant's articles lacked an objective and factual basis.
        The first article took as its starting-point one specific case of ill-treatment - the Skafti Jonsson case - which gave rise to extensive public debate and led to the conviction of the policeman responsible. It is undisputed that this incident did actually occur.
        With regard to the other factual elements contained in the articles, the Court notes that these consisted essentially of references to "stories" or "rumours" - emanating from persons other than the applicant - or "public opinion", involving allegations of police brutality. For instance, it was the room-mates of the young man at the hospital who had recounted, and the hospital personnel who had confirmed, that he had been injured by the police paragraph 9(9) above). As was pointed out by the Commission, it has not been established that this "story" was altogether untrue and merely invented. Again, according to the first article, the applicant had found out that most people knew of various stories of that kind, which were so similar and numerous that they could hardly be treated as mere lies (see paragraph 9(10) above).
        In short, the applicant was essentially reporting what was being said by others about police brutality. He was convicted by the Reykjavik Criminal Court of an offence under Article 108 of the Penal Code partly because of failure to justify what it considered to be his own allegations, namely that unspecified members of the Reykjavik police had committed a number of acts of serious assault resulting in disablement of their victims, as well as forgery and other criminal offences (see paragraphs 9(9)-(10), 10(15) and 24 above). In so far as the applicant was required to establish the truth of his statements, he was, in the Court's opinion, faced with an unreasonable, if not impossible task.
        66. The Court is also not convinced by the Government's contention that the principal aim of the applicant's articles was to damage the reputation of the Reykjavik police as a whole.
       In the first place, his criticisms could not be taken as an attack against all the members, or any specific member, of the Reykjavik police force. As stated in the first article, the applicant assumed that "comparatively few individuals (were) responsible" and that an independent investigation would hopefully show that a small minority of policemen were responsible (see paragraph 9(19)-(20) above). Secondly, as the Court has observed in paragraph 65 above, the applicant was essentially reporting what was being said by others.
        These circumstances - combined with a perusal of the first article - confirm his contention that his principal purpose was to urge the Minister of Justice to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate complaints of police brutality. The second article, which was written in response to certain statements made by a police officer during a television programme, must be seen as a continuation of the first article.
        67. The articles bore, as was not in fact disputed, on a matter of serious public concern. It is true that both articles were framed in particularly strong terms. However, having regard to their purpose and the impact which they were designed to have, the Court is of the opinion that the language used cannot be regarded as excessive.
      68. Finally, the Court considers that the conviction and sentence were capable of discouraging open discussion of matters of public concern.
        69. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court has come to the conclusion that the reasons advanced by the Government do not suffice to show that the interference complained of was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. It was therefore not "necessary in a democratic society".
        70. Accordingly, there was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50
        71. Mr. Thorgeir Thorgeirson sought just satisfaction under Article 50 according to which:
        [text of Article 50 of the Convention] A. Work carried out by the applicant
      72. The applicant claimed 875,250 Icelandic crowns for his own work on the case over seven years, which he said had occupied forty-one days of his spare time per year.
      The Court affords "just satisfaction" only "if necessary". The applicant, who was assisted by counsel both in Iceland and in Strasbourg, has not established why it is necessary to compensate him for his own work.

         B. Pecuniary damage
        73. The applicant sought 2,020,200 Icelandic crowns as compensation for loss of earnings (24,050 crowns per month during the years 1984 to 1991) resulting from his "dissident's status".
        The Government disputed this claim, while the Commission left the matter to be decided by the Court.
        The Court is unable to accept this claim since it has not been established that there was a sufficient connection between the alleged loss and the matter held in the present judgment to be in breach of Article 10.

         C. Costs and expenses
          74. The applicant claimed in respect of costs and expenses:
      (a) 218,160 Icelandic crowns for the translation of documents submitted in the Strasbourg proceedings;
          (b) 134,392 crowns for computer processing of such documents;
       (c) 250,000 crowns for Mr T3mas Gunnarsson's fees for 100 hours' work (at 2,008 crowns per hour, plus 24.5% value-added tax) in connection with his representation before the Convention institutions;
          (d) 73,473 crowns for the fine imposed and legal costs in the domestic proceedings.
        75. As to items (a) and (b), the Government expressed their willingness to pay a suitable amount, to be by the Court on the basis of particulars supplied by the applicant. In their view, item (c) was reasonable.
        On the other hand, the Government pointed out that the fine and the domestic legal costs had never been paid by the applicant. Moreover, they stated that the fine had become unenforceable by reason of lapse of time and that they were prepared to take appropriate measures to ensure that the costs would not be collected, should the Court find a violation.
        76. The Court accepts the claims under headings (a), (b) and (c). Taking account of the Court's case-law in field as well as the relevant legal aid payments made to the applicant by the Council of Europe, the Court considers that he is entitled to be reimbursed, for costs and expenses, the sum of 530,000 Icelandic crowns.

 
 FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

         1. Holds unanimously that there has been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention; *
         2. Holds by eight votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 10;
         3. Holds unanimously that Iceland is to pay, within three months, 530,000 (five hundred and thirty thousand)  Icelandic crowns to the applicant for costs and expenses;
         4. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 25 June 1992.
        Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL President  Signed: Marc-Andrc EISSEN Registrar

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PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GARDAR GISLASON
        It is on the final question arising under Article 10 - whether in the specific circumstances of the case (see paragraphs 65-69 of the judgment) the interference was "necessary in a democratic society" - that I regretfully depart from the opinion of the majority.
        Allegations that crimes have been committed are either true or false. It is certainly "necessary" to restrain false allegations of serious crime in order to protect the reputation or rights of others. Therefore, in a defamation case it is in my view crucial whether or not the imputation of a serious crime has been made in good faith as to its truth.
        Although the applicant, in his article of 7 December 1983, took as his starting-point the much debated Skafti Jonsson case, he emphasised that he considered it to be "of little importance"; for him, the real problem was "bigger and much more horrifying". He referred to another case, that of a young man whom he had seen at a hospital several years previously and who had been paralysed by the brutal methods of the Reykjavik police. In my view he thereby implied that this "case" had not been investigated in any way and that no policeman had therefore been questioned, let alone found guilty. The applicant did nothing to substantiate this story, and there is no indication that the young man had actually been ill- treated by the police. In the defamation case the applicant was convicted not only for vituperation and insults but also for the above-mentioned imputation to policemen of serious crimes which, if they had in fact been committed, would have made them liable to heavy sentences.
        Bearing the above in mind, I fully endorse the Court's reasoning in its Barfod v. Denmark judgment ... . Mr. Thorgeir Thorgeirson was convicted not for criticising but rather for making defamatory accusations against members of the Reykjavik police, which were likely not only to lower them in public esteem but also to expose them to hatred and contempt, and those accusations were published without any supporting evidence or other justification.
        It is therefore my opinion that no breach of Article 10 has been established in the circumstances of the present case.
        I have voted on the Article 50 issue on the basis of the findings of the majority concerning Article 10.2491D--
 
 
 


 

*  Please note above: C. 42. "A revised Code of Criminal Procedure is expected to enter into force on 1 July 1992. Article 123 of the Bill provides that if the prosecutor does not appear at a court sitting, the case must be adjourned."
 
This and other Articles of the old CCP providing unsatisfactory procedural rules, which I had been complaining about, were all corrected in the mentioned revision of the CCP, possibly initiated by the Court of Human Rights.
  That is a remarkable and, indeed, a happy result.

ThTh