EUROPEAN COURTOFHUMAN RIGHTS |
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| Thorgeir Thorgeirson: |
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| Thorgeir Thorgeirson: |
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| A formal application
is done on a questionnaire the Commission sends to you immediately
after having received your complaint. It shall be filled out and returned
to the Commission within the six months deadline from the Supreme Court
sentence.
A rich accurate and systematically numbered documentation is of capital importance. Translations of the documents involve a considerable
cost for those who do not have French or English nationalities, but you
can apply for support from the Commission.
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1) Name: Thorgeirson 2) First name: Thorgeir 3) Nationality: Icelandic 4) Profession: author 5) Date and place of birth: 30.04.1933 at Hafnarfjördur 6) Resident: Bókhlödustígur 6 B - 101 Reykjavík - Iceland 7) Tel No: [55]1 66 988) - 12) No answers.13) The high contracting party: Iceland 14) Statement of the facts: See enclosed: " A Short Report on Case nr. 272/1986 at the Supreme Court of Iceland: The Public prosecutor v/Thorgeir Thorgeirson" and documents in ref. to art. 6 number 1 and number 2 as well as art. 10 of Section 1. Eventually other art. 15) Statement of alleged violations of the convention and of relevant argument: See under II, 14. and enclosed documents about the violations. 16) Final decision: 20.10.1987. Judgment of the Supreme court of Iceland. 17) Other decisions: See: "A Short Report..." which is enclosed. 18) Is any other appeal or remedy available which you have not used? No. 19) Statement on the object of the application: This is the first and - I hope - the last time that I have to be in the situation of an accused person. This has been quite an experience. From the beginning of this overwhelming period I have tried to develope an objective standpoint, which at first was practically impossible, later it was easier. For some time. But the shock first came when I realized that mine was not a case of individual persecution but the com-mon experience af all those ( ome 3000 persons a year) who happen to be summoned to meet with the people of the Criminal court of Reykjavík. The others had simply kept silent. Many a thing to my disliking I have had to observe during the last four and a half year. What remains is a feeling of something going essentially wrong in our Judicial system. But I want to be sure and therefore I have decided to send the documentation for your objective, impartial evaluation. Your Court is widely respected and could have a very positive impact upon the situation here, which I see as a potential catastrophe if nothing will be done in the near future. Local possibilities are limited as usually in such cases. That is the reason for my application. 20) Statement concerning other international proceedings: None.21) Enclosed documents:a) A Short Report on the case nr. 272/1986 ( a copy)b) My article "Let us consider now!" that started the whole case. (in Icelandic together with an English translation)c) My article "Strike while the fly is sitting on my nose!" (in Icelandic together with an English translation)d) The Public Prosecutor Thordur Björnsson's letter to the Head of State Criminal Investigation Police, Hallvardur Einvardsson, dated May 21st 1984. ( Icel. copy and Engl. translation)e) The SCIP report on their interrogation with my statements. (Icel. copy and Engl. translation )f) The Icelandic Copyright act (art. 4) in English translation.g) A letter of January 9th 1984 from the Minister of Justice. ( Icel. copy and Engl. translation )h) Bill of Indictment, dated August 13th 1985. Issued by Public prosecutor Thordur Björnsson. (Icel. copy and Engl. transl.)i) The Criminal Court judgment of June 16th 1986. ( Icel. copy and Engl. translation )j) The confirmation of Sigurmar K. Albertssons appointment to advocate my appellate case, dated April 10th 1987. (Icel. copy and Engl. translation)k) My letter of May 14th 1987 to all Supreme Court judges regarding my right according to the law on the Supreme court and according to the Convention art. 6 and art 10 of Sec. I. ( Icel. copy and Engl. translation )l) My letter of Sept.8 to "advocate" Sigurmar K. Albertsson with my objections against his advocating the case. ( Icel. copy and Engl. translation )m) My letter of 8/9 1987 to Public prosecutor Hallvardur Einvardsson on the same subject. (Icel. copy and Engl. trl.)n) A transcript from the Judgment book of the Supreme court: hearing of September 22nd 1987 and Judgment of October 20th 1987 together with Gaukur Jörundsson's dissenting opinion. (Icel. copy and Engl. translation)o) My letter of 20/10 1987 to the Secretary of the Supreme court inquiring about documentation and facts of the appointment of the "advocate". ( icel. copy and engl. translation )p) A letter 27/10 from the Secretary of the Supreme Court with information about the destiny of my letter to the Public prosecutor as well as the appointment of SKA. (Icl.copy & Engl.trl.) Practically each and every point mentioned in the " Short Report" is well documented ( in Icelandic). I neither had time nor means to have everything translated now. Could more documents be introduced at a later stage?April 8th 1988EX QUESTIONAIRE:A L I S T O F R O L E SBecause Icelandic names are difficult for persons of other nationalities I set up a list of the names and their roles in the case.We distinguish between three different periodes of the case:A: from December 1983 to August 1985.B: August 1985 to August 1986.C: the year 1987.During A During B During CTórdur Björnsson: issued the prosecution partly absent retiredpartly prosecutingPétur Gudgeirsson: Debuty at Public prosecut- Prosecutingor's Investigation Judge.OfficeHallvardur Einvardsson: Head of SCIP during Public prosecutorinterrogations during Supr.CourtproceduresWith regards:________________________________Thorgeir Thorgeirson (sign) |
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| Each item of the report is supported
by one or more documents (see: list of documents in application)
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1983: The 7th and the 20th of December
I published two articles on police brutality in the daily Morgunbladid.
1983: The 27th of December the solicitor of the Association of Policemen in Reykjavík asked for an Official Investigation of those texts. 1984: The 21st of May Public Prosecutor Thordur Björnsson sent the case to The State Criminal Investigation Police for examination. The Head of SCIP at that time was Hallvardur Einvardsson who later had the role of Public Prosecutor for the same case at the Supreme Court. 1984: The 18th of June I was interrogated at the SCIP Headquarters where I gave answers to all questions asked by two Policemen, protesting though against their methods of examination:
2):The interrogators were Policemen and thus not in the position to conduct an impartial examination, the subject matter being my texts on the professional errors of their companions - if not their own errors. 1985: The 17th of September Judge Pétur Gudgeirsson ( formerly employed by Public Prosecutor Thordur Björnsson where PG was working during the period this case had been treated by that Office ) conducted the first session of The Criminal Court Trials. The session was not recorded on tape ( although this is obligatory according to Law nr. 74/1974: on Criminal Procedure ). Nor was any of the following sessions, which all were conducted by Judge Gudgeirsson. The Public Prosecutor abstained from Court which immediately caused a lot of confusion. Judge Gudgeirsson claimed to be representing the Prosecution as well, which seems to be the practice at The Criminal Court of Reykjavík. In the situation he was unwilling to accept my note on the Prosecutor's Bill of Indictment being unlawful, thus my bearings on this matter couldn't reach the Protocol of The CC until I had published them in a letter to the Judge in a daily and formally claimed the article to be numbered among the Documents of the case. 1985: The 24th of September my advocate, Tómas Gunnarsson, claimed the abdication and replacement of Judge Pétur Gudgeirsson on the basis that a Judge representing Prosecution in Court instantly becomes adverse to the cause of the defendant and thus involved in the case he is to judge. Adv. Gunnarsson also pointed out that our Constitution does not allow such endorsement of Prosecution. 1985: The 25th of September CC-Judge Pétur Gudgeirsson pronounced the following Judicial Decision of his: "Defendant's Thorgeir Thorgeirsson's claim that the Judge of this case be replaced by another person is overruled". 1985: The 25th of September advocate Gunnarsson (on my behalf) by telegram appealed Judge Gudgeirsson's Decision (of the same date) to The Supreme Court of Iceland. 1985: The 26th of September The Public Prosecutor's obstruction (motivated by Art. 171 of the Law nr. 74/1974) of my appeal was conveyed in a letter to CC-Judge Gudgeirsson. 1985: The 30th of September adv. Gunnarsson published an open letter to The Minister of Justice, Jón Helgason, in a daily of Reykjavík introducing to Mr. Helgason the situation of my case, objecting to many violations of good rules and prevailing Law that the Police, the Public Prosecutor and the Criminal Court had been executing. 1985: The 9th of October Public Prosecutor Björnsson suddenly was present in Court ordering his former employee, the Honorable Judge Gudgeirsson, around. Adv. Gunnarsson made his announcement that Art. 171 of the Law nr. 74/1974, used as motivation for the Prosecutor's obstruction formerly mentioned, was contrary to Art. 1 and Art. 60 of our Consti- tution. He asked for a suspension of the Court until the Ministry had responded to his letter of sept. 30th and decided weather an appeal to the Supreme Court would be allowed. 1985: The 18th of October The Ministry of Justice addressed a letter to adv. Gunnarsson supporting the Public Prose- cutor's obstruction of my appeal. "The Ministry has considered the matter and finds no reason to support your plea" Signed by Thorsteinn Geirsson and Thorsteinn A. Jónsson. 1985: The 23rd of October adv. Gunnarsson published an open letter to all Members of Parliament (Alþingi) explaining the situation of my case, reminding of the Parliamentarian's duty to survey the righteous conduct of Court. 1985: The 25th of October I published the formerly mentioned
letter to the Judge in a daily of Reykjavík where I declared the
Prosecutor's Bill of Indictment unlawful and put forward some
1985: The 25th of October the case was tried in presence of Public Prosecutor Björnsson who accepted that Gunnarsson's letter to the Parliamentarians and my letter to the Judge were numbered among Documents of the case. Adv. Gunnarsson once again insisted on the appeal to the SC being allowed to proceed. I was questioned about things completely irrelevant to my case and gave answers to all the questions asked. 1985: The 11th of November adv. Gunnarsson, in a letter to CC-Judge Gudgeirsson, asked for a " copy of any conclusion of the concerned Association of Policemen of Reykjavík insisting on the official investigation of Thorgeirsons's articles ". 1985: The 15th of November Einar Bjarnason, the Chairman of the Association of Policemen of Reykjavík testfied before the Court in presence of the Public Prosecutor that there " probably was existing some document " concerning the Association's wish to start this investigation, " at least " he could " remember the case being discussed ". 1986: The 17th of January CC-Judge Gudgeirsson received a negative answer from the Secretary of the Association of Policemen who didn't wish to forward any such conclusion of theirs. 1986: The 31st of January adv. Gunnarsson in Court stressed the fact that the Association of Policemen had failed to forward any evidence of their wish to start this case which left the Court without any legal body having asked for this " investigation ". Thus the case should be dismissed. 1986: The 28th of April the Public Prosecutor announced in Court that he was not going to deliver any verbal or written motivations of his prosecution in the case, nor was he going to be present at my verbal vindication, which of course left the Defense in a difficult position, having no concrete argumentation to oppose. 1986: The 16th of June CC-Judge Pétur Gudgeirsson sentenced me to 8 days of prison and payment of all costs. The strange thing about his motivation of this Sentence is that it rather sounds like a Prosecution text - which only is natural considering the fact that by abstaining from this last stage of the Trials Public Prosecutor Björnsson factually handed the power of Prosecution again to the Judge. Thus Mr. Gudgeirsson brings into the motivation of his sentence, composed of course after the delivery of my defense, numerous citations to judge made law and other "arguments" that neither had been mentioned to me nor to my advocate during the Trials. This is insufficient jurisprudence. If any. Another strange part of the CC-sentence was a very strict note my advocate, Tómas Gunnarsson, got for misconduct and offense of the Court and the Prosecutor during trials. Astonished by this highly unfair and professionally inconvenient note he contacted the Court asking for an explanation, and was then informed that his offense consisted in asking both the Judge and the Public Prose- cutor to pass a test to confirm if they really were literate. But those had been my words towards the end of the CC-trials as I finally got tired of the limited understanding of my texts the two Honorable Gentlemen under the circumstances could allow themselves. 1986: The 16th of June I appealed the case to The Supreme Court of Iceland and this time the appeal was granted by Public Prosecutor Björnsson. Due to the above mentioned note adv. Gunnarsson had got, he felt obliged to defend himself in the case which made him too involved to represent my interests. In this situation I decided to take over the Defense myself ( in accordance with Art. 6, 3 c of Section I of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Co E ) as well as a similar Art. ( 49 ) in prevailing local Law on The Supreme Court of Iceland nr.75/1973 ). 1987: The 4th of March I advertised this my decision in a letter to Magnus Thoroddsen, the President of The Supreme Court of Iceland, referring to many a precedent of others defending their own cases at the SC. In the same letter I listed up 12 different points on violation of good rule and prevailing Law being executed by the Public Prosecutor, the Police and the CC-Judge during the "investigation", many of which I already mentioned in this report. 1987: The 9th of March the Honorable President of the SC informed me that my wish to defend my own case had not been granted. 1987: The 11th of March I firmly protested in a registered letters to all the members of The Supreme Court of Iceland and had my Correspondence with the SC-President officially published in a daily of Reykjavík under the title ANALFABETISMUS REGALIS (Royal Analfabetism). 1987: The 6th of May adv. Sigurmar K. Albertson came to my home and informed me, verbally, that the 10th of april 1987 the President of The Supreme Court, Magnús Thoroddsen, had appointed him to defend my case at The Supreme Court. I immediately protested against this unlawful procedure and expressed my unwillingness to rely on SKA's assistance for a minute of my life. I also pointed out that SKA's conduct was more than questionable: hiding for over three weeks the fact that he secretly had taken over my interests. 1987: The 7th of May I protested again in registered letters to all Judges of the SC referring to my constitutional rights and other legal rights already mentioned in this document. A copy was sent to the Ministry of Justice. Without result. 1987: The 22nd of September Case 272/1986 was before the Supreme Court (see encl. documents) with Sigurmar K. Albertsson as my " advocate ". 1987: The 22nd of September I handed over a letter to the new Public Prosecutor, Hallvardur Einvardsson (former Head of the SCIP during the period they had "examined" the same case). This letter contained my plea for an Official Investigation of the appointment of Sigurmar K. Albertsson as my " advocate " and a list of other details. A copy also was handed over to the President of the sitting SC as well as Mr. Albertsson, before the trial started (see encl. documents ). The SC-trial being held all the same I have interpreted as the Public Prosecutor's de facto rejection of my plea. 1987: The 20th of October the SC-Judges: Gudmundur Jónsson, Gudmundur Skaftason, Arnljótur Björnsson and Magnús Þ.Torfason issued their Confirmation of the sentence of the Criminal Court. But SC-Judge Gaukur Jörundsson issued a Special Vote based on his concept of our Constitution ( see encl. documents ). Whereby all domestic remedies in the case have been exhausted. Conclusion: I hereby complain of the Icelandic State's violation of Art. 6, 3 c of Sec.I and Art. 10 of Sec.I of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe. And the violation of eventually other Art. that further consideration might add to the list. ___________________________________
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Presented at the Criminal Court of Reykjavik; 10.09.1985 |
| THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR announces:
That a case is to proceed before the criminal court of Reykjavík against author Thorgeir Thorgeirsson, domiciled at Bókhlödustígur 6 B, Reykjavík, born 30th of april 1933 at Hafnarfjördur, for defamatory imputations against policemen in two articles published in Morgunbladid. The first article bearing the title "Let us consider now" and the subtitle " An open letter to minister of justice Jón Helgason " appeared the 7th of December 1983. The second article bearing the title "Strike while the fly is sitting on my nose..." appeared the 20th of the same month and year. I. In the first article the following imputations are considered to be
defamatory:
In the second article the following imputations are considered to be defamatory:
The aforecited defamatory imputations that are directed against members of the Reykjavík police force without naming or assigning of individuals are considered to violate art. 108 of the general penal law nr. 19/1940. The claim is that the defendant be punished and sentenced to pay all costs of the case. The Public Prosecutor Office, Reykjavík,
(signed) Thordur Björnsson
2 The case will proceed at the criminal court of Reykjavík, helot at Borgartún 7, court room A, Tuesday the 10th of Sept- ember 1985 at 10 o'clock and the defendant is summoned to appear in court to hear the suit, answer it and hear his sentence. Chamber of Criminal
(signed) Pétur Gudgeirsson
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I present this case on behalf of Thorgeir
Thorgeirson,
residing at Bókhlöðustígur 6B in Reykjavík, national registry number 9563-3005, and I exhibit the following: This Brief and Exposition of Claims. Also the defendant's exposition with attached documents, i.e. a judgment in French, pronounced in Paris in 1857 over Gustave Flaubert, with documents relating to that judgment; a photocopy from Helgarpósturinn of 17 October 1985, an article on Sigurjón Sigurðsson, director of police in Reykjaík then in office; an article by Helgi Skúli Kjartansson in Lesbók Morgunblaðsins from 9 November 1985, and an article by Álfrún Gunnlaugsdóttir and Matthías Viðar Sæmundsson in Morgunblaðið of 27 May 1986. The defendant requests that the case be dismissed from court or that he be acquitted of all charges, and that he be indemnified and his counsel granted lawyer's fees on account of the proceedings in the lower instance; his counsel kr. 25,000.-, and himself kr. 50,000.-. I reiterate the main points relating to facts of the case. The defendant
has been working as an author for many years and enjoyed the recognition
of public authorities, as shown i.a. by the payment of author's salaries.
His work has been conducted under the protection of the final provision
of Article 72 of the Constitution, which reads: "Censorship or other limitations
to freedom of press may never be enacted."
The articles are not directed against particular public servants on account of their duties in public office. Their aim is rather to bring judicial authorities to endeavor to limit and prevent maltreatment and permanent injury inflicted on the citizens by policemen on duty. The Minister of Justice has replied to the writings of the defendant, and stated that the matter would be considered. Efforts to have the Reykjavík Police Association publish or exhibit its decision or resolution to lodge a complaint on account of the defendant's writings have been unsuccessful, cf. court exhibit no. XXII, and it is not certain, either, that such a resolution has been made, cf., the testimony of Einar Bjarnason, chairman of the Reykjavík Police Association, in criminal court on 15 November 1985. No individual public servant has lodged a complaint on account of the defendant's writings. The person to whom a reference is made in the defendant's earlier article was not Trausti Elliðason, notwithstanding the fact that the prosecution has made that assumption and exhibited evidence relating to him. As the case has progressed no confirmation of Trausti Elliðason's connections to the defendant's earlier article has been discovered. The Public Prosecutor has not attended to his duties relating to the
conduct of this case. He has not made an appearance during all court sessions
when the case has been brought up; he was not in attendance, e.g., when
a videotape of a program broadcast on Television 13 December 1983 was shown.
Arguments Relating to the Facts and the Law: The defendant's arguments in support of dismissal and acquittal are the following: The indictment constitutes an infringement on the part of the prosecution authority of the defendant's rights. His articles are cut down into individual sentences and words, in violation of Article 4 para. 2 of the Copyright Act, no. 73/1972, which reads: "Altering the product of a copyright holder, or publishing his product in such a manner or in such context as to prejudice his artist's honor or individuality, is prohibited." This conduct must result in dismissal of the case. The prosecution has waived submitting a brief in criminal court in support of the indictment. This means both that the prosecution authority has ceased prosecuting its case, and therefore the case should be terminated or acquittal granted for that reason alone. This also has the effect that preconditions for the defense counsel's work are lacking. After evidence has been collected in criminal court he lacks knowledge of the arguments the prosecution may employ when the case is submitted for adjudication. Thus the conditions as regards the substance of the arguments of the defense counsel are lacking, and he can not justly or equitably be expected to reply to arguments of which he may have very limited knowledge. The case should be dismissed from court on these grounds alone. As regards particular points of law relating to alleged violations of Article 108 of the General Penal Code no. 19/1940, the defendant wishes to state that it was not his intention to vituperate or insult or bring forth defamatory allegations against any particular public servant on account of the discharge of his duty; nor has any public servant lodged a complaint. I also call attention to the fact that the Morgunblaðið published the defendant's articles in about 40,000 copies. If anyone "brought forth" alleged insults or other expressions covered by the Article it is clearly Morgunblaðið. It is right and very proper to draw attention to activity which may
cause physical injury, bring it to light, and request official action to
prevent it. Such indications command little attention unless published
in the media, and even that frequently goes unnoticed. Strong words and
stylistic artifices also seem necessary to awaken people. This fact is
better known by authors and various specialists than by the general public.
Disclosure can not be avoided of the fact that the defendant has doubted the technical and subjective ability of the judge of the case, and of the Public Prosecutor, to read, and requested an investigation of this and an entry into the record, which request went unheeded. For this reason and to this extent the court session of 28 April 1986 was wrongly recorded. This is a source of great concern, to say the least. The defendant's request was prompted by the indications of authors from various countries whom the defendant met in West Germany last winter. In their opinion the case of the defendant resembled in various ways cases from the Soviet Union, as they considered that judges and other holders of power read laws and other rules almost exclusively with the understanding desirable in the view of the authorities, not objectively. It is also well known that language used by public authorities and various experts is so different from ordinary spoken language that it is very difficult and sometimes impossible for the general public to understand the authorities. There are also examples of authorities misunderstanding other authorities. Reading is highly important in connection with the case of the defendant. It is most important that his articles are read in their entirety, but not as individual words or sentences. The lawyer of the Police Association, Svala Thorlacius, seems originally to have understood this, cf. her letter in court exhibit no. III, of 27 December 1983. Later, an indication was received from the office of the Public Prosecutor to the effect that individual words and sentences should be taken out of the articles. The Office of the Public Prosecutor also seems to consider that not all provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no. 74/ 1974, need to be taken seriously, such as the beginning of Article 20 and also a provision of the same Act stipulating that the prosecution is to safeguard what may bring about acquittal of the defendant or work in his favor. Various other conduct of the prosecution authority indicates that it does not derive the common understanding from reading laws, rather an understanding which suits financial appropriations to the Office and other condit- ions pertaining to it. The judge of the case, Pétur Guðgeirsson, seems to read and understand the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Copyright Act in a similar way as the prosecution authority, as evidenced by his decision of 25 September 1985 of not to withdraw. The request for the judge's withdrawal was based on his tolerating the above infringements of law with a case in progress in criminal court. I also call attention to the court session of 10 September 1985, where
the following was recorded:
In the defendant's opinion the above points are conducive to doubt as regards the judge's ability to read; however, the defendant trusts him to read French, cf. the document exhibited. I refer again to the requests and arguments made, and in support of
them I refer to the documents exhibited, in so far as they support the
defendant's claims.
I submit the case for adjudication. Reykjavík 3 June 1986. Respectfully, |
Court Exhibit
No. XXVII: The Reykjavík Criminal Court, 3.6.1986 PG back |
| a written statement
To the Criminal Court of Reykjavík.
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INTRODUCTION
(To the Judge) During the more than one and a half years I have had to stand as accused owing to the performance of my duty I have repeatedly asked that a specialist assistant judge be called to read and understand my texts, the ones that Mr. Þórður Björnsson, Public Prosecutor, has indicted me for having written. This petition of mine is not in the slightest conflict with legal custom in comparable cases, and is all the more natural since it has become more apparent with every successive court session that the driving force behind the actions of the prosecution is clearly some kind of illiteracy, concomittant with a predilection for derangement and a lack of objectivity. The petition has been turned down, as have also my frequently repeated requests that the petition at least be entered into the record. It is also a fact that few entries have been made into the record on my initiative, except if I have first written about the matter in the news-papers. All this has detracted from my faith in the legal system as a whole and in the people who have to such a large extent allowed their own personal whims to influence the development of a case which originated in a mere request for an "investigation". I have now received an oral promise (but been refused to have it recorded, as usual), that I will be permitted to "speak" when the case is prosecuted and defended in court. At that time I thought I knew that the case would be argued orally. Since then the prosecution judicial authority has capriciously seen fit to deny oral presentation. Nevertheless I am led to believe that I shall be permitted to speak. As my trust is now at its end I feel entitled to doubt this, and I resort to delivering my exposition in written form - as it would surely be too obvious an attempt to make me ridiculous if I were to speak at an assembly where others have waived their right to speak. As I now decide to deliver my exposition in writing I yet again raise my petition that the judge call an assistant judge on whom all parties may agree: to read and interpret for himself the texts here at issue, their coherence and their message in its entirety. Also, to adjudge whether the treatment of my texts in the indictment conforms to the practices of civilized nations in such a situation - in other words whether the indictment does not constitute a violation of the Copyright Act and of international agreements which our country is duty bound to observe. In this document I reserve for myself a wider freedom of expression to the extent dictated by the necessity of explanation. A FEW FACTS
II. It has not proved possible to bring Icelandic authorities to perform a realistic and objective study of these matters. Nor is it they who suffer battery by defective policemen and doorkeepers. Except in rare cases. And such cases may be solved by simpler methods. III. It is of course the general public that suffers battery by policemen and doorkeepers. Such an experience is quite memorable, and, in the normal way of things, one person tells another. In that process descriptions frequently tend to become exaggerated. As the instances increase in number a public opinion is formed, which naturally is more rough-hewn, even, than the problem itself. To a significant extent, I used this public opinion as a main feature of my article "Let Us Consider Now". Public opinion is, of course, a fact by itself, and its causes are generally of less import and more agreeable. The two must be kept separated, since for example criticism of a landscape painting can never be regarded as a condemnation of the terrain where the painter stood while he applied the colors to the canvas, can it? IV. If public opinion turns sour confidence in policemen is lost, also in policemen who never have as much as hurt a fly. In the autumn of 1983 this loss of confidence had assumed proportions outright dangerous for public welfare. So, when the case of Skafti Jónsson emerged, I became aware of this danger. And my oft mentioned article published in Morgunblaðið of 7 December 1983 was my reaction to this dangerous situation. By writing the article I considered myself performing the duty of an honorable writer who studies the spirit of the nation and reports his findings without any eva ions. This is clear to any person who is willing to read the article in its entirety using the whole of his mental faculties to perceive what is written there. V. The article is, of course, especially written for persons who are completely literate, even though there is no possibility of preventing persons who read badly from viewing the text in their own way. But I can naturally not assume legal responsibility for such faults on the part of my readership, unless I waive my constitutional right of freedom of expression. Unfortunately, the reactions of the Police Association and later of the Public Prosecutor have their origins in the confused manner of reading which often is due to psychiatric disturbances, mental excitation, or proclivities which I still less desire to discuss. THE FACTS CONNECTED
WHAT ARE THE ANSWERS?
THE REACTIONS OF POLICE LEADERS
REACTIONS OF THE PUBLIC
THE REACTIONS OF OFFICIALDOM, THE COURT, AND OF MEMBERS OF
THE ALTHING
ILLITERACY (ANALFABETISMUS) AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POWER
HAVE MY WRITINGS DONE ANY GOOD ?
FINAL WORDS
As I am aware that my judge is able to read French I would appreciate
being allowed to attach to this document a photocopy of a 131 year old
judgment in a famous case against the author Gustave Flaubert. The prosecutor's
presentation of the case is also attached. That judgment has been considered
by many to mark the origins of modern copyright law, i.e., exactly the
ideas reflected by the international conventions on copyright which our
country is obliged to obey - and those ideas are also clearly evidenced
by Article 4 of the Copyright Act, no. 73/1972, to which I called the attention
of the judge already when the present case was first brought up in court:
that Þórður Björnsson's indictment itself violated.
The judge elected to turn a blind eye to this, hopefully only due to lack
of knowledge, not to willful meanness. Therefore I would like to ask him
to read carefully the arguments of the French prosecutor of 131 years ago.
Respectfully,
<signature>
Enclosures: 1) LE PROCES DE MADAME BOVARY (16 sheets)
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Court Exhibit No. XXIX
The Reykjavík Criminal Court, 3 June 1986 PG
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From the Judgment book of the Criminal court
Septrmber 30th 1986
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| The defendant, Thorgeir Thorgeirsson,shall
pay a fine of ikr. 10.000 or be imprisoned for 8 days should the fine not
be paid within 4 weeks from the rendering of this judgment.
The defendant shall pay all cost of the case inclusive the fee of ikr. 20.000 to his appointed advocate, Tómas Gunnarsson. Pétur Gudgeirsson This judgment is read aloud at 10:00 h. in presence of the convict and his advocate. The convict announces that he wishes to appeal the judgment to the Supreme Court of Iceland. Read aloud. Confirmed. They leave the court at 10:05 h.
Pétur Gudgeirsson
Confirming this is the name of the judge and the
court's seal.
July 22nd, 1986
The above stated judgment received by the Prosecutor's office along with a letter of last August 14th, and which the convict, Thorgeir Thorgeirson, has wished to appeal and the Prosecutor also considers essentially correct to appeal to the Supreme court for aggravation, which hereby is done and the case shall proceed as soon as possible. Consequently the convict, Thorgeir Thorgeirson, is summoned to be present at the Supreme court when the case will proceed there, to hear the suit, answer it and hear his sentence. No further summon is to be expected in this case. The Public Prosecutor Office, Reykjavík September 30th 1986 (signed) Hallvardur Einvardsson
Today this summon of appeal has been rendered to me. I wish that advocate Tómas Gunnarsson be appointed for my defense. Reykjavík 13 - 10 - 1986 (signed) Thorgeir Thorgeirson
Advocate Tómas Gunnarsson is appointed to speak for the defendant at the Supreme court. Reykjavík, October 15th 1986. (signed) Magnús Th. Torfason
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| THORGEIR
THORGEIRSON |
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| In this letter
the defendant is insisting on his (and anyone's) right to speak for himself in court. |
Reykjavík Sep. 8 1987
Hallvardur Einvardsson
Please find enclosed the copies of two letters to my "appointed advocate"
in the Supreme court case nr. 272/1986 as well as a copy of a statement,
dated May 5th, which I have sent to all the Supreme court Judges by registered
mail. As demonstrated in those letters I am of the opinion that my fundamental
rights have been essentially violated by the Supreme court's President
as he appointed this person to "advocate" my interests. In my mind this
appointment is a violation of human rights, a limitation of freedom of
speech and a forceful abuse against an accused person. In this connection
I refer to your duties concerning accused persons as well as to the Convention
for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council
of Europe, and to the law on the Supreme court of Iceland. And I specially
want to point out the fact that over three weeks had passed from the date
of Albertsson's appointment until he had the courage to convey the situation
to me. Without my knowledge he had, during this period, been in charge
of my affairs, which he had been discussing with a completely alien person
without my permission.
Finally I should like to use the opportunity to forward the wish that
the obligatory tapes of the Criminal court sessions of the case be submitted
in the Supreme court as documents of the case, in accordance with the law
on official proceedings.
Respectfully, ( signed ) Thorgeir Thorgeirson |
| THORGEIR
THORGEIRSON |
|
| See also:
A letter to the PP and A request for investigation |
Reykjavík Sep. 8 1987
Sigurmar K. Albertsson
Lögfrædiskrifstofan Klapparstíg 27 101 Reykjavík Acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 4th of this month, posted
the 5th, together with a list of cases to be heard at the Supreme court
where your name has been connected with mine in a manner I can by no means
tolerate.
Sincerely (signed)Thorgeir Thorgeirson |
| THORGEIR
THORGEIRSON |
|
|
|
A transcript from the Judgment book of
the Supreme court
|
| Year 1987, Tuesday September 22nd at 09:40 h. the
Supreme court Judges Gudmundur Jónsson, Gudmundur Skaftason,
Magnús Th.Torfason, the appointed Supreme court Judge, Gaukur
Jörundsson and Professor Arnljótur Björnsson
are assembled To hear:
case nr. 272/1986 The Public Prosecutor v/ Thorgeir Thorgeirson The appealed judgment of the Reykjavík Criminal court was pronounced
June 16th 1986 as follows:
This judgment is read aloud at 10:00 h in presence of the convict and
his advocate. The convict announces that he wishes to appeal the judgment
to the Supreme Court of Iceland.
Hallvardur Einvardsson ( sign ) The Secretary presents the documents of the case marked A-O. The case proceeded verbally. Public prosecutor Hallvardur Einvardsson represented the Prosecution forwarding the following claims on behalf of his Office: I. That defendant Thorgeirson be convicted in accordance with the indictment
and his conviction be aggravated from what the Criminal court had decided.
Appointed advocate Sigurmar K. Albertsson represented the defendant
forwarding the following claims:
II. For secondary liability: discharge. Furthermore he claims an advocate's fee as decided by the Supreme court. The advocate summed up the case and mentioned that he was pleading as an appointed advocate in accordance with the 3rd par. of art. 179 of the law nr. 74/1974, against the protests of the defendant, who had wished to speak for himself at the Supreme court. The Public prosecutor spoke again remonstrating the advocate's claims
for anulment of the appealed judgment ab initio together with the Bill
of Indictment. Annulment could not be motivated. The Prosecution demand
a judgment on merits in this case according to the Prosecutor's former
claims, which the Prosecutor reiterated and submitted the case to court.
Then the Court recessed while the Judges, the Public prosecutor and the
appointed advocate watched the videotaped copy of the program "Differing
opinions" that had been broadcast on the State TV, December 13th 1983.
The videotape was marked: Ó. The
Erla Jónsdóttir ( sign )
Year 1987, Tuesday October 20th the Supreme court of Iceland pronounced, in case nr. 272/1986 The Public prosecutor
the following judgment: This case is judged by the Supreme court Judges Gudmundur Jónsson, Gudmundur Skaftason, Magnus Th. Torfason and appointed Supreme court Judge, Gaukur Jörundsson and Professor Arnljótur Björnsson. The case was appealed to the Supreme court by a summon dated September 30th 1986 according to the wishes of the defendant and appealed for aggravation on behalf of the Prosecutor. The defendant's appointed advocate claims that the appealed judgment be annuled ab initio together with the Bill of Indictment and the case be remanded for a different procedure. For secondary liability he claims discharge. On behalf of the Prosecution the claim of annulment is remonstrated. Some new documents have been submitted to the Supreme court. In the first place the claim of annulment is based on the fact that
the Criminal court Judge Pétur Gudgeirsson had been employed as
deputy of the Public prosecutor, during the period this case was investigated
by the Office of the public
The Criminal court's decision about the defendant's guilt and its application
to penal law have to be approved of. The penalty decided by the Criminal
court is to be confirmed. The Criminal court decision on cost of the case
shall be
Accordingly the defendant must be sentenced to pay all cost of the appellate case inclusive a prosecutor's fee of ikr. 20.000 to the State and his Supreme court advocate's salary of ikr. 20.000. The sums are not inclusive taxes. Judgment: The appealed judgment is to remain unaltered except that the moratorium of the fine is set to 4 weeks from the rendering of this judgment. The defendant, Thorgeir Thorgeirson, is to pay all cost of the appellate case inclusive a prosecutor's fee of ikr. 20.000 to the State and his Supreme court advocate Sigurmar K. Albertsson's salary of ikr.20.000. This judgment is to be legally executed. A dissenting opinion
In cases prosecuted for punishment of defamatory imputations it has to be made unmistakably clear who is the defamed part. This is necessary for the defence of the accused and for the delicate precision of what inevitable limitations there should be imposed upon the general public debate in this respect. The introduction of the Bill of Indictment for this case states that the case is to proceed "for defamatory imputations against policemen", later there is stated, in part III of the indictment, that the mentioned defamatory imputations are directed against members of the Reykjavík police force without naming or assigning of individuals." Consequently the interpretation of the indictment is to be that the subject of the criminal act has been the Reykjavík police force in general. Even if the comments cited in the indictment are harsh and seem to remain
unmotivated, my opinion is, considering the aforementioned formulation
of the indictment, that there are no conditions to punish the defendant
on grounds of art. 108 of the general penal law, which has to be interpreted
with regard to the fundamental constitutional right of free expression
of opinions in writing and in speech.
Correct transcript certified by ( signed ) Fee ikr. 225,00 received:
|
| Thorgeir Thorgeirson | Speech at Strasbourg
I
on Application no. 13778/1988 : delivered before the Commission of Human Rights 14:03: 1990 |
|
| Contrary
to the Supreme Court of Iceland the Commission allowed mr. Thorgeirson
to speak for himself.
|
I.
Introduction and
claims
My name is Thorgeir Thorgeirson. I am a freelance
author, translator and journalist , born 30 April 1933; a citizen of Iceland,
resident of Reykjavík, Iceland, enjoying the rights listed in the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
which the State of Iceland ratified 3 September 1953. By a letter of 3
November 1987 I contacted the European Court of Human Rights with my complaint
after having been sentenced by the Supreme Court of Iceland 20 October
1987. On 14 April 1988 the Commission received my Application and supporting
material; marked: a) - p) Icel. 272/1986, fulfilling the conditions
of Art. 25 and 26 of The Convention. The bases for my application were
Art. 6. 3 c and Art. 10 of Section
I, with retention of rights to bring complaints under other relevant laws
and conventions as might prove appropriate. Now I am exercising those rights
and bringing further complaints under Art. 6, Art. 8, and Art. 10 of Section
I, and retaining my right to claim just satisfaction under Art. 50
of Section IV. Other documents which I have presented to the Secretary
are my 5 COMMENTING POINTS on the observations of the Icelandic Government
concerning Application no. 13778/1988 (Aug. 1989) with 6 supporting documents,
numbered: Comm. points 1) to 3), and: PS doc. 1) to 3). Finally I
forwarded supporting material 21 Feb. 1990, marked: doc. Thorgeirson v.
Iceland, 1990; a)- e)
II.
A summary
As doc. a) Icel. 272/1986 indicates, my open
letter to the Minister of Justice, reproduced in doc. b) 272/1986 and
another article reproduced
in doc. c) 272/1986 gave rise to the criminal case against me. The history
of the case is given in doc. a) 272/1986. To demonstrate that I have exhausted
all local remedies provided by Icelandic law, I now present the doc. a)
Thorgeirson v. Iceland 1990, A
REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION, which in fact was received and rejected
by the Supreme Court of Iceland, as confirmed in doc. p) Icel. 272/1986.
Among the faulty elements of the proceedings against me were:
1. The Reykjavík Police Society, or its board, had initiated the case without later being able to submit any document confirming this highly questionable initiation. 2. The case was investigated by the State Criminal Investigation Police ( SCIP ), against my protest, as may be verified in doc. e) Icel. 272/1986. As the SCIP cannot be considered impartial or an open tribunal in the sense of Art. 6.1, this investigation was a violation of Art. 6.1 of the Convention. 3. The Bill of Indictment was a violation of prevailing Icelandic law and of Art. 8 of the Convention, as will be demonstrated. 4. The Public Prosecutor's office
issued the Bill of Indictment on 13.08.1985. Just prior to that time, Mr.
Pétur Guðgeirsson was a staff member of the Public Prosecutor's
office and very likely became acquainted with the case there. Guðgeirsson
left the Public Prosecutor's office in July 1985 and became the Criminal
Court
5. Judge Guðgeirsson himself conducted the Criminal Court investigation, acting as a representative of the Public Prosecutor's office. He thus could not have acted with impartiality as prescribed by Art. 6 of the Con- vention. 6. When Judge Guðgeirsson ruled against my motion that he remove himself from the case for lack of impartiality, the ruling was appealed, but the Public Prosecutor's office denied the appeal with reference to Art. 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no. 74/1974. 7. The legal duty of recording the Criminal Court proceedings by phonographic means never was observed, and most claims for records were simply overruled by Judge Guðgeirsson. ( Art. 6 ) 8. My lawyer was reprimanded by Judge Guðgeirsson, without cause, and thus excluded from any further defense of my case. This provided the President of the Supreme Court, Magnús Thoroddsen, with the opportunity to force a new defense counsel upon me completely against my will, thus violating Art. 6.3 c of the Convent- ion and the laws governing the Supreme Court of Iceland as well as the Icelandic Code of Civil Procedure. 9. All this resulted in damage to my professional standing and to my personal life. Clearly all the facts of the case violate both Art. 8 and Art. 10 of the Convention. Having suffered considerable professional and personal damages I reserve all rights to claim just satisfaction under Art. 50 of the Convention. 10. In addition to this, I shall
demonstrate that the laws under which the Bill of Indictment was brought
( Art. 108 of the General Penal Code of Iceland ) clearly are a violation
of various articles of the Icelandic Constitution as well as of both Art.
6 and Art. 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Funda-
III.
Principles
1. The idea
of free expression or the liberty "to print and publish the truth, from
good motives and for justifiable ends" ( Black's Law Dictionary on liberty
of the press ) is both an individual right to be respected, and a contribution
to the rights of the public to receive information and ideas. Observing
the masses of Eastern Europe rising to secure this major premise of democratic
society, recently we have had an opportunity to realize that free access
to opinions and knowledge - especially offending opinions and hidden knowledge,
as they are more likely to open new horizons - is a necessary condition
for our democracy as well. I, naturally, have not been able to find a satisfactory
general definition of this liberty. Armies of scholars seem to have
been occupied for ages formulating all kinds of limitations to freedom
of expression, without ever defining what they are limiting. Liberty has,
to date, mainly been defined by negations. Such definitions pose a great
danger, since each of them inevitably is a reduction of liberty. If freedom
of expression is to prevail, we shall have to construe its conventions
and declarations broadly and employ definitions sparingly.
2. Concerning my newspaper article: "Let us consider now!" contained in doc. b) Icel. 272/1986, I wish to reiterate my former declaration, that writing this open letter to the Minister of Justice was the professional duty of a journalist who personally had experienced unmotivated police brutality, and who, after studying a number of similar cases, had found that this rapidly increasing problem was due to a minority of primitive persons employed by the Reykjavík police force. I also had discussed the matter with several attorneys, all of whom advised against suing individual policemen because, as they said, our judicial system would offer no probability of winning a case against a police officer. 3. My right to do this duty is a matter of interpretation of Art. 72 of the Constitution of Iceland as well as of Art. 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 4. The strong tone of my article is both justified and necessitated by its content. Any milder tone would have been an extenuation of my conviction. The article reported on a small group of "brutes" within the Reykjavík police force. No individual was singled out nor was the force in general defamed. On the contrary, my experiences of the kind and helpful nature of the average policeman in Reykjavík are clearly expressed. The police force in general did not suffer in the public opinion as a result of my article. But their own initiation of the case against me damaged them severely, because the public immediately concluded that this was a manifestation of the powerful influence of the above mentioned minority of "brutes" within the board of the Reyjavík Police Society. The Supreme Court judgment in my case, based on a general condemnation of the police force, which my article never expressed, since this would have been contrary to my opinion, resulted in a serious blow to the reputation of the Reykjavík police force. This was a lamentable accident, of course. 5. But accidents
are apt to happen in a system where freedom of expression is not
considered " applicable to ideas that offend, shock or disturb " ( ref:
point 41 of the Court's Judgment of the Lingens Case, 1986 ) as well as
to more favorable opinions.
6. The content of the second newspaper article, contained in doc. c) Icel. 272/1986 is, of course, not prosecutable under Art. 108 of the Icelandic Criminal Code since Mr. Bjarnason and Mr. Elíasson had not been acting as public servants during the TV-program in question. And my article did not refer to them as such.
IV.
The process
1. On 15 November
1985 Einar Bjarnason, the Chairman of the Reykjavík Police Society,
testified at the Criminal Court of Reykjavík on his and Mr. Elíasson's
appearance in the above mentioned TV-program. He stated that they had been
acting as private individuals, not as policemen. At first he could not
remember any document that they had read aloud during the program.
(See: doc. c) Icel. 272/1986 ). After being shown the videotape of the
incident, however, he admitted having read the document aloud. He also
confessed that the document had been typed at the Reykjavík police
station and that police officer Jóhannes Jónasson had visited
the signatory (Trausti Elliðason) and "made him sign the document"
that would be lost. He could not explain how the police had found out about
the dates of my hospitalization ( See doc. c) Icel.272/1986 ). My own inquiries
showed that I had been isolated at Intensive Care until the very
day the signatory of the above document had left the hospital - and I could
not possibly have seen him. Thus, he not only was not, but could not have
been, the person referred to in my article "Let us consider now!". After
this evidence was presented to the court, Elliðason's "testimony" against
me was dropped without comment and Judge Guðgeirsson overruled all
requests by the defense for a further investigation into this matter.
He also refused to investigate how the police force gathered computer information
about my personal life. ( Art. 8). This is mentioned to illustrate the
methods that have been used against me in a case the Ministry of Justice
seems to classify as a "demanding" or "extensive" one ( p. 15 of the Governmental
observations of 26 June 1989 ). And I have presented a document: Thorgeirson
v. Iceland 1990 e), containing threats by a high ranking officer within
the Reykjavík police force, to demonstrate the aims and ambitions
of the initiators of the case.
2. Since 27 December
1983 most publishers in Iceland have been reluctant to deal with me, some
mentioning the risk of publishing texts by someone who has the whole system
of power against him.
V.
The context
1. Having considered
the vulnerable situation of freedom of expression in general and the vindictive
initiation of this particular case, I cannot escape the conclusion that
the good principle of "Justice must not only be done; it must also be seen
to be done!" has in this case practically been subverted to: "Injustice
must be visible enough to inhibit other writers from telling the truth
!". An author who believed himself to be doing his professional duty
"from good motives and for justifiable ends" was in this case found guilty
of expressing an opinion he never had and never, in fact, professed.
2. As the judgment
in this case could not be the result of an impartial and independent tribunal,
and a combination of many deplorable things was involved, the context of
the case becomes especially important. I thus shall give a more detailed
picture of three elements: The police investigation, the Bill of Indictment,
and Art. 108 of the General Penal Code of Iceland that was applied
in the case. Finally I shall give a brief impression of what
it was like to face Prosecution, Inquisition and Judgment in one person.
VI.
The SCIP investigation
1. The State Criminal
Investigation Police were disqualified in the case because: a) their daily
procedures violated ( and, indeed, still violate ) fundamental rights of
accused persons, and b) the newspaper articles involved in this investigation
specially treated the negative aspects of the SCIP-procedures, as was declared
by my attorney answering question no. 2 on doc. e) Icel. 272/1986.
Answering question no. 3 of the same document, I clearly reiterated this
and demanded a further investigation into their methods. My theory, supported
by information from within the Reykjavík police, was that police
captain Gudmundur Hermannsson, together with his son, SCIP-captain Arnar
Guðmundsson, while acting in a private, not official, capacity had
conducted a prepara- tory "investigation" through questionable access to
the hospital computer. There they found the name of a pers- on, Trausti
Elliðason, whom they "made sign" the above "testimony" that later failed
to do its job after I had proved that I could never have seen the signatory.
2. Important as
this dubious "testimony" at first seemed to the investigators ( the
SCIP-men as well as Criminal Court judge Guðgeirsson ), it suddenly
lost its importance as soon as its forged nature became obvious. Judge
Guðgeirsson's emphasis on this "testimony" against me at first and
his total disregard of it as soon as it turned in my favor, are among the
many indications of his unmistakable hostility towards me during the case.
This personal attitude of his may have various explanations. Some of it
may have stemmed from his sympathy towards the police in general, some
from prejudice towards writers in general or towards my activity in the
press in particular. How should I know? One thing is certain, though: His
ideas about freedom of expression proved to be as archaic as his principles
of the judiciary. Other indications can be seen in the text of his judgment
and in the "Observations to the Minister of Justice" he signed 15 October
1987, contained in doc. 1) with my 5 COMMENTING POINTS last August.
VII.
The Bill of Indictment
From the beginning, I have protested against the
Bill as being a misstatement of the convictions expressed in my articles.
Since the Bill of Indictment is an official assertion that my work was
criminal, and since it presents words and phrases in my articles completely
out of context, I have felt that my work has, indeed, been "altered and
made available to the public in a context that is prejudicial to the author's
individuality", and thus a violation of Art. 4 of the Copyright Act ( See:
doc. f) Icel.272/1986) as well as Art. 8 of the Convention. When I voiced
this complaint at a Criminal Court hearing of the case on 17 September
1985, the investigator-prosecutor Judge Guðgeirsson refused to record
the complaint on the grounds that " he was in charge of this investigation
". On the other hand, at the hearing of 24 September 1985 he recorded: "the defendant's indication that the Bill of Indictment contained a violation of Art. 4 of the Copyright Act has not come to the knowledge of the Prosecution". In spite of my insistence I never could get this indication of mine through, nor were my demands that a literary assessor be nominated to the case, ever recorded. Thus the judgments of the case have been based on a wilful misinterpretation of my newspaper articles. I already have stated why part II of the Bill is defective: The content of the second newspaper article never was prosecutable under Art. 108 of the Criminal Code. Another defect is part III's application of Art. 108 for the protection of a whole class of people. Art. 108 says: "Whoever vituperates or otherwise insults a public servant ...etc." And finally, Art. 108 of the General Penal Code of Iceland is highly questionable a legislation per se, as I shall demonstrate. VIII.
Art. 108 of the
GPC
As in the Lingens case my sentence is " likely
to deter journalists from contributing to public discussion -
liable to hamper the press in performing its task ". I have presented three
new documents: b), c) and d) Thorgeirson v. Iceland 1990 to demonstrate
the concern of our journalists and authors vis-à-vis Art.
108 of the General Penal Code. In practice, Art. 108 is repeatedly being
used to terrorize authors and journalists and inhibit them from telling
uncomfortable truths about public servants.
You may have noticed the absence of the EXCEPTIO VERITATIS rule in Art. 108 of the Icelandic Penal Code, which makes my case so fundamentally different from both the cases of Lingens and Barfod, since both Art. 77 of the Greenland Penal Code and Art. 111 of the Austrian Penal Code clearly demonstrate the rule of EXCEPTIO VERITATIS. The late dr. Gunnar Thoroddsen, in his fundamental work on libel and defamation before Icelandic courts, reasons that the rule of exceptio veritatis is valid as a general rule in the Icelandic judiciary in spite of the fact that this rule is not to be found in any article of Icelandic law. This he very correctly deduces from the clear exclusion of the rule in Art. 108 ( "An allegation, even if proven, brings fines, etc."). The article would, of course, not exclude a rule if it were not generally valid. This raises some questions: Why do civil servants enjoy this privilege? Is this perhaps in conflict with Art. 78 of the Icelandic Constitution? ( See: doc. Comm. points 2) ) Does not the exclusion of the exceptio veritatis rule negate the presumption of innocence and violate Art. 6.2 of the Convention, the guilt being a simple matter of taste " on which disagreement or argument is futile " ( Judge Woolsey in his judgment lifting the US ban on Joyce's Ulysses ) and without the defendant's possibility of proving his innocence? Can a democratic state have such a discretionary clause concerning the freedom of expression prevailing in law without risking violations of Art. 10 of the Convention? All those questions are worth consideration. IX.
The absence of
the public Prosecutor
As must be clear from the observations of 5 Criminal
Court judges I cited in point 03 on pages 6 to 8 of " 5 COMMENTING POINTS
", the absence of the Public Prosecutor from The Criminal Court
added the duties of prosecution to an already overloaded inquisitorial
judge. Representing Prosecution means asserting the guilt of the defendant,
and who can remain impartial towards his own claims? That alone completely
destroys the appearance of impartiality. This, of course, also colors the
questions of the Inquisitor who is the most prominent of the three gentlemen
in one a defendant is confronted with when summoned before the Criminal
Court of Reykjavík. If the defendant is a person who learned in
school that our security under the law was guaranteed, the confrontation
with this judiciary Trinity can be compared to the shock of experiencing
an earthquake of the highest degree. All of a sudden, there is no legal
or moral ground beneath your feet.
The fear you experience is a very solitary one. Much later you might be capable of sharing such an experience with another person. Not immediately. You feel the impossibility of just treatment in the form of hostile questions from someone who will also interpret your answers and judge them, and you feel his "synchronization" with the police very strongly. The immediate result is a justifiable fit of paranoia. The very private quality of this experience shows the profound nature of what has been taken from you: You no longer enjoy as fundamental a human right as security under the law. This, perhaps, is what makes my case different from the cases of Piersack and De Cubber. In my case, the violations hardly can be traced to single human errors within a comparatively secure judicial system since they are due to archaic rules of the "age-old inquisitorial procedure" ( See: 5 COMM. POINTS , page 6 ) which are still in effect at the Criminal Court of Reykjavík. X.
Conclusion
Reiterating my complaints under Art. 6, Art. 8
and Art. 10 of Sec. I, and retaining the right to claim just satisfaction
under Art. 50 of Sec. IV of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, I would like the honored members of this
Commission to consider the questions I have raised and admit the
Application 13778/ 1988.
Thank you. |
back |
| Thorgeir Thorgeirson: |
|
filed: September 5th 1991
|
|
*
**
|
I am filing this memorial, together
with the documents numbered I-VIII) 1991/ 13778/88, according to the Court's
invitation in a letter of 06.06.1991.
The content of the memorial:
1) A note on Judge Vilhjálmsson's nomination to the Court. However important it may seem to have a judge of one's own nationality on the Court I have to express my fears that the nomination of Mr. Vilhjálmsson might bring discredit to the impartiality of the Court. Personally, I have nothing against Judge Vilhjálmsson but I wish to point out that: a) he was among the recipients of a registered letter ( given in doc. k) Icel. 272/1986 ) I sent to all Supreme Court Judges in Iceland, and that he then did take a stand in the case by his silence regarding one of the points I later complained of in my Application to the Commission. Thus his qualification to deal with the case could be questioned. b) He was connected with the case of magazine "Spegillinn" (16/1983), mentioned in my request to the Public Prosecutor for official investigation of the Supreme Court ( doc. a) Thorgeirson v. Iceland 1990 ). My request for a special investigation regarding the connection of my case ( 272/1986) to case 16/1983 never was carried out to clear the question, which leaves me with a justified suspicion. * c) After my case had been referred to the Commission, Judge Vilhjálmsson did approach me trying to advise the withdrawal of my Application, pronouncing his firm conviction that my Application was "nonsensical". However friendly he has been pronouncing his consultations, this prejudice of his is somewhat disturbing. Considering the importance of the Court's impartiality I feel obliged to mention these facts, as each of them might point to a possible conflict of Judge Vilhjálmson's interests while adjudicating. ** The Report of the Commission states: "The factual elements upon which
the applicant based his strong criticism of the prevailing situation may
in some respects be uncorroborated ..." ( p. 24, para 81 ). This statement
prompted me to introduce doc. I) 1991/13778/88 containing the full and
unabridged defense of the case in the Reykjavik Criminal Court for your
reconsideration as well as doc. IV) 1991/ 13778/88 presenting Mr. Valgeirsson's
request for an official investigation to clear his own professional reputation,
a request of exactly the same nature as the Police Association's request
that started my case in December 1983. I should like to draw your kind
attention to the prosecutor's answer in Valgeirsson's case, especially
the sentence: "A complaint, or at least a reasonable suspicion of such
conduct, is a prerequisite for initiating such investigation." As the Public
Prosecutor, in my case ( Dec. 1983), undeniably initiated such investigation,
without any complaint having been forwarded, he must, at the time, have
had as reasonable a suspspicion about police brutality as any other citizen
of Iceland. And I see the suspicion of such an authority as a firm corroboration
of my credibility. Therefore, I am introducing this exchange of letters
into the case. But, of course the main corroboration of my strong criticism
lies in the doc. V) 1991/13778/88 consisting of some fragments from
Judge Ingibjörg Benediktdóttir's sentence in a case of police
brutality, strikingly similar to what I had been describing in my article
"Let us consider now!" in December 1983. I saw no reason for having repeated
descriptions of half a dozen witnesses on the same incident translated.
Therefore, I am introducing only fragments of this remark-able judgment.
If required I can have the whole judgment of 50 pages translated. The choke
holds I mention in my article of 7 Dec. 1983 also were subject to investigation
in connection with case 232/1991, and I have included translations of testimonies
given by different policemen before the court to demonstrate the delicacy
of this topic. Their testimonies also support my opinion, already expressed
in Dec. 1983, that the majority of policemen are honest but fearful people.
Reading this document on the conduct of a policeman in uniform mishandling
an innocent citizen he was meant to defend, certainly calls for strong
reactions: Words like beastly, savage, brutal, bullish, pervert or sadistic
inevitably enter your mind. A harsh action calls for harsh words.
3) Claims under Art. 50 of the Convention. In doc. IX) 1991/13778/88 I have outlined my claims under Art. 50
of the Convention. The claims under I. cover a considerable part of the
direct cost of the case. The claims under II. are based on the fact that
for 7 years I have occupied the situation of a dissident person. Different
state organs as Police force, Courts, State radio, State television and
others have more or less been organized against me in a way that never
was completely fair. As mentioned in the document my claims are absolutely
minimal. In fact they could be seen as just symbolical figures to fulfill
the moral duty of claiming some reparation from a state that demonstratively
has been practicing persecution of an individual on account of his opinions.
4) On DOCUMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS in chronological order. Realizing the mess I have made of the numbering system of the forwarded documents and observations of the case, I had a special booklet with all my material in chronological order produced. This I did to facilitate the study of the case and, especially, to make references during the hearings more convenient. Under separate cover I am sending 15 copies for the Commission and the Judges of the Court. Should more copies be needed I can have them made at a short notice. Respectfully, _____________________
To
|
back |
| Thorgeir Thorgeirson |
|
|
| Unlike
the Supreeme Court of Iceland the Courrt of Human Rights
permitted mr. Thorgeirson to speak for himself in court.
|
Mr.
President, Members of the Court!
I thank you for having invited me to speak for myself and, eventually, answer your questions at the hearings. As introduction of myself and this case I refer to page 130 of the booklet DOCUMENTS & OBSERVATIONS where my speech before The Commission on March 14 1990 is printed. As a sequel to that speech, I shall give an account of the background to my article: "Let us consider now!", which, strangely enough, has been under consideration at many a tribunal for almost a decade. When I, during the first week of December 1983, sat down to write
this article I did not do so on the spur of the moment. The problem had
"for several years been bothering - if not obsessing - my mind" as may
be read on page 18 of DOCUMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS. A whole decade
earlier, in 1973, I had witnessed, in Reykjavík, an incident of
completely unmotivated police brutality. I offered to testify on behalf
of the victim who had registered a complaint, which he later withdrew,
following his attorney's advice that there was nothing to gain and he probably
would lose his reputation for life by confronting the Police Force
in public.
Your Honors! I
have been classified as a socially engaged writer with a realistic approach
to life. I am old enough to know human nature, and police brutality alone
never could have worried me all that much. But the difficulty of having
police brutality openly discussed, and moreover the impossibility of having
cases examined impartially, bothered me so much that I had tried to contact
high ranking persons and make them conscious of this state of affairs (
see my open letter to the Minister of Justice, Mr. Helgason, on page 21
of DOC & OBS ). I quote: "Two of your predecessors in office have received
letters from me regarding these problems. Neither of them had the courtesy
to answer."
Your Honors! Allow
me to quote the Russian poet Alexander Blok. In a famous poem called: To
a young lady, he writes:
Your Honors! As you will have noticed I have sought to corroborate the factual background of my article: "Let us consider now!" with documents issued by state institutions, which from the very beginning have supported the truth of my words, but at the same time they have shown a merciless determination to convict me for telling the truth. I should like to give those institutions credit for their corroboration of truth. However I must disagree with them on the other point and accuse them of violating art. 10 of the Convention, making the obvious truth punishable by methods incompatible with art. 6 and art. 8 of the Convention as well. Allow me to quote the important dissenting opinion of appointed Supreme Court Judge Gaukur Jörundsson ( page 99 of DOC & OBS ) that "there are no conditions to punish the defendant on grounds of art. 108 of the general penal law, which has to be interpreted with regard to the fundamental constitutional right of free expression of opinions in writing and in speech." Your Honors! The
question might well be put: Why did I not collaborate and forward my often
mentioned interviews during the processes to back up my opinions? The answer
is simple. I had read police captain Sigurðsson's threat ( reproduced
on page 34 of DOC & OBS ) and later realized that members of the Police
Force would go as far as to break into computerized files of the City Hospital
to seek out someone, who in reality, never had seen me, and make him sign
a fraudulent document against my reputation which was later read on television;
having realized that the State television had no intention to publish a
correction in my favor; and finally; having realized the nature of the
judicial system handling the case, I made up my mind to reserve my internationally
recognized right to protect my sources.
Your Honors! Reiterating
my former claims, with reference to all the material forwarded in my booklet
DOCUMENTS & OBSERVATIONS, as well as later filed material, I thank
you for your kind attention and submit to your judgment the immediate fate
of my right to free expression of opinion in speech and in writing.
|
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| Claims under Art. 50 of the Convention
Case 47/1991/299/ 370 Thorgeirson against Iceland |
| I.
Reimbursement for costs and spare time spent on the case: isk.: 1.551.275, - II. Reduced earnings: isk. 24.050,- pr. month during the years 1984 - 1991: isk.: 2.020.200, - ____________ I. + II. isk: 3.571.475, - ___________________________________
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ARTICLES: 6-1 ; 10 ; 50
The European
Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article 43 (art. 43)
of the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("the Convention") and the relevant provisions of Rules of Court,
as a Chamber composed of the following judges: Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr L.-E. Pettiti, R. Macdonald, Mr A. Spielmann, Mr S.K. Martens,
Mrs E. Palm, Mr R. Pekkanen, Mr A.N. Loizou, Mr Gardar Gíslason,
ad hoc judge, and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar,
[...] Delivers the following
judgment, which was adopted on [28 may 1992]:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred
to the Court on 8 March 1991 by the European Commission of Human Rights
("the Commission"), within the three-month period laid down in Article
32 para. 1 and Article 47 of the Convention. It originated in an application
(no. 13778/88) against the Republic of Iceland lodged with the Commission
under Article 25 by Mr Thorgeir Thorgeirson, an Icelandic citizen, on 19
November 1987.
[...] The object
of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether or not the facts
of the case disclosed breach by the respondent State of its obligations
under Articles 6 para. 1 and 10 of the Convention.
2.- 6. [paragraphs 2 - 6
describe the proceedings before the Court, and in particular the exchange
of memorials and other submissions between the parties, the composition
of the Chamber of the Court and the names of the persons representing the
parties].
AS TO THE FACTS
I. Particular circumstances
of the case
A. Background
7. Mr. Thorgeir Thorgeirson is an Icelandic
citizen. He is a writer and resides in Reykjavik, Iceland.
8. From 1979 to 1983 a number
of incidents occurred in Iceland involving allegations of police brutality,
about ten of which were reported to the police. The last such complaint
was made in the autumn of 1983 by a journalist, Mr Skafti Jonsson, and
it led to the prosecution of three members of the Reykjavik police, of
whom two acquitted and one convicted. His case received extensive coverage
by the press and gave rise to considerable discussion on the relations
between the public and the police. This caused the applicant to publish
two articles on police brutality in the daily newspaper Morgunbladid on
7 and 20 December 1983 respectively.
9. The first article read
as follows (translation):
see pag. ?-?
10. Extracts from the second
article read as follows:
see pag.?-?
11. In response to
these articles, the Ministry of Justice sent the applicant a letter dated
9 January 1984. It informed him that the problems raised in the articles
were being reviewed at various levels and that the matter on the agenda
of the Parliament (Althing) so that the Minister of Justice could report
to it in the near future on studies and proposals which had been made in
this field.
B. Investigation and
defamation proceedings
12. By letter of 27 December 1983, the Reykjavik
Police Association had asked the public prosecutor investigate the aforementioned
allegations. Accordingly, he sent the case to the State Criminal Investigation
Police ("SCIP") on 21 May 1984 to examine whether the publications constituted
defamation within the meaning of Article 108 of the General Penal Code
of 1940 (Law no. 19/1940 - "the Penal Code"). On 18 June the interrogated
the applicant, who was assisted by his lawyer.
13. As a result, on 13 August
1985 the public prosecutor issued a bill of indictment charging the applicant
defamation of unspecified members of the Reykjavik police, contrary to
Article 108 of the Penal Code.
14. The following passages
of the first article were considered to be defamatory:
"beasts in uniform" (paragraph 9(3) above);
"of those wild beasts in uniform" (paragraph 9(6) above);
"The young man's room-mates told me that his injuries had been
inflicted by bouncers of a restaurant and policemen. At first
I could not believe this, so I inquired among the hospital
staff and - Yes, they were right; had there a victim of the Reykjavik night-squad"
(paragraph 9(9) above);
"I then found out that most people had various stories of persons
who had had a similar or even worse with the beasts in uniform.
Individuals reduced to a mental age of a new-born child as
a result of that policemen and bouncers learn and use with brutal spontaneity
instead of handling people with prudence care. There are so many such stories,
identical in substance, that you can hardly dismiss them merely
as lies any more" (paragraph 9(10) above);
"victims of the police brutes" (paragraph 9(11) above);
"allowing brutes and sadists to act out their perversions" (paragraph
9(13) above).
15. The second article was
also considered to contain a defamatory statement:
"Their behavior was so typical of what is gradually becoming
the public image of our police force defending itself: bullying,
forgery, unlawful actions, superstitions, rashness and
ineptitude" (paragraph 10(15) above).
16. On 9 September 1985 the indictment
was served on the applicant; it summoned him to appear at a sitting on
the following day of a chamber of the Reykjavik Criminal Court, of which
Judge Petur Gudgeirsson was the only member. At the applicant's request,
the arraignment was adjourned until 17 September. On that day the court
a sitting at which he appeared, accompanied by Mr Tomas Gunnarsson, a Supreme
Court lawyer; the prosecutor was not present. The sitting proceeded as
follows:
(a) As required by the second
paragraph of Article 77 of the 1974 Code of Criminal Procedure
(Law no. 74/1974), the judge informed the defendant that he was being questioned
as he was suspected of committed an offense.
(b) Mr. Tomas Gunnarsson
was appointed as the applicant's defense counsel. All the case
documents handed to them.
(c) The applicant was asked
by the judge whether he had written the two newspaper articles. He
replied that he had, but pointed out that the passages quoted in the indictment,
while correct, had been removed from context.
(d) The judge confronted
the applicant with a record of his statement to the SCIP on 18 June 1984
and with his letter to them of 19 June. The applicant confirmed the accuracy
of the record and that he had written the letter.
(e) When asked by the judge
whether he could substantiate the relevant passages in his articles,
the applicant maintained that, in their context in the indictment - on
which he had already commented -, he was neither able obliged
to do so; this was not his literary product, but the product
of the accuser.
(f) The applicant asked
to be given time in which to acquaint himself with the case documents
and to prepare his comments. Another sitting was scheduled for 24 September
1985.
17. On that date the applicant
and his counsel appeared before the court, again in the absence of the
prosecution. Counsel submitted a motion that Judge Petur Gudgeirsson should
withdraw, on the ground that, in addition to acting as judge, he had represented
the prosecution because of its absence at this and the previous sittings.
18. On 25 September 1985
the judge decided as follows:
"This case does not warrant (an adversarial procedure) according to
Article 130 of the Code of Procedure .... (The applicant's) motion that
the judge yield his seat is unsupported by any valid arguments and totally
unfounded. The judge is neither obliged nor allowed to yield his seat."
19. On 26 September 1985
the prosecution, pursuant to Article 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
refused the applicant's request for leave to file an appeal by way of a
summary procedure against that decision with Supreme Court. He subsequently
asked the Ministry of Justice to appoint an ad hoc prosecutor to
whether leave should be granted, but this request was refused on 18 October.
20. During the period from
9 October 1985 until 28 April 1986, the Criminal Court held six more sittings
at which the applicant and his counsel were present. Documents were submitted,
oral statements made and heard. The public prosecutor appeared at each
of these sittings, except that on 17 February 1986, when videotaped television
program was shown to the court.
21. At a sitting held on 25 October 1985, Judge
Petur Gudgeirsson showed the applicant photographs of a and asked him whether
this was the young man at the local hospital, described in the first article
(see 9(8) above). The applicant replied as follows: "... it
is astounding for an experienced adult to hear another experienced adult
ask a question like that. I see study between one and two hundred persons
daily. This would correspond to the entire population of Iceland about
7 years. Therefore an individual whom I see less than 50 times does not
stick in my mind unless there are some special reasons to the contrary.
Therefore it is outright absurd and against the nature of the human mind,
ask a person whether he recognizes an individual whom he might conceivably
have seen seven years ago. I can, however, answer that this is not the
young man I had in mind when I wrote the article 'Let Us Consider Now!'
..."
22. During a sitting held on 28 April
1986 the parties agreed that further investigation by the court was not
required. Accordingly, counsel was given until 3 June 1986 to submit the
applicant's written defense; prosecutor declared that he would make
no further observations.
23. In his defense, which was filed on 3 June 1986,
the applicant resuscitated the claim (see paragraphs above) that the case
should be dismissed or the defendant acquitted on account of the prosecutor's
absence at certain sittings of the trial. With regard to the merits of
the case, he claimed, inter alia, the following: "It is of course the general
public that is assaulted by policemen ... . Such an experience is quite
memorable and, in the normal course of things, one person tells another.
In the process descriptions frequently become exaggerated. As the instances
increase in number a public opinion is formed, which naturally is even
rougher at the edges the problem itself. To a significant extent, I used
this public opinion as a main feature of my article 'Let Us Consider Now!'.
Public opinion is, of course, in itself a fact and its origins are generally
less important and less open to dispute ...
If public opinion turns
sour, confidence in policemen is lost, also in policemen who have never
as much as hurt a fly. In the autumn of 1983 this loss of confidence had
assumed proportions outright dangerous to public welfare. So, when the
case of Skafti Jonsson emerged, I became aware of this danger. And my ...
article published in Morgunbladid on 7 December 1983 was my reaction to
this dangerous situation. By writing the article I consider that I was
performing the duty of an honorable writer who studies the spirit of the
nation and reports his findings without hiding the truth. This is clear
to any person who is willing to read the article in its entirety and puts
his mind to really understanding what is written there. ... But the main
purpose of the article, and its conclusion, was to request the Minister
to have an investigation carried out as to whether public opinion was correct
or incorrect. The article was intended to raise a lawful, urgent
question.
Even though my intention
was to write an article completely within the limits of the law, I shall
not hide the fact I also tried to phrase the text in such a way as to elicit
answers from the parties concerned. The question, of course, was about
the truthfulness of the menacing public opinion. If this was incorrect,
the police authorities (which alone may possess comprehensive knowledge
of these matters) could be expected to react in the composed, confident
and calm manner of respectable, honest souls. The Board of the Police Association
and the Chief of Police would simply have recommended to the Minister that
he initiate at the earliest opportunity an impartial investigation of the
matter asked for. Such a reaction would also have calmed the public considerably,
as it would have borne witness to good faith."
24. On 16 June 1986, at
a sitting attended by the applicant, judgment was delivered by Judge Petur
Gudgeirsson who rejected the claim based on the prosecutor's absence at
certain sittings. As to the merits he stated inter alia: "According to
the evidence submitted, the defendant underwent treatment at the Reykjavik
City Hospital from 19 June to 11 July 1978. At the same time a patient
named Trausti Ellidason ... was staying there, (completely) paralysed following
a physical assault by an acquaintance of his ... . The defendant has been
shown photographs of Trausti Ellidason taken at the City Hospital the day
after the assault. The defendant has stated that Trausti Ellidason is not
the man he describes in his ... article in the Morgunbladid; ...
A video-tape
recording of the television programme 'Varied Opinions', broadcast on 13
December 1983, has been submitted in evidence. ... Matters relating to
law enforcement, the relations between the public and the police, as well
as the 'Skafti case' ... were discussed. At the end of the programme Mr.
Einar Bjarnason, Police Sergeant and Chairman of the Reykjavik Police Association,
pointed out that ... the defendant's article could be shown to be unfounded,
as he had ... a statement from the young man of whom the defendant had
written in the Morgunbladid. The sergeant read out (the statement). (It)
reads, inter alia 'What Thorgeir Thorgeirson says about my case in his
article is wrong from beginning to end.' Having investigated the matter,
(Mr. Bjarnason) and Constable Bjarki Eliasson considered that the statement
had been made by the person about whom the defendant had written.
As requested by the defendant's
counsel ..., (Mr) Einar Bjarnason was called to testify. He said that the
statement had been made by a young disabled man, called Trausti Ellidason,
... that he had obtained information as to the time when the defendant
and Trausti Ellidason were in hospital, and that it had been assumed that
the defendant had been referring to Trausti Ellidason in his article. That
was how they had obtained his statement. Furthermore, the witness stated
that, to his knowledge, no Reykjavik policeman had ever caused anyone injuries
while on duty such as those described by the defendant in his article of
7 December 1983. ... The defence ... submitted that in writing the two
articles the defendant was performing a writer's duty to society by drawing
attention to people's physical injuries that have been caused by the police,
bringing such matters to light and requesting official action to prevent
this. [...] His work fell within the scope of protection offered by Article
72 of the Constitution, which forbids censorship and other limitations
on the freedom of the press.
However the said constitutional
rule goes on to provide that a person may be held responsible for printed
statements, a principle which has never been disputed in Icelandic law.
There are various statutory provisions making it a punishable offence to
express certain thoughts or statements in public, such as in print. [...]
The defendant cannot be deemed to enjoy any privileges or greater freedom
of expression than others owing to the fact that he is a writer.
The defendant's newspaper
articles were published in his name, and he has acknowledged having been
their author. The defendant was resident in Iceland when the articles were
published in the Morgunbladid. Pursuant to Article 15 of the Right of Publications
Act 1956 ... he thus incurs both criminal liability and liability for damages
on account of the contents ... thereof.
The statements founding
the charges in the indictment were said to be directed against unspecified
members of the Reykjavik police force.
Notwithstanding that the
wording of Article 108 of the ... Penal Code covers offences against specific
... civil servants, (this provision) also covers offences against a defined
group of civil servants [...].
The words 'beasts in uniform'
and 'of those wild beasts in uniform' are, in the context in which they
were published,held to amount to vituperation against and insults to unspecified
members of the Reykjavik police force. These statements are punishable
according to Article 108 of the ... Penal Code.
In the indictment these
statements are considered to be defamatory allegations. Having regard to
the third paragraph of Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ...,
the defendant can nevertheless be held responsible for their publication;
his actions have been correctly reported and he cannot be held to have
been prejudiced in the preparation of his defence case.
[the statments founding
the charges in the indictment are then analysed by the judge who concludes
that they constitute insults and vituperation against unspecified members
of the Reykjavik police]. By making these statements the defendant has
become liable to punishment according to Article 108 ... .
[...]
25. The applicant was sentenced
to pay a fine of 10,000 Icelandic crowns to the State Treasury or, in default
of payment within four weeks from service of the judgment, to eight days'
imprisonment. He was also ordered to pay all the costs of the case, including
his counsel's fees.
26. Both the applicant and
the prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court of Iceland, which heard the
case on 22 September 1987. Counsel for the applicant requested that not
only the Criminal Court's judgment but also the entire proceedings, starting
with the issue of the indictment, be annulled and that the case be referred
back to the Criminal Court for adjudication. In the alternative, he sought
his client's acquittal on all charges. The prosecutor asked for aggravation
of the penalty.
27. In its judgment of 20
October 1987, the Supreme Court held inter alia:
"... the request to annul
the proceedings is based on the same arguments as those presented to the
Criminal Court on 24 September 1985, when the defendant's lawyer made the
following statement:
'... no representative of
the prosecution was present at ... any former sittings in this case ...
In view of Articles 20(1) and 36(1)(1) (of the Code of Criminal Procedure),
the defendant considers the fact that one person performed both the role
of judge and prosecutor in the same case to be unlawful. Having regard
to the judge's lack of initiative in rectifying this state of affairs,
(his) replacement ... is required.'
The Criminal Court judge
dismissed this request and the public prosecutor refused to authorise an
appeal therefrom by way of a summary procedure to the Supreme Court ...
. No evidence has been produced during the proceedings in this non- prosecuted
case, so classified in accordance with Article 130 of the aforementioned
code,to justify a disqualification of the judge or quashing the (conviction)
... .
The Criminal Court's finding
of the defendant's guilt and its application of the penal law ... are upheld
as well as the punishment imposed ... . The Criminal Court's decision on
the costs of the case shall remain unaltered."
28. In a dissenting opinion
one member of the Court held as follows:
"In a criminal action in
respect of defamator statements it is necessary to clearly define those
to whom the statements are considered damaging. This is required both for
the defence case and in order to resolve the difficult question of necessary
limitations on discussion of matters of public concern.
The indictment states ...
that the action is brought 'on account of defamatory allegations against
policemen' and ... that the allegations in question are directed 'against
unspecified members of the Reykjavik police force'. The indictment must
thus be understood as relating to an offence directed against policemen
in Reykjavik generally. While agreeing that the statements quoted in the
indictment are harsh and have, as such, not been justified, I consider,
by reference to the above-mentioned way in which the case has been set
out in the indictment, that the conditions for punishment by reason of
a violation of Article 108 ..., which is to be construed in the light of
the fundamental principle of Icelandic constitutional law relating to freedom
of expression in speech and writing, have not been fulfilled.
In view of the above I consider
that the defendant should be acquitted and that all costs of the proceedings
in the [Criminal] Court as well as in the Supreme Court should be paid
by the State Treasury; these are to include the fees of the defendant's
appointed counsel before the Supreme Court."
II. The relevant domestic
law
A. Freedom of expression
and defamation of civil servants
29. Article 72 of the Constitution of
17 June 1944 of the Republic of Iceland reads:"Every person has the right
to express his thoughts in print. However, he may be held responsible for
them in court. Censorship or other limitations on the freedom of the press
may never be imposed."
The responsibility referred
to in this provision is further defined by statute.
30. An author may, according to Article
15 of the Right of Publication Act 1956 (Law no. 57/1956), be held both
criminally and civilly liable for publications made in his own name, if
he is domiciled in Iceland at the time of publication or if he is within
the jurisdiction of the Icelandic courts when an action is brought against
him. If the publication is not made in his name, it is the publisher, editor,
seller, distributor or printer who may incur such liability.
31. A defamatory publication constitutes a
criminal offence under the Penal Code. Article 108 deals specifically with
the defamation of civil servants, in the following terms: "Whoever vituperates
or otherwise insults a civil servant in words or actions or makes defamatory
allegations against or about him when he is discharging his duty, or on
account of the discharge of his duty, shall be fined, detained or imprisoned
for up to three years. An allegation, even if proven, may warrant a fine
if made in an impudent manner."
32. In the applicant's case both the Criminal
Court and a majority of the Supreme Court interpreted Article 108 as including
defamatory statements directed not only against specific civil servants,
but also against a limited group of unspecified civil servants. Precedents
to support this interpretation may be found in two Supreme Court judgments:
... .
B. Criminal procedure
33. Article 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vests
authority to prosecute in the Public Prosecutor, who is assisted by the
Assistant Public Prosecutor as well as several prosecutors and deputies.
He decides how the investigation in criminal cases is to be conducted and
supervises it (Article 21).
34. Under Article 115, the Public Prosecutor may
initiate criminal proceedings by issuing an indictment against the accused.
This must clearly specify, inter alia, the court in which the case is to
be filed, the name of the defendant, the alleged offence and the potential
penalty. The indictment is then transmitted, together with the case-file,
to the appropriate court. The judge to whom the case is assigned notes
on the indictment, which is subsequently served on the defendant, the time
when the case will be formally opened.
35. The case is, according to Article 121, formally
opened at a court sitting during which the Criminal Court makes the indictment
and other documents available to the defendant. If the defendant makes
a clear confession at this stage, the case will be adjudicated there and
then. Otherwise, he must be given the opportunity to adduce evidence and
present a defence, in writing or orally, with the assistance of counsel
if appointed.
36. It is for the Public Prosecutor to determine
whether the case warrants an adversarial procedure as set out in Articles
131 to 136. If so, the prosecution will appear before the Criminal Court
judge. ... .
If the adversarial procedure is not
followed, the conduct of the case is governed by Articles 123 to 129. The
defendant presents his case before the judge in the absence of the prosecution,
unless the Public Prosecutor decides otherwise.
37. When the prosecution does not appear the
judge must, in accordance with the general rule contained in Article 75,
investigate ex officio and independently, all the facts of and issues in
the case, even if the prosecution has already investigated them and prepared
reports thereon. The judge must also consider all factors relevant to the
guilt or innocence of the accused and all mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Once the investigation is completed and the defendant, or his counsel,
has submitted his evidence and written observations, the judge determines
the case on the basis of all the evidence.
38. An appeal against a conviction by the
Criminal Court lies to the Supreme Court. The Public Prosecutor must appear
on an appeal, even if he did not do so before the Criminal Court.
39. The Supreme Court is empowered to review
questions of both fact and law. According to Article 185, it may
annul the entire proceedings or, alternatively, the judgment of the Criminal
Court if it finds that serious errors occurred in the conduct of the case
at first instance. In that event, the case may be referred back, in whole
or in part, to the lower court for fresh proceedings.
40. Under Article 171, a defendant may, with
leave of the Public Prosecutor, file a summary appeal with the Supreme
Court against a refusal by a Criminal Court judge to withdraw. In the absence
of such leave, it is possible for the defendant, in an ordinary appeal
to the Supreme Court, to ask for the Criminal Court proceedings to be annulled
on the ground that the judge should have withdrawn.
41. Article 36 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Law no. 85/1936) which, according to Article 15 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, applies also to criminal cases, provides that a
judge shall withdraw in the following circumstances:
(a) if he is a party or
representative of or related to a party to the litigation;
(b) if he has testified to the facts
of the case or served as a surveyor or appraiser in connection with the
case;
(c) if he has argued the
case or given advice to a party;
(d) if he is hostile to
a party;
(e) if the case is of financial
or moral concern to himself or his relatives;
(f) if there is otherwise
a risk that he will not be able to consider the case impartially.
If a judge is disqualified for any of
the above-mentioned reasons, the Minister of Justice must appoint another
judge to hear the case.
C. Revision of the Code of
Criminal Procedure
42. A revised Code of Criminal Procedure
is expected to enter into force on 1 July 1992. Article 123 of the Bill
provides that if the prosecutor does not appear at a court sitting, the
case must be adjourned.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
43. In his application (no. 13778/88) lodged
with the Commission on 19 November 1987, Mr. Thorgeir Thorgeirson alleged
violations of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3(c) (right to a fair hearing by an
impartial tribunal and right to defend oneself) and Article 10 (right to
freedom of expression) of the Convention as a result of the proceedings
instituted against him and his subsequent conviction.
44. On 14 March 1990 the
Commission declared admissible the complaints concerning:
(a) the absence of the Public
Prosecutor at certain court sittings during the applicant's trial and its
effect on the impartiality of the Reykjavik Criminal Court; and
(b) the interference with
the applicant's freedom of expression.
The remainder of the complaints
were declared inadmissible.
In its report adopted on 11 December
1990 (Article 31), the Commission expressed the opinion that there had
been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 (unanimously) and that there had
been a violation of Article 10 (thirteen to one).
FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT
45. At the hearing on 22 January
1992, the Government invited the Court to hold that, as submitted in their
memorial of 16 September 1991, there had been no violation of the Convention
in the present case.
AS TO THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 PARA. 1
46. Mr. Thorgeir Thorgeirson alleged
that he had not received a hearing by an "impartial tribunal" within the
meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant,
provides:
[text of Article 6 para.
1 of the Convention] The applicant complained that, under the current Icelandic
legislation (see paragraph 36 above), less serious cases, which did not
warrant an adversarial procedure, could be examined in the absence of the
Public Prosecutor. This meant, according to the applicant, that district
court judges were empowered in such cases to take over the prosecutor's
functions. This situation had been criticised by a number of district court
judges and was, moreover, about to be changed: pursuant to Article 123
of the Bill revising the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was expected
to enter into force on 1 July 1992, the case would have to be adjourned
if the prosecutor did not appear.
The applicant contended that in
his own case, in which the Public Prosecutor had been absent from a number
of sittings of the Reykjavik Criminal Court, the result of this legislation
had been that Judge Pctur Gudgeirsson - single member of that court - had
not only conducted the court investigation but had also taken on a role
as a representative of the prosecution. Consequently, the Criminal Court
did not satisfy the requirement of impartiality in Article 6 para. 1 of
the Convention.
47. This
claim was contested by the Government and was not accepted by the Commission.
48. It should be recalled
that the Court's task is not to review the relevant law and practice in
abstracto, but to determine whether the manner in which they were applied
to or affected the applicant gave rise to a violation of Article 6 para.
1 (see, amongst other authorities, the Hauschildt v. Denmark judgment ...).
49. The existence of impartiality
for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 must be determined according to a
subjective test, that is on the basis of the personal conviction of a particular
judge in a given case, and also according to an objective test, that is
ascertaining whether the judge offered guarantees sufficient to exclude
any legitimate doubt in this respect (ibid., ...).
50. As to the subjective test, the personal impartiality of a judge must
be presumed until there is proof to the contrary (ibid., ...); the applicant
has adduced no evidence to suggest that the judge in question was personally
biased.
51. Under the objective
test, it must be determined whether, quite apart from the judge's personal
conduct, there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to his
impartiality. In this respect even appearances may be of a certain importance.
What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society
must inspire in the public and above all, as far as criminal proceedings
are concerned, in the accused. Accordingly, any judge in respect of whom
there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality must withdraw.
This implies that in deciding
whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular
judge impartiality, the standpoint of the accused is important but not
decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear can be held to be objectively
justified (ibid., ...).
52. The Court notes that
in the present case the Reykjavik Criminal Court held twelve sittings between
10 September 1985 and 16 June 1986. The Public Prosecutor was absent from
the following six sittings which were devoted to the matters indicated:
(a) 10 September 1985: at
the request of the applicant (who was also absent), the Court decided to
adjourn the case (see paragraph 16 above);
(b) 17 September 1985:
this sitting was of a preparatory character (see paragraph 16 above);
(c) and (d) 24 and 25 September
1985: the court dealt only with procedural matters, unrelated to the merits
of the case (see paragraphs 17-18 above);
(e) 3 June 1986: the applicant
filed his written defence (see paragraph 23 above);
(f) 16 June 1986: the court
delivered judgment (see paragraph 24 above).
On the other hand, the Public Prosecutor
was, with one exception, present at all the sittings at which evidence
was submitted and witnesses were heard (9 and 25 October 1985, 15 November
1985, 31 January 1986 and 17 February 1986; see paragraphs 20-21 above).
The exception was the sitting of 17 February 1986, which was essentially
devoted to the showing of a video-taped television programme. Both the
applicant and the prosecutor appeared at a further sitting held on 28 April
1986, when they agreed that no further investigation was necessary (see
paragraph 22 above).
53. It can be seen from the foregoing
that, at those sittings at which the Public Prosecutor was absent, the
Reykjavik Criminal Court was not called upon to conduct any investigation
into the merits of the case, let alone to assume any functions which might
have been fulfilled by the prosecutor had he been present. In these circumstances,
the Court does not consider that such fears as the applicant may have had,
on account of the prosecutor's absence, as regards the Reykjavik Court's
lack of impartiality can be held to be justified.
54. Accordingly, there has
been no violation of Article 6 para. 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10
55. Mr. Thorgeir Thorgeirson
claimed that he had been a victim of a violation of Article 10 of the Convention,
which is worded as follows:
[text of Article 10 of the
Convention]
This allegation was accepted
by the Commission but contested by the Government.
56. The Court considers
- and this was not disputed - that the applicant's conviction and sentence
for defamation by the Reykjavik Criminal Court on 16 June 1986, as upheld
by the Supreme Court on 20 October 1987 (see paragraphs 24-25 and 27 above),
constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression. Such
an interference entails a violation of Article 10 unless it was "prescribed
by law", had an aim or aims that is or are legitimate under Article 10
para. 2 and was "necessary in a democratic society" for the aforesaid aim
or aims.
A.
Was the interference "prescribed by law"?
57. The
applicant, referring to the dissenting opinion of a member of the Supreme
Court in his case (see 28 above), submitted that Article 108 of the Penal
Code, as interpreted in the light of the constitutional right to freedom
of expression, could not provide a proper basis for his conviction.
58. However, the Court notes
that the manner in which the Reykjavik Criminal Court and, subsequently,
the majority of the Supreme Court (see paragraphs 24 and 27 above) interpreted
and applied that Article in the present case was not excluded by its wording
(see paragraph 31 above) and was, moreover, supported by precedent (see
paragraph 32 above). Above all, it is primarily for the national authorities,
notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (see, amongst many
other authorities, the Kruslin v. France judgment ...).
Consequently,
the Court agrees with the Government and the Commission that the interference
was "prescribed by law".
B. Did the interference
have a legitimate aim or aims?
59. It was not disputed
that the applicant's conviction and sentence were aimed at protecting the
"reputation ... of others" and thus had an aim that is legitimate under
this provision.
C. Was the interference
"necessary in a democratic society"?
60. In contesting
the view of the applicant and the Commission that the interference complained
of was not "necessary in a democratic society", the Government made submissions
that fall into two groups, one relating to questions of general principle
and the other relating to the specific circumstances of the case.
61. The submissions in the
first group may be summarised as follows.
(a) The Court's Lingens v. Austria...,
Barfod v. Denmark... and Oberschlick v. Austria... showed that the wide
limits of acceptable criticism in political discussion did not apply to
the same extent in the discussion of other matters of public interest.
The issues of public interest raised by the applicant's articles could
not be included in the category of political discussion, which denoted
direct or indirect participation by citizens in the decision-making process
in a democratic society.
(b) The actions of civil
servants should continually be subject to scrutiny and debate and be open
to criticism.
However, since
they had no means of replying, it was not permissible to accuse them, without
legitimate cause, of criminal conduct.
(c) Apart from the differences
referred to under (a), it followed clearly from the three judgments cited
that a person who claimed that his freedom of expression had been unnecessarily
restricted must himself have exercised it in a manner consistent with democratic
principles: he must have been in good faith as to the legitimacy of his
statements and have voiced them in a way that was compatible with democratic
aims; in addition, the statements must have effectively promoted those
aims and been supported by facts.
62. With regard to the specific
circumstances of the case, the Government made the following submissions.
(a) The statements in the
applicant's articles lacked an objective and factual basis. Police brutality
was very uncommon in Iceland; during the past fifteen years, there had
been only two instances of policemen being convicted of physical assault.
The story of the young man at the local hospital mentioned in the first
article (see paragraph 9(8)-(9) above) was completely untrue and had merely
been invented to provide arguments for a campaign against the police. The
applicant had refused to co-operate in clarifying this matter and had adduced
no proof to support his contention. In this connection, the Government
referred to a declaration by a certain Mr. Trausti Ellidason, who had been
at the hospital at the relevant time, and to the proceedings before the
Reykjavik Criminal Court (see paragraphs 21 and 24 above). Although it
was the Skafti Jonsson case (see paragraph 8 above) that had prompted the
applicant to act, his first article had not relied on that case, which
it described as "of little importance". It dealt instead with police brutality
that would never be brought to the public's knowledge and stated that "the
real problem" was "in fact bigger and much more horrifying" (see paragraph
9(4) above). In the second article, the applicant had not discussed individual
cases, but a situation which he said comprised at least several hundred
cases (see paragraph 10(8) above).
(b) The applicant's articles
had not been confined to a criticism of the manner in which the police
performed their duties. The author's principal aim had not been to advocate
new methods of investigating complaints against the police, but to damage
the reputation of the Reykjavik police as a whole, by making specific allegations
of misconduct, including serious crime.
(c) Even if it were accepted
that there was a factual basis for the applicant's statements, he had clearly
overstepped all reasonable limits by using malicious, insulting and vituperative
language and by condemning the police on a slender foundation.
(d) The sanctions imposed, which did not include
confiscation of the articles, had been insignificant and were not likely
to discourage open discussion of matters of public concern.
63. The Court recalls that
freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society; subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable
not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded
as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend,
shock or disturb.
Freedom of expression,
as enshrined in Article 10, is subject to a number of exceptions which,
however, must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restrictions
must be convincingly established (see the Observer and Guardian v. the
United Kingdom ...).
In the present case, the
applicant expressed his views by having them published in a newspaper.
Regard must therefore be had to the pre-eminent role of the press in a
State governed by the rule of law (see the Castells v. Spain ...). Whilst
the press must not overstep the bounds set, inter alia, for "the protection
of the reputation of ... others", it is nevertheless incumbent on it to
impart information and ideas on matters of public interest. Not only does
it have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also
has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable
to play its vital role of "public watchdog" (see the Observer and Guardian
judgment, ...).
64. On the questions of
general principle raised by the Government, the Court observes that there
is no warrant in its case-law for distinguishing, in the manner suggested
by the Government, between political discussion and discussion of other
matters of public concern. Their submission which seeks to restrict the
right to freedom of expression on the basis of the recognition in Article
10 that the exercise thereof "carries with it duties and responsibilities"
fails to appreciate that such exercise can be restricted only on the conditions
provided for in second paragraph of that Article.
65. As regards the specific circumstances
of the case, the Court is unable to accept the Government's argument that
the statements in the applicant's articles lacked an objective and factual
basis.
The first article took as
its starting-point one specific case of ill-treatment - the Skafti Jonsson
case - which gave rise to extensive public debate and led to the conviction
of the policeman responsible. It is undisputed that this incident did actually
occur.
With regard to the other
factual elements contained in the articles, the Court notes that these
consisted essentially of references to "stories" or "rumours" - emanating
from persons other than the applicant - or "public opinion", involving
allegations of police brutality. For instance, it was the room-mates of
the young man at the hospital who had recounted, and the hospital personnel
who had confirmed, that he had been injured by the police paragraph 9(9)
above). As was pointed out by the Commission, it has not been established
that this "story" was altogether untrue and merely invented. Again, according
to the first article, the applicant had found out that most people knew
of various stories of that kind, which were so similar and numerous that
they could hardly be treated as mere lies (see paragraph 9(10) above).
In short, the applicant
was essentially reporting what was being said by others about police brutality.
He was convicted by the Reykjavik Criminal Court of an offence under Article
108 of the Penal Code partly because of failure to justify what it considered
to be his own allegations, namely that unspecified members of the Reykjavik
police had committed a number of acts of serious assault resulting in disablement
of their victims, as well as forgery and other criminal offences (see paragraphs
9(9)-(10), 10(15) and 24 above). In so far as the applicant was required
to establish the truth of his statements, he was, in the Court's opinion,
faced with an unreasonable, if not impossible task.
66. The Court is also not
convinced by the Government's contention that the principal aim of the
applicant's articles was to damage the reputation of the Reykjavik police
as a whole.
In the first place, his criticisms
could not be taken as an attack against all the members, or any specific
member, of the Reykjavik police force. As stated in the first article,
the applicant assumed that "comparatively few individuals (were) responsible"
and that an independent investigation would hopefully show that a small
minority of policemen were responsible (see paragraph 9(19)-(20) above).
Secondly, as the Court has observed in paragraph 65 above, the applicant
was essentially reporting what was being said by others.
These circumstances - combined
with a perusal of the first article - confirm his contention that his principal
purpose was to urge the Minister of Justice to set up an independent and
impartial body to investigate complaints of police brutality. The second
article, which was written in response to certain statements made by a
police officer during a television programme, must be seen as a continuation
of the first article.
67. The articles bore, as
was not in fact disputed, on a matter of serious public concern. It is
true that both articles were framed in particularly strong terms. However,
having regard to their purpose and the impact which they were designed
to have, the Court is of the opinion that the language used cannot be regarded
as excessive.
68. Finally, the Court considers that
the conviction and sentence were capable of discouraging open discussion
of matters of public concern.
69. Having regard to the
foregoing, the Court has come to the conclusion that the reasons advanced
by the Government do not suffice to show that the interference complained
of was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. It was therefore not
"necessary in a democratic society".
70. Accordingly, there was
a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50
71. Mr. Thorgeir Thorgeirson
sought just satisfaction under Article 50 according to which:
[text of Article 50 of the
Convention] A. Work carried out by the applicant
72. The applicant claimed 875,250 Icelandic
crowns for his own work on the case over seven years, which he said had
occupied forty-one days of his spare time per year.
The Court affords "just satisfaction"
only "if necessary". The applicant, who was assisted by counsel both in
Iceland and in Strasbourg, has not established why it is necessary to compensate
him for his own work.
B. Pecuniary damage
73. The applicant sought
2,020,200 Icelandic crowns as compensation for loss of earnings (24,050
crowns per month during the years 1984 to 1991) resulting from his "dissident's
status".
The Government disputed
this claim, while the Commission left the matter to be decided by the Court.
The Court is unable to accept
this claim since it has not been established that there was a sufficient
connection between the alleged loss and the matter held in the present
judgment to be in breach of Article 10.
C. Costs and expenses
74. The applicant
claimed in respect of costs and expenses:
(a) 218,160 Icelandic crowns for the
translation of documents submitted in the Strasbourg proceedings;
(b) 134,392
crowns for computer processing of such documents;
(c) 250,000 crowns for Mr T3mas
Gunnarsson's fees for 100 hours' work (at 2,008 crowns per hour, plus 24.5%
value-added tax) in connection with his representation before the Convention
institutions;
(d) 73,473 crowns
for the fine imposed and legal costs in the domestic proceedings.
75. As to items (a) and
(b), the Government expressed their willingness to pay a suitable amount,
to be by the Court on the basis of particulars supplied by the applicant.
In their view, item (c) was reasonable.
On the other hand, the Government
pointed out that the fine and the domestic legal costs had never been paid
by the applicant. Moreover, they stated that the fine had become unenforceable
by reason of lapse of time and that they were prepared to take appropriate
measures to ensure that the costs would not be collected, should the Court
find a violation.
76. The Court accepts the
claims under headings (a), (b) and (c). Taking account of the Court's case-law
in field as well as the relevant legal aid payments made to the applicant
by the Council of Europe, the Court considers that he is entitled to be
reimbursed, for costs and expenses, the sum of 530,000 Icelandic crowns.
FOR THESE
REASONS, THE COURT
1. Holds unanimously that there has been no violation of Article 6 para.
1 of the Convention; *
2. Holds by eight votes to one that there has been a violation of Article
10;
3. Holds unanimously that Iceland is to pay, within three months, 530,000
(five hundred and thirty thousand) Icelandic crowns to the applicant
for costs and expenses;
4. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered
at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 25 June
1992.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL President Signed: Marc-Andrc EISSEN Registrar
* Please note above: C. 42. "A revised Code of Criminal
Procedure is expected to enter into force on 1 July 1992. Article 123 of
the Bill provides that if the prosecutor does not appear at a court sitting,
the case must be adjourned."
This and other Articles of the old CCP providing unsatisfactory procedural
rules, which I had been complaining about, were all corrected in the mentioned
revision of the CCP, possibly initiated by the Court of Human Rights.
That is a remarkable and, indeed, a happy result.